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Some years ago, when asked by a Hungarian colleague of literary studies about the subject of 
my doctoral dissertation in the making, I told her John C. Calhoun, making her quip: "Such 
an obscure topic." Yet being attracted by the beauty of his system, I felt this a trifling excuse 
for distraction. Furthermore, obscure as he may seem in a contemporary Hungarian context, 
six thousand miles and more than a century from his own world, Calhoun's political theory 
does have relevance reaching beyond national boundaries precisely because it has intricate ties 
with the more general problems of the modern nation state. To a considerable extent, 
Calhoun's concerns were similar to those of Magyars, for instance, who, in the mid-nine-
teenth century, discussed the importance of an independent nation state, trying to break free 
from Hapsburg rule. 
The analogy is, of cotirse, not without problems: Calhoun aimed to preserve independence 
for the South within the Union, while a reform-minded Hungarian nobility allied by a feeble 
bourgeoisie faced the task of achieving independence. Furthermore, Calhoun was painfully 
aware of the pitfalls of majoritarian democracy, a political system that the Revolutionaries of 
1848 were only beginning to dream about. Nonetheless, what connects the cause of the 
Hungarian revolutionaries with that of Calhoun and the slave-holding South is the problem of 
diversity that they both faced. 
In the case of Hungary, which started a modernizing reform movement in the 1830s aimed 
ultimately at abolishing feudal economic and social conditions, the progressive part of the 
Hungarian elite hoped to make an alliance with the peasantry, raising them out of serfdom, 
into nationhood. Thus, the platform of the revolution of 184-8 included the abolition of 
serfdom as well as privileges for the once-feudal elite. Their refusal to grant special ethnic 
rights to ethnic minorities such as Romanians, Croats, Serbs or Slovaks turned these groups 
away from and against the cause of the Magyars, largely contributing to the defeat of the 
revolution. Calhoun, at the same time, was preoccupied with dealing with the divisions within 
the white male elite, hoping to maintain a republican order and status quo. 
Thus, my road from studying the ideology of Hungarian nationalism in the early nineteenth 
century led me relatively easily to South Carolina. Calhoun's relevance became even more 
marked for me with the re-birth of Hungarian independence after the changes of 1989 and the 
eventually successful attempt to establish liberal parliamentary democracy based on major-
itarian rule after forty years of occupation by a foreign power. Thus, my visit to the United 
States as an "international exchange student" in the early 1990s, in the midst of the turbulent 
age of new nation states appearing on the scene came at a topical moment. I hoped to have the 
chance to continue investigating the beauty of Calhoun's system of political thought, fa- 
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miliarizing myself with novel perspectives and receiving new impulses and I was not dis-
appointed. 
I wish to thank all the people who, in one way or another, inspired me to conceive and 
complete this text which developed out of my dissertation. First of all, I owe thanks to David 
W. Noble of the University of Minnesota for familiarizing me with the work of J. G. A. 
Pocock, Sacvan Bercovitch as well as to John R. Howe of the University of Minnesota, who 
directed my attention to Calhoun's republicanism. I am particularly grateful to Bálint Rozsnyai 
for his invaluable comments on my work in progress, his criticism of an earlier version of the 
manuscript, his several important suggestions for improvement as well as for his patience and 
encouragement. 
Several short term grants and study trips helped me struggle my way through: a TEMPUS 
grant at the University of Hull, another offered by the John F. Kennedy-Institut at Freie 
Universitat, Berlin, yet another by USIS at Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo. Since 
I acquired most of the research material via interlibrary loan, Éva Ötvös and the late Zsófia 
Németh of the interlibrary loan division of the one-time József Attila University of Szeged's 
Central Library provided me with indispensable assistance. So did James Carlson, W. Kirk 
Wood, and Randy Hanson who were kind enough to provide me with pertinent materials. 
I also owe debts to Dwight Hoover, Paul Kantor as well as Zsolt Virágos, Ádám Anderle, and 
György Novák for their comments on different versions of my writing. For the same reason 
and much more, I am also grateful to Robert Hughes, a faithful friend and a great southerner. 
I also wish to thank those colleagues who helped me with their comments at conferences 
where I read parts of the work as well as colleagues at the Institute of English and American 
Studies of the University of Szeged, whose work inspired me in more ways than they would 
think. Last but not at all the least, I wish to convey my deepest thanks to Liz Driver, a keen-
eyed outsider to this subject, for reading and scrutinizing the manuscript in its entirety for 
language and style and giving me the benefit of her suggestions and evaluation. Needless to 
say, all the errors and oversights that remain are my own responsibility. 
I wish to express my gratitude to Rhetoric and Public Affairs and its publisher, Michigan State 
University Press for their kind permission to reprint parts of my article "John C. Calhoun's 
Republicanism Revisited" published in Rhetoric and Public Affairs Vol. 4, No. 3 (2001), ap-
pearing in a modified and extended version in Chapter 2 of this book. 
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Sarah Mytton Maury, an Englishwoman visiting the United States in 1846, used the following 
words to provide a vividly dynamic description of John C. Calhoun: 
The champion of Free Trade; a Slaveholder and Cotton Planter; the vindicator 
of State Rights, and yet a firm believer in the indestructibility of the Federal 
Union; now the advocate of war, and now of peace; now claimed as a Whig; 
now revered as a Democrat; now branded as a Traitor; now worshiped as a 
Patriot; now assailed as a Demon; now invoked as a Demi-god; now with-
standing Power, and now the people; now proudly accepting office, now as 
proudly spurning it; now goading the Administration, now resisting it; now 
counselling, now defying the Executive.' 
Being in regular correspondence with Calhoun, even proposing him to President Polk for 
Minister to England,' Maury intended these words to suggest the ambiguous nature of 
Calhoun's political career and to show the diversity of images that his contemporaries held 
about him. By the same token, modern scholarship has suggested Calhoun's ambiguities, 
identifying inconsistencies in his political ideas, sometimes going so far as to designate them 
as incompatible and hence his political thought as incoherent and unstructured. As one of his 
less sympathetic critics, Louis Hartz, has observed, "[DJespite the outward literary appearance 
of `rigor' and `consistency' in Calhoun's work, one is bound to affirm that the man is a 
profoundly disintegrated political theorist." 3 
I intend to argue the contrary in this book. A thorough investigation of Calhoun's political 
thought will result in a different conclusion: instead of blaming him for being inconsistent, I 
suggest he is to be regarded as a pluralistic but integrated thinker, his political rhetoric 
informed by various traditions which he nevertheless managed to integrate into a coherent 
system. Admitting his creativity and versatility as a political thinker, it is thus important to 
emphasize the complexity of his argument. Accordingly, I undertake to show that although 
Calhoun's political philosophy cannot be interpreted as a homogeneous derivation of a single 
tradition, it is to be viewed as an amalgam of diverse traditions or "political languages," often 
modified by Calhoun to match his purposes. Hence I will understand his political thought as 
a complex text constituted by various traditions ranging from liberalism through repub- 
Sarah Mytton Maury, The Statesmen of America in 1846 (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1847), 169. 
2 	Papers of Calhoun, 23:271n. 
3 	Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution 
(New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1955; San Diego, etc.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991), 159. Citations 
are to the Harcourt Brace Jovanovich edition. 
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licanism to the American jeremiad. He was a "polyglot," that is, part of mainstream American 
political traditions, in more ways than has been previously recognized. ¢ 
Scholarly attempts at linking Calhoun with individual traditions abound.' Conservative 
interpretations include Russell Kirk's work, which claims Calhoun's conservatism on the basis 
of his rejection of "progress,' centralization, and abstract humanitarianism," the Lockean 
conception of liberty, or the corporative principle in political representation. Within the same 
paradigm, Clinton Rossiter discusses Calhoun on account of, among other features, his 
emphasis on the community as the basic social unit, his assertion of human inequality or his 
rejection of the majority principle in organizing government. August O. Spain connects 
Calhoun with Aristotle and Edmund Burke as primary influences in his rejection of the natural 
rights theory and its tenets about man, society and government, while Gunnar Heckscher 
considers Calhoun a representative of European conservative thought, rejecting the doctrine 
of natural rights. According to Vernon Louis Parrington, Calhoun reproduced principles of 
the ancient Greek democracy based on inequality with the elite representing the interests of 
those excluded from the political sphere.' 
Other scholars view Calhoun as belonging to a liberal tradition. For instance, Louis Hartz 
claims that despite his explicit rejection of Locke's natural state in an affirmative manner, 
Calhoun, in fact, adopted it with all its consequences in his doctrine of state interposition. 
Darryl Baskin, at the same time, emphasizes Calhoun's vision of atomistic individuals com-
peting to acquire, leaving their community behind following the principles of liberty and 
progress, whereas Peter F. Drucker, arguing for Calhoun's concurrent majority characterizing 
the American system of government, which he understood basically as an arena of competing 
pluralistic interests.' 
Differing from both the conservative and liberal interpretations, Richard Hofstadter and 
Richard N. Current drew a parallel between Karl Marx's class analysis of society and 
Calhoun's understanding of labor relations, specifically in the context of North and South as 
sections with antagonistic interests and with Calhoun's critique of northern capitalism.' 
4 	Scholars have detected the "influence" of various thinkers in Calhoun's political theory, yet such an approach 
fails to do justice to political languages as ideas with persuasive force, clustering into coherent traditions, spanning 
centuries and communities. See Richard N. Current, John C. Calhoun (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963), 
43; and John Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of the Union: A Biography (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State 
University Press,1988), 47-48, 330-331, 333. Calhoun drew upon coherent systems of ideas instead of making 
indiscriminate choices. 
5 	For literature on and by Calhoun in general see the comprehensive bibliography by Clyde N. Wilson, John 
C. Calhoun: A Bibliography (Westport, Conn.: Meckler, 1990). 
6 	Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind from Burke to Santayana (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. , 1953), 132, 146- 
57; Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion (New Work: Knopf, 1964), 120-23; August 
O Spain, The Political Theory ofJohn C. Calhoun (New York: Bookman Associates, 1951), 82-95, 263-64; Gunnar 
Heckscher, "Calhoun's Idea of `Concurrent Majority' and the Constitutional Theory of Hegel," American Political 
Science Review 33 (1939): 585-90; and Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, vol. 2, The Romantic 
Revolution in America, 1800-1860 (1927; repr., New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1954), 65-78, esp. 74. 
Hartz, Liberal Tradition, 145-67; Darryl Baskin, "The Pluralist Vision of John C. Calhoun" Polity 2 (1969): 
49-66; and Peter Drucker, "A Key to American Politics: Calhoun's Pluralism" Review of Politics 10 (1948): 412-26. 
8 	Richard Hofstadter, "John C. Calhoun: The Marx of the Master Class," in The American Political Tradition. And 
the Men Who Made h (1948; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 67-69; and Current, John C. Calhoun, 86-102, 105. 
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More recently, with the emergence of the republican perspective in early American his-
tory, scholars have also turned their attention to a republican Calhoun. William J. Harris 
labels him the "last of the classical republicans," whereas Ford calls him a "post-Madisonian» 
republican, as opposed to a classical one, integrating liberal economic tenets into his creed, 
as well as "last of the Fathers," who aimed to secure virtue in the republic by institutional 
means. Pauline Maier, H. Lee Cheek, Jr. and Irving H. Bartlett also emphasize the continuity 
between Calhoun's and the Founders' political principles. In the same line, W. Kirk Wood 
also points out that Calhoun was an integral part of the American republican tradition through 
his doctrines of states' rights and Nullification.' 
Of the scholars attempting to find more individualistic links in Calhoun, Peter J. 
Steinberger sees him as an advocate of the public interest and thus a descendent of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. Robert A. Garson, in turn, argues that "Calhoun combined elements of 
utilitarianism and laissez-faire consumerism" in his defense of slavery. 10 
There have been a number of efforts to discuss the characteristic features of Calhoun's 
political rhetoric from a formal rhetorical point of view. t t Yet these have failed to integrate 
him into the American traditions, while I contend that his political rhetoric is to be seen as a 
9 	J. William Harris, "Last of the Classical Republicans: An Interpretation of John C. Calhoun," Civil War 
History 30 (1984): 255-67; Lacy K. Ford, "Republican Ideology in a Slave Society: the Political Economy of John 
C. Calhoun," The Journal of Southern History 54 (1988): 405-24; Lacy K. Ford. "Recovering the Republic: Calhoun, 
South Carolina, and the Concurrent Majority." South Carolina Historical Magazine 89 (1988): 146-59; Pauline Maier, 
"The Road not Taken: Nullification, John C. Calhoun, and the Revoltuionary Tradition in South Carolina," South 
Carolina Historical Magazine 82 (1981): 1-99; H. Lee Cheek, Jr., Calhoun and Popular Rule: The Political Theory of the 
Disquisition and Discourse (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 79; Irving H. Bartlett, John C. 
Calhoun: A Biography (New York: Norton, 1993), '78; and W. Kirk Wood, "In Defense of the Republic: John C. 
Calhoun and State Interposition in South Carolina, 1776-1833" Southern Studies, n.s., 10 (2003): 9-48. Although 
Gillis J. Harp admits the coexistence of different political traditions in antebellum America, he fails to undertake 
a comprehensive and thorough exploration of Lockean liberalism and republicanism in Calhoun's thought. Gillis J. 
Harp, "Taylor, Calhoun, and the Decline of a Theory of Political Disharmony," Journal of the History of ideas 46 
(1985): 107-120. 
10 
	Peter J. Steinberger, "Calhoun's Concept of the Public Interest: A Clarification," Polity! 3 (1981): 410-24, 
and Robert A. Garson, "Proslavery as Political Theory: The Examples of John C. Calhoun and George Fitzhugh," 
South Atlantic Quarterly 84 (1985), 211. 
tt 	Bert E. Bradley and Jerry L. Tarver, for instance, have examined Calhoun's pro-slavery rhetoric. See 
Bradley and Tarver, "John C. Calhoun's Rhetorical Method in Defense of Slavery," in Oratory in the Old South, 
1828-1860, ed. Waldo W. Braden (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 169-90. Bradley also 
examined the rhetorical tools employed by Calhoun in refuting his opponents' arguments. Bradley, "Refutative 
Techniques of John C. Calhoun," Southern Speech Communication Journal 37 (1972): 413-23. Steven A. Wartofsky, 
in turn, has argued that there is a paradox in Calhoun's attempt in his speech against the Force Bill in 1833 to 
construct a heterogeneous, diverse Union while at the same time proposing homogeneous state sovereignty. 
Wartofsky, "Critique of the Upright Self: Everett, Webster, Calhoun and the Logic of Oratory," Massach usetts Review 
33 (1992): 419-26. William Lyon Benoit and Alexander Moore characterize Calhoun as a deliberative orator making 
influential speeches. See Benoit and Moore, "John C. Calhoun (1782-1850), spokesperson for the South and the 
Union," in American Orators before 1900: Critical Studies and Sources, ed. Bernard K. Duffy and Halford R. Ryan (New 
York, Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1987), 68-78. Herbert L. Curry, at the same time, while 
exploring the general pattern of his speeches and focusing on the logical devices that Calhoun employed, argues that 
he was a fiasco as a speaker in the Senate in striving to achieve his aims through rhetoric. Herbert L. Curry, "John 
C. Calhoun," in A History and Criticism ofAmerican Public Address, ed. William Norwood Brigance (McGraw-Hill 1943; 
New York: Russell and Russell, 1960), 2:659-61. 
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collection of different political languages, which, at the same time, were rooted in times and 
periods going beyond the Founders backward in time. 
As part of my aim, I will identify and discuss layers of Calhoun's political rhetoric so far 
unexplored. I will demonstrate how he explained and justified his claims and political stance 
through his use of the broader rhetorical patterns. More particularly, my primary objective 
is to unravel the connections between certain aspects of Calhoun's political thought and those 
intellectual traditions. In doing so I investigate the meanings of various concepts in Calhoun's 
texts by focusing on their context, usage and relationship to tradition, how he meant them and 
how he modified their original meanings. 
In order to discuss all this I will draw upon J. G. A. Pocock's theory of political languages. 
A political language is a compound of political ideas and beliefs often rooted in broader 
philosophical, religious and moral premises, usually coalescing around some core structures 
with distinct boundaries. At the same time, political languages function as linguistic entities 
in the sense that they exert rhetorical power within a particular political community. Due to 
their communal aspect, it is essential to view them in a historical perspective, as traditions 
spanning over various historical periods. Finally, political languages are "spoken" and "written" 
by agents who communicate in them in a way that the meanings of the "idioms" that they are 
made of are prone to change, although their core ideas tend to remain stable at the same time. 
In the first two chapters I discuss Calhoun's use of republicanism and Lockean liberalism, 
respectively. They are intended to reconsider the previous analyses of these traditions in his 
political thought and are aimed at modifying them. I will argue that Calhoun made extensive 
use of the republican tradition, employing more components, drawing upon more layers of 
the paradigm than has previously been recognized. Republicanism was a political language 
with its core structure containing the concept of virtue and the public good. Having a long 
tradition in its various forms from ancient Greece and Rome to nineteenth-century USA, it 
structured contemporary political discourse to a great extent. As far as his republicanism is 
concerned, I hope to show that Calhoun articulated several visions of the way virtue was to 
be preserved in the Republic: the people's moral character assumed great significance for him, 
and once he saw it deteriorating, in various epochs of his career he alternatively turned to 
military virtue and to institutional means of securing it. His vision of the South with its own 
virtue contributing to national republican stability was an important element in that. In his 
political economy, Calhoun also expressed concerns and ways to tackle them very much in 
line with the republican tradition: the dynamic relationship between population growth and 
expansion as well as his emphasis on free trade and independence all fit into a republican 
framework, as does his denunciation of financial interests as a source of corruption, done in 
the manner advocated by previous representatives of republican rhetoric. 
Lockean liberalism, with its concern with individual rights, derived from the state of 
nature. It also contained elements that Calhoun, who otherwise rejected its basic premises, 
nevertheless adopted and employed Locke's ideas for his own purposes. The South Carolinian 
was compelled to talk to a contemporary audience steeped in Lockean language, and I argue 
that he appropriated more elements of the English philosopher's system than identified before. 
I first contend that Locke's emphasis on rationality as a criterion of self-government informed 
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his conception of liberty and (in)equality. Calhoun also drew upon Locke's labor theory of 
value in his conception of property and hence in his defense of slavery. His understanding and 
use of self-preservation and the interrelated concept of revolution was also Lockean in nature. 
Complementing the widely-held belief that Calhoun's political theory was a fundamental 
defense of political minority rights, I will finally aim to show that it was also, in part, an 
evocation of Lockean majority rule, but with important distinctions. 
Chapter 3 addresses his application of the American jeremiad and is intended to explore 
a problem hitherto completely ignored in Calhoun's political rhetoric. Originating in Puritan 
times, the American jeremiad functioned as a rhetorical ritual expressing the community's 
fears over declension from the cultural ideals that the people were expected to conform to in 
their lives. In its original form, the American jeremiad involved belief in God's afflictions for 
waywardness manifest in moral corruption; at the same time, it also suggested the assurance 
of ultimate redemption for the individual and- the community. The . American jeremiad as a 
rhetorical strategy -expressing the 'exceptional nature of America's venture in the world 
informed Calhoun's political rhetoric throughout his career. Various political and economic 
issues provided occasions for him to articulate his anxieties about the state of the republic, 
and, at the same time, ensure optimism by proposing different solutions in the times before, 
during and after the Nullification Controversy. Although using the jeremiad to address a 
national audience throughout, by the late 184-0s, Calhoun placed his hope in the South as the 
saving remnant of the mission. 
Republicanism, Lockean liberalism and the American jeremiad were rhetorical traditions 
of major political force in Calhoun's times. Little wonder, then, that he drew upon them in 
an extensive manner. It is somewhat of a puzzle, however, that scholarship has ignored the 
simultaneous existence of a number of elements of these traditions that otherwise Calhoun 
selectively drew upon. Therefore, the discussion of these thematic aspects offers an oppor-
tunity to make up for this gap in Calhoun scholarship. 
The book is organized according to a thematic structure, but within certain themes, the 
chronological principle will also be followed. Several of the chapters are interlocking due to 
the similar idioms that I examine in them, and I will often provide an analysis of different 
excerpts of the same text, which indicates that Calhoun drew upon several traditions even in 
the same text. 
In examining the connection between the abovementioned traditions and Calhoun's 
political ideas, I also address the problem of legitimization insofar as he exploited those 
traditions to generate authority in debates over the diverse political issues of his age. Whether 
Lockean liberalism, classical republicanism, or the American jeremiad, all represented tra-
ditions with persuasive potential for his audience. He was a participant in the political struggle 
over meaning, whether it concerned a contemporary issue or past event. 
An important presupposition of my approach to Calhoun's political rhetoric is that he 
applied these conventions to give meaning to the events he responded to, making sense of 
what was happening, ascribing meaning to events. They enabled him (like others) to speak 
about political experience as well as to understand it, at the same time providing him with 
arguments in political debates. This feature of political languages also accounts for what as one 
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scholar of Calhoun's rhetoric, Herbert L. Curry has argued, namely that "The total effect of 
Calhoun's methods was to produce speeches characterized by dry intellectuality. He seems 
to have been more interested in displaying intellectual processes than in moving men to accept 
his point of view.» 12 Nevertheless, Calhoun's use of political languages was precisely an 
attempt to address an audience and persuade them. 
Calhoun ranks among those orators who, in historian of rhetoric Edwin Blacks's term, can 
be categorized as applying "structural aesthetic" in their rhetoric. Their public utterances are 
primarily aimed at providing their audience with a sense of structure of the external world, 
imposing order on fluid experience. In doing so, they communicate through a "rhetoric of 
power;" "structural aesthetic is an exhibition of conformity with the scruples of the public 
domain." 13 If such were the case, a possible way of studying the Calhounian persuasion would 
be to address the issue of his employment of "structural aesthetic" in conveying a sense of 
order to his audience. 
Finally, I am aware that my assumption about the pluralism of political languages in 
Calhoun's thought may be in sharp contrast to the consensual theses of Hartz and the early 
Pocock, who presumed the exclusivity of the traditions—liberal and republican, respective-
ly—that they identified in American political thought. However, as Calhoun's case will 
demonstrate, the relation of these traditions to one another—even in the same person's 
thought—is more complementary than exclusive. Calhoun's political rhetoric exemplifies the 
compatibility of various elements of different political languages even in the same text. 
Furthermore, republicanism, Lockean liberalism or the American jeremiad appeared in his 
texts with alternating significance, in no regular sequential order. The political languages that 
existed side by side in his political rhetoric, also make testimony to a pluralistic American 
political tradition. He was as "multilingual" as the Founders. 14 
J. G. A. POCOCK'S THEORY OF POLITICAL LANGUAGES 
My understanding of Calhoun's political thought as a complex of political languages is in- 
formed by J. G. A. Pocock's theory and methodology, developed and advocated in his works 
published mainly in the 1970s and 1980s. 1S As one of his commentators argues, for Pocock, 
12 	Curry, "John C. Calhoun," 661. 
13 	Edwin Black, "Aesthetics of Rhetoric, American Style," in Rhetoric and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century 
America, ed. Thomas W. Benson (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 4, 7. 
14 	See Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Sedorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, Kansas: 
The University Press of Kansas, 1985), 235. 
15 	See Pocock;-Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1989); Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 1975); Pocock, "The Machiavellian Moment 
Revisited: A Study in History and Ideology," The Journal of Modern History 53 (1981): 49-72; Pocock, "The concept 
of a language and the métier d'historien: some considerations on practice," in The Languages of Political Theory in Early-
Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge, London, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 19-38; and 
Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cam-
bridge, etc: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 
14 
political languages or discourses behave like "conceptual and metaphorical frameworks" 
operating with a "relatively stable" set of vocabulary items, "conventions, usages, idioms." 
They are not languages in the "ethnic sense" but "sublanguages, idioms, and rhetorics." i6 They 
consist of recurring vocabularies, structures and rules, based on the consensual use of the 
political community. They are distinct "ways of talking about politics, distinguishable language 
games of which each may have its own vocabulary, rules, preconditions and implications, tone 
and style."" 
A further important characteristic feature of political languages is their legitimating 
function: "Each entails a set of linguistic conventions placing constraints on how politics might 
be conceptualized, and on the ways in which its institutions and practices might be legiti-
mated." They also provide the means by "which political argument might be conducted." They 
are organized according to various rules accepted by the participants involved in the political 
discussion.' $ Through them ideas are conveyed; their users communicate, justify, and explain 
political phenomena to others for the purpose of making sense of the nature of reality ex-
perienced by the political community. In this way, political languages can be regarded as 
paradigms; that is, to a large extent, they determine what can be said, what problems can be 
raised, how political events and other phenomena can be interpreted within a particular 
political community. Their paradigmatic force also means that "each will present information 
selectively as relevant to the conduct and character of politics, and it will encourage the def-
inition of political problems and values in certain ways and not in others.» 19 After the analyst 
has identified the political language appropriated by the author, Pocock argues, "he is to show 
how it functioned paradigmatically to prescribe what he [i. e. the author] might say and how 
he might say it."2o 
The paradigmatic feature of political languages creates constraints on the individual 
speaker. The author's freedom to form an utterance is partly restricted by the language(s) that 
he uses. 21 Since the authority of political languages as paradigms rests on consensus and is a 
condition for common political thinking and action, their communicative effectiveness rests 
16 	John E. Toews, "Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Ir- 
reducibility of Experience," The American Historical Review 92 (1987): 891; Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, 7. 
17 	J. G. A. Pocock, "Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the Ideologia Americana," Journal of 
the History of Ideas 48 (1987): 21. 
18 	Melvil Richter, "Reconstructing the History of Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner, and the Geschichdiche 
Grundbegr f e," History and Theory 29 (1990): 55; and Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, 2. 
19 	pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, 2, 8. 
20 	Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time, 25; see also Pocock, "The Machiavellian Moment Revisited," 51. For this, 
he relies on Thomas S. Kuhn's influential scientific paradigm concept, an important component of which is that 
scientific (interpretive) communities develop their own particular methods of raising problems and solutions to them 
or theories that are intended to explain the phenomena under investigation. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 2"" ed., enlarged (1962; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970). For an expla-
nation of Kuhn's understanding of scientific paradigms see, for instance, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Reconstructing 
Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1989), 131-62. For the Kuhnian connection in Pocock's model, see Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in 
the Historical Imagination (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 284-85 and 
329-30. 
21 	See also Pocock "The Machiavellian Moment Revisited," 52. 
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on their consensual nature, namely that they are accepted by the political community in which 
they operate. Consequently, the political individual is able to partake of the authority of a 
political community only by applying its language, and thus his or her "freedom of political 
speech" is largely constrained by the paradigmatic force of the language that he or she is 
speaking. 22 
All this is derived from Pocock's treating language as exercise in power. In the first place, 
for him, communication consists in the individual's borrowing of already existing languages 
that are institutionalized, that is, having been used by other speakers, often for purposes and 
in situations different from his or her own. Those original sources and purposes, however, are 
distanced from the individual speaker's own to such an extent that he or she cannot be aware 
of them. This institutional understanding of language results in control exerted over the 
speaker's use of his or her language, the power of the sources of his or her utterance. In 
Pocock's words: "Each of us speaks with many voices, like a tribal shaman in whom the 
ancestor ghosts are talking at one; when we speak, we are not sure who is talking or what is 
being said, and our acts of power in communication are not wholly our own." 23 
The problem of power, however, also plays a crucial role in Pocock's theory in another 
way. In "two-way" communication (as in the case in political communication), the speech 
situation is basically defined by the equal sharing of power in the community of communi-
cation. Institutionalization results in the ambiguous nature of communication: the individual's 
utterance is subject to usage, response and thus interpretation by another person. Hence the 
power wielded through the individual utterance can be shared by the receiver of commu-
nication: "Language gives me power, but power which I cannot fully control or prevent others 
from sharing," says Pocock. In institutionalized communication, then, speech-acts are per-
formed "in ways defined by others' acceptances of the words you have used," 24  and thus the 
individual speaker does not only wield power in a given speech situation but is also exercised 
power upon. 
Pocock argues that ignoring this nature of power sharing results in the breakdown of"two-
way" communication. Trying to exclude its ambiguity by using power to control the meaning 
of a given utterance in an arbitrary way leaves no room for a chain of "statement, reply, and 
counter-reply." Fixed meanings cannot result in a communicative situation. 25 
Pocock, then, also acknowledges the relative freedom of the individual to modify available 
political languages through his or her capacity to utilize them by restructuring or reinter-
preting them. A given political language may be appropriated by an author in a way that he 
or she, by means of his or her individual utterance, contributes to and even modifies it. "The 
language he employs," Pocock maintains, "is already in use; it has been used and is being used 
22 	Pocock's understanding of the function of political languages is similar to Gordon S. Wood's description 
of the nature of ideas as related to social experience. Wood, "Intellectual History and the Social Sciences," in New 
Directions in American Intellectual History, ed. John Higham and Paul K. Conkin (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
HoFkins University Press, 1979), 35-36. 
3 	Pocock, "Verbalizing a Political Act: Toward a Politics of Speech," in Language and Politics ed. Michael J. 
Shapiro (New York: New York University Press, 1984), 29. 
24 Ibid., 31, 32. 
25 	Ibid., 30, 31. 
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to utter intentions other than his. At this point, an author is himself both the expropriator, 
taking language from others and using it to his purposes, and the innovator, acting upon 
language so as to induce momentary or lasting change in the ways in which it is used." 26  On 
this basis, he also asserts that "the historical agent is sometimes the language or thought-
pattern which the author used, sometimes the author as modifier of the thought pattern." In 
this way, the author's text becomes part of the context of the political language. 27 
The possibility of innovation or change in a given political language results from the fact 
that it can be considered "multivalent," that is, it can be put to various uses by different 
speakers (or the same speaker) and hence its meaning or function may vary according to 
context. Pocock asserts that "[i]t is of the nature of rhetoric and above all of political rhetoric 
... that the same utterance will simultaneously perform a diversity of linguistic functions" and 
"must simultaneously designate and prescribe diverse definitions and distributions of author-
ity."' The synchronic multivalence of a political language is accompanied by a diachronic 
multivalence of individual utterances in time. Moreover, these utterances "may transform one 
another as they interact under the stress of political conversation and dialectic." 29 
One crucial implication of Pocock's theory thus concerns the problem of authorial in-
tention and mis-reading. By acknowledging the potential multivalence of meaning in political 
texts, Pocock also separates authorial intention from the act of their reading. In other words, 
the intended meaning will not necessarily be realized through reader response, which is an- 
27 	Quotation in Pocock, "The Machiavellian Moment Revisited," 51; see also Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time, 
29. Given Pocock's understanding of political language as distinguished from individual utterance, it is not surprising 
that at some point he borrows the distinction that Ferdinand de Saussure made between longue, language as a system 
of rules and parole, language as individual usage. According to Pocock, "the history of political thought becomes a 
history of speech and discourse, of the interactions of longue and parole." Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, 5; 
see also Pocock, "The concept of a language." For a more recent explanation of the work of the founder of structural 
linguistics see Paul J. Thibault, Re-reading Saussure: The dynamics of signs in social life (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1997). Intellectual historian Ralph Lerner argues that "new historians," among whom he includes 
Pocock, individual thinkers "count for little." Ralph Lerner, The Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice in the 
new Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 5. See also Lerrier, "The Constitution of the Thinking 
Revolutionary," in Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II, eds., Beyond Confederation: Origins 
of the Constitution and American National Identity (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 
38-69. Despite critical claims to the contrary, however, in Pocock's system, the individual does have a role and 
power in shaping a political language, even to the extent of innovation. Pocock's theory of political languages also 
emphasizes the role of ideas in deliberation or political communication. For him, they make political interaction (in 
theory as well as in practice) possible. Lerner takes issue with his "new historians," when he charges them with 
ignoring "deliberating individuals" (ibid., 14). On the contrary, as Pocock's example shows, in so far as "deliber-
ation" denotes not simply thinking but also deliberation, i.e., debate, the exchange of views among "thinking" in-
dividuals, Pocock's system does seem to hold. 
28 	Pocock explains this multivalence by reference to political pluralism: "It is part of the plural character of 
political society that its communication networks can never be entirely closed, that language appropriate to one level 
of abstraction can always be heard and responded to upon another, that paradigms migrate from contexts in which 
they have been specialized to discharge certain functions to others in which they are expected to perform dif-
ferently." Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time, 21. 
29 	Ibid., 17, 18, 19. 
26 	Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, 6; see also 20 and Pocock, "Between Gog and Magog," 32-37. 
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other consequence of the multivalence of political texts. 30 The explanation is that the meaning 
of a given utterance is determined by the context of communication. However, to complicate 
the issue, at a given moment, there are a number of contexts available for the speaker, who 
has the task of choosing from those in order to make his or her utterance meaningful for an 
audience that, in turn, has the power to understand it in a way different from the intended 
one, by assigning different contexts to it. Hence the speaker cannot fully control the meaning 
of his or her own utterance. 31 
A political community often has a variety of political languages at its disposal which are 
more or less equal with regard to their command of authority and their utilitarian potential. 
Pocock argues for the polyphony of political languages in a given time period, which therefore 
enjoy equal paradigmatic status. At the same time, they can be in competition with each other, 
the new one being "in intimate interaction" with the old. 32 Pocock also emphasizes that just 
as a given political society can be viewed as possessing a reservoir of political languages, one 
particular text by a given author may exhibit traces of a variety of such languages. 33 
Furthermore, in Pocock's theory and methodology, political languages appear as contexts 
in which the political rhetoric of a given actor can be placed, resulting in recognition of new 
meanings of the terms and idioms he uses. # In other words, his understanding of political 
languages also implies that the same political idiom or utterance can gain a different meaning 
in a different context. 3s Hence, Pocock's theory of political languages suggests that the ana- 
30 	Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, 20. He maintains, "any and all of the speech acts the text has been 
performing can be re-performed by the reader in ways nonidentical with those in which the author intended and 
performed them; they can also become the occasion for the performance of new speech acts by the reader as he 
becomes an author in his turn" (ibid.). See also Pocock, "Verbalizing a Political Act," 32. For a recent consideration 
of reader-response approaches in early American history, see Saul Cornell's The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and 
the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, for the 
Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1999). In view of the Anti-Federalists, he also points 
out the possible discrepancy between intended meanings, expectations of writers and undisciplined readers in the 
public sphere. 
31 	Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock, introduction to Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball 
and J. G. A. Pocock (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1988), 8. 
32 	Pocock, "Between Gog and Magog," 344-345; quotation on 345; see also Toews, "Intellectual History," 
891. On Pocock's claim about the coexistence of various idioms belonging to "all sorts of structurally incompatible 
languages" see also Daniel T. Rodgers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History 79 
(1992): 35. 
33 	Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, 9; see also 16, and cf. Richter, "Reconstructing the History of Political 
Languages," 57, Toews, "Intellectual History," 891, 892, and Rodgers, "Republicanism." Pocock's position that 
different political languages can be used by the same individual in different contexts is reinforced by Jan Lewis' "The 
Problem of Slavery in Southern Political Discourse," in Devising Liberty: Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New 
American Republic, ed. David Thomas Konig (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 273. All that 
can be added here, as Calhoun's example may demonstrate, is that even the same context may facilitate the 
application of different languages by the same individual. 
34 	Pocock, "States, Republics, and Empires: The American Founding in Early Modern Perspective," in Con- 
ceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kan-
sas, 1988), 56-57. 
35 	Interestingly, in a critique of Pocock Joyce Appleby has also pointed this out in her "What Is Still American 
in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson?" William and Mary Quarterly, 314 ser., 39 (1982): 306-307). One 
should add, though, the reverse possibility: different terms may denote the same concept, different linguistic forms 
(i.e. signifiers) denoting the same/similar concepts (i.e. s `gnifieds). 
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lyst's task should be to identify the political languages and their idioms in which a particular 
author wrote and investigate the ways in which they function in relation to the original 
paradigmatic language. Therefore, to identify the meaning of a given piece means "to establish 
the discourse or discourses in which the text was written." 36 
Perhaps the most important overall effect of Pocock's work has been to rhetoricize po-
litical thought and intellectual history. According to him, studying political thought amounts 
to studying political languages, their functioning and interaction in texts. In this way, the 
"`history of ideas' ... gives way to a history of languages, vocabularies, ideologies.n 37 For 
Pocock, political ideas and ideology are deeply rooted in rhetoric and are expressed through 
political languages, which therefore have a double nature: they can be regarded as "conceptual 
languages," that is, linguistic and conceptual, ideological and rhetorical constructs at the same 
time 
The legitimizing power of political languages derives from their being vital to the act of 
producing meaning in political communication. This quality of theirs is rooted in more general 
features of the Western epistemological tradition. According to Christian thinking, particulars 
have no meaning in themselves, and they can become intelligible only through their relation-
ship to the universal, the timeless order of things, by excluding "temporal and secular history." 
Ina similar vein, early modern thinkers attempted to make the particular meaningful, together 
with time, both representing originally less intelligible phenomena than the universal: "the 
knowledge of particulars was circumstantial, accidental, and temporal.» 38 Consequently, in 
Saussurean terms, the parole of the individual speaker can make sense and gain legitimacy and 
power only through its connection with the langue(s) of the community. Concepts and mean-
ings can function only through communication, hence the intimate relationship between the 
ideological-conceptual and linguistic-rhetorical aspects of political languages, the difficulty of 
separating them, and, finally, the interchangeability of terms such as ideology, language, dis-
course, and rhetoric in Pocock's vocabulary. 
Another corollary of Pocock's theory is that the problem of influence often raised in 
intellectual history can be replaced by the concern with identifying the language that a par-
ticular author employed and the purposes that he or she meant to achieve through it, instead 
of seeking evidence of direct textual reference to the source of origins. In this way, emphasis 
can be shifted from the personal source of influence to linking individual usage to a certain 
"linguistic tradition," becoming aware of the presence and workings of a particular language 
in the text of the author "under influence.»39 An important consequence is that one can speak 
a political language without being aware of it, admitting it, even when denying it explicitly. 
36 	Richter, "Reconstructing the History of Political Languages," 5S. 
37 	Pocock, "The Machiavellian Moment Revisited," SO-51; see also Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 105. 
38 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 8, 4. 
39 Applying m the concept of political language facilitates a method of inquiry ywhich avoids the question of origin, , 
instead attempting to establish the nature of the given rhetorical utterance by linking it to a certain "linguistic" tradition. 
A similar attitude to the problem of influence is professed by Steven M. Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, 
Liberalism and the American Revolution, rd ed. (1990; Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), 67, 87. 
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Furthermore, he or she may not necessarily be borrowing from the immediate source of 
origins . 40 
Another feature of Pocock's theory of political languages, as one of his commentators 
points out, is that it largely builds on the problem of time. A basic component of a political 
community's identity is the way it relates itself to time through its political language, which 
also largely defines the nature, possibilities and limits of its "political order" and "political 
activity," its "continuing identity through time.' This understanding of political languages, 
then, emphasizes the ways in which their speakers make sense of their experience, how they 
respond to what is happening to them and give expression to it in their discussion of political 
problems. 
Finally, studying the history of political thought as political languages acknowledges the 
relevance of the historical context: a political utterance is made in response to a historical 
situation or event, and as such it is bound to contain the speaker's understanding of the given 
context that he or she reflects upon. 4z 
Pocock's theory of political languages offers a perspective on the study of Calhoun's po-
litical thought facilitating a better understanding both its diversity and his relationship to the 
traditions that the South Carolinian drew upon. More particularly, the Pocockean approach 
allows the revealing of idioms in Calhoun's political rhetoric that he would otherwise deny 
and/or even was unaware of (cf. his denial of Lockean premises, for instance). Thus, idioms 
of political languages that might remain hidden in Calhoun's political discourse can be brought 
to surface and examined. Also, linking his own utterances to the larger traditions in the 
Pocockean manner raises awareness of the flexibility of those in terms of assigning new 
meanings to already existing signifiers. Furthermore, such a perspective facilitates a move 
beyond the explicit meanings of Calhoun's texts by bringing in meanings generated through 
the interaction of those texts and the traditións, thereby making possible a perception of the 
richness of South Carolinian's political thought. Accordingly, a Pocockean reading is a con-
textualist reading, thereby lifting Calhoun's political utterances out of isolation, rendering 
them meaningful in terms of their relation to tradition. Without the Pocockean approach 
much of Calhoun's thought would be obscured. For instance, relying only on the principle of 
authorial intention would be insufficient to open up Calhoun's texts as completely. 
Pocock's "political linguistics" presented above can, then, be utilized in an analysis of 
Calhoun's political thought, which I consider an "event ... in the history of [political] lan-
guage[s]." Consequently, I will follow the method that Pocock suggests, that is, I will in- 
4o 	Michael O'Brien has observed that although Calhoun relied on several authors in developing his arguments, 
he rarely named the sources of his ideas. Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 1810-1860 
(Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 2:921; see also Guy Story Brown, 
Calhoun's Philosophy of Politics: A Study of A Disquisition on Government (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 
2000), 6, 36 and 322n17). This also underlines the relevance of political language as a concept by which to approach 
Calhoun's texts: it is what languages he "spoke" and how that becomes important and not their author's influence. 
41 	Iain Hampsher-Monk, "Political Languages in Time—The Work of J. G. A. Pocock," British Journal of 
Political Science 14 (1984): 99. 
42 	Pocock, for instance, makes the point clear discussing Machiavelli's response to the return of the Medici 
in 1512, and its articulation in his II Principe. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 156. 
20 
vestigate his relationship to various political rhetorical traditions and "decompose" his 
"writings into the various languages which he used and transmitted, and in whose history he 
played a part, rather than reconstructing the unity which his thought may have conferred upon 
them. 3 As will be seen, the structures and components of these languages were retained after 
their appropriation by Calhoun. Yet, in some instances, he modified them, often putting them 
to different use, exploiting their multivalence. He often did so in the same text, which there-
fore shows traces of different political languages. 
It is important to note that given the focus of this work, the events of the historical period 
of Calhoun's career will be important only to the extent that they evoked responses from 
Calhoun articulated within the framework of political languages. 





THE REPUBLICAN TRADITION 
INTRODUCTION 
Previous analyses of Calhoun's republicanism have had limited scope in either their under-
standing of the republican ideology that he búilt on or in their recognition of the components 
of the republican tradition in his writings. Laying emphasis on how he strove to find the means 
of securing virtue in the republic, these analyses tended to focus on the institutional devices 
that Calhoun proposed in order to mechanize virtue and, on that account, connected him to 
the tradition of the Founders in general.' My major point here, however, will be that 
Calhoun, in fact, drew upon various strains of the republican tradition by making selective use 
of its vocabulary, reappropriating more of its idioms than identified by these scholars. Virtue 
represented a complex matter for him and assumed various forms and dimensions during his 
political career. He offered means other than constitutional devices to deal with corruption; 
at the same time, institutional means for securing virtue assumed various forms for him, 
linking him to several strains of the republican tradition. My aim is, therefore, to show that 
Calhoun's republicanism was by no means a homogeneous construct but rather contained 
See especially David F. Ericson, The Shaping of American Liberalism: The Debates over Ratification, Nullification 
and Slavery (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993); David F. Ericson, "The Nullification 
Crisis, American Republicanism, and the Force Bill Debate," The Journal of Southern History 61 (1995): 249-70; J. 
William Hams, "Last of the Classical Republicans: An Interpretation of John C. Calhoun," Civil War History 30 
(1984): 255-67; Lacy K. Ford, Jr., "Republican Ideology in a Slave Society: The Political Economy of John C. 
Calhoun," The Journal of Southern History 54 (1988): 405-24; Lacy K. Ford, Jr., Origins of Southern Radicalism: The 
South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); Lacy K. Ford, Jr., 
"Recovering the Republic: Calhoun, South Carolina, and the Concurrent Majority," South Carolina Historical Magazine 
89 (1988): 146-59; Lacy K. Ford, Jr., "Inventing the Concurrent Majority: Madison, Calhoun, and the Problem 
of Majoritarianism in American Political Thought," The Journal of Southern History 40 (1994): 19-58. Other dis-
cussions of Calhoun's republicanism include Pauline Maier, "The Road not Taken: Nullification, John C. Calhoun, 
and the Revolutionary Tradition in South Carolina," South Carolina Historical Magazine 82 (1981): 1-19; Gillis J. 
Harp, "Taylor, Calhoun, and the Decline of a Theory of Political Disharmony," Journal of the History of Ideas 46 
(1985): 107-20; Chandra Miller, "'Title Page to a Great Tragic Volume:' The Impact of the Missouri Crisis on Slav-
ery, Race, and Republicanism in the Thought of John C. Calhoun and John Quincy Adams," The Missouri Historical 
Review 94 (2000): 365-88; H. Lee Cheek, Jr. "Recovering Popular Rule: Calhoun, Sectional Conflict, and Modern 
America ,"Journal of Libertarian Studies 10 (Spring 2002): 35-55; H. Lee Cheek, Calhoun and Popular Rule: The Political 
Theory of the Disquisition and Discourse (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2001); K. R. 
Constantine Gutzman, "Paul to Jeremiah: The Disillusionment of John C. Calhoun," Journal of Libertarian Studies 16 
(2002): 3-33; and W. Kirk Wood, "In Defense of the Republic: John C. Calhoun and State Interposition in South 
Carolina, 1776-1833," Southern Studies New Series 10 (2003): 9-48. 
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elements of various strains of the political languages, and that by placing him in a broader 
republican context, new layers of his political rhetoric can be brought to light. 
As we shall see, the republican features of Calhoun's political rhetoric were informed by 
the dichotomy of virtue and corruption in the following issues: the moral character of the 
people in the maintenance of republican political stability; military virtue and its connection 
to political virtue; the mechanization of virtue; the virtue of the South; and, finally, the re-
publican features of his political economy, as related to the problem of virtue. 
As background to my analysis of his republicanism and in order to explore the connections 
between Calhoun's republican rhetoric and the major components of the paradigm, these 
must first be related to the republican interpretation of early US history as it developed into 
an interpretive model in American intellectual history 
REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORY 
OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
The works of Bernard Bailyn, Gordon S. Wood and J. G. A. Pocock have become established 
starting points for analyses of republican ideology in the antebellum United States and have 
been regarded collectively as concise formulations of republicanism.' However, as several 
authors have demonstrated, republicanism is not to be regarded as a unified, homogeneous 
tradition; instead, its diversity of regional, ethnic, class or gender based varieties of its core 
elements is to be recognized and appreciated.' My goal here, however, does not involve the 
2 	Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics (1967; New York: Vintage Books, 1970). Citations refer to 
the Vintage edition.; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967; Cambridge, Mass. and 
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992); Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 
1776-1787 (University of North Carolina Press, 1969; New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1993). 
Citations refer to the W. W. Norton edition.; J. G. A. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and 
the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Pocock, Politics, 
Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History. (New York: Atheneum, 1971; rep. with new preface 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 104-47. Citations refer to the University of Chicago 
Press edition. On the paradigm-generating effect of these works see Robert E. Shalhope, "Republicanism and Early 
American Historiography," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3'd ser., 39 (1982), 334-35; Joyce Appleby, "Repub-
licanism and Ideology," American Quarterly 37 (1985), 464-65; Marc W. Kruman, "The Second American Party 
System and the Transformation of Revolutionary Republicanism,"J ournal of the Early Republic 12 (1992), 510n2; and 
Daniel T. Rodgers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," The Journal of American History 79 (1992), 15-16. 
Although the republican paradigm is usually associated with these three authors, the earliest attempt at a com-
prehensive identification of the major elements of American republican ideology with a focus on the 1790s is John 
R. Howe's "Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790s," American Quarterly 19 (1967): 147-206. 
3 On these, as well as on the emergence and development of the "republican synthesis," see Robert E. 
Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American 
Historiography," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3`d  ser., 29 (1972): 48-80; and Shalhope, "Republicanism," 334-
56. The numerous works elaborating on the development of the variations of republican ideology in the early 
Republic include Robert Kelly's "Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," American Historical Review 
82 (1977), 531-46 (on regional varieties); Sean Wilentz's Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American 
Working Class, 1788-1850 (1984; New and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) (on the urban working class 
version); Linda Kerber's Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (University of North 
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variations of the republican tradition; I will rather attempt to focus on those assumptions of 
republican ideology that served as a legitimate basis for the "dialogue" among its individual 
users. Finally, although it is not my purpose to indicate the diachronic variations of the para-
digm, I will also discuss the historical transformation of some of its elements relevant to my 
analysis. 
The main tenets of republicanism, in their crystallized form, became available for eighteenth-
century American colonists through a corpus of literature produced by eighteenth-century 
British opposition thinkers, who provided them with an ideological framework in which to 
articulate their vision of the British Empire and of themselves.' Eighteenth-century republican 
ideology in the Anglo-American world consisted of values and ideals comprising a set of 
standards by means of which the perceived state of government and society could be assessed. 
One such ideal was that of the mythic "English constitution" (referring to the structure of 
government), which had started to develop in mid-seventeenth-century England, ultimately 
deriving from the ancient Aristotelian-Polybian model. This constitution was revered by most 
subjects of the British Empire for its stability and permanence, which they attributed to its 
mixed nature. Its uniqueness lay in the fact, as its admirers argued, that it included each of the 
three estates or orders existing in English society, namely the King, the Lords and the 
Commons, creating a balance among them by assigning each to its appropriate sphere and 
providing them with means of checking one another. The revered stability and permanence 
of the English government was attributed to its involving all three estates, each contributing 
its own peculiar character or virtue to the common good.' 
The reason that balance needed to be maintained among the three elements of the mixed 
government was, as contemporaries assumed, that power tends to encroach upon liberty, 
ultimately destroying it. Power was imagined by eighteenth-century Englishmen on both sides 
of the Atlantic as an active, dynamic force tending to expand at the expense of liberty, one 
whose course could be curbed only by means of power. Therefore, in their belief, if one social 
estate wielded more power than it was entitled to, it necessarily endangered the liberties of 
the others, and the outcome would be the establishment of a government in which one of the 
three estates ruled, without considering the liberties and interests of the others. Eighteenth-
century British subjects emphasized two of these degenerated forms of government: the 
Carolina Press, 1980; New York and London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1986) Citations refer to the W. W. Norton 
edition. (on the role of women in revolutionary republicanism); or Stephanie McCurry's Masters of Small Worlds: 
Yeoman Households, Gender Relations and the Political Culture of the Antebellum South Carolina Low Country (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and "The Two Faces of Republicanism: Gender and Proslavery Politics in 
Antebellum South Carolina," The Journal of American History 79 (1992): 1245-64 (on white women and slavery in 
South Carolina). 
4 	Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 35-54 and passim; and Wood, Creation of theAmerican Republic, 10-17 and passim. 
5 Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, 53; Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 70 72-73; Wood, Creation of the American 
Republic, 11, 20. The first expression of this view in the Anglo-Saxon political tradition was a document issued by 
Charles I: His Majesty's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament of June 21, 1642. It was meant 
to argue for the mixed nature of the English political system. See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 361-64. 
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tyranny of the one and the anarchy of the many. 6 The ideal English mixed constitution, then, 
was seen as making it possible to counter power with power, preserving liberty for each com-
ponent of government and society. 
Another ideal of republican ideology was related to the notion of public or civic virtue 
rooted in Aristotelian civic humanism. Eighteenth-century republicans shared Aristotle's view 
of man as a social animal (zoon politikon) by nature. They held that the individual self could not 
be fully human unless he' participated in public life. 8 In addition, they also believed that as 
citizen, the individual was expected to subordinate the pursuit of his private interest to the 
promotion of the public good or res publica, the "common weal." Hence the importance of 
public virtue in republican ideology: it expresses the willingness of the individual to make that 
sacrifice. Self-sacrifice was seen as vital to the stability of the republic, the existence of which 
was dependent upon a virtuous citizenry able and willing to pursue the good of the whole. At 
the same time, public virtue was seen as being rooted in the private virtues of the individual: 
benevolence, self-sacrifice, frugality or simplicity were essential qualities of the virtuous cit-
izen. 9 
The notion of political participation also had an aspect that connected it with the ideal of 
mixed government. The ideal republican government was to realize the greatest possible 
number of values (or interests, goods) in a given society; in other words, it was to provide 
universal representation for every interest, 10 utilizing their potentials. The mixed government 
was conceived to be designed for such a purpose. 
The republican emphasis on the need to pursue the public good was intimately linked to 
the problem of time and human society's relationship to it. The republic existed in time and 
represented the particular, a concept that in Renaissance epistemology, was understood as 
limited and inferior to the universal. Hence the major concern of political human beings was 
to "realize the university of values within a particular, and therefore finite and mortal political 
structure.» 11  The only way to attempt the assurance of the survival of the polity was to make 
it universal by ensuring the realization of all values in society. The concern with universal 
representation of values also had implications for the ideal size of the republic. Republics were 
6 Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, 56 ; Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 56-59, 70, 77; Wood, Creation of the A-
merican 	
.l 	 ; 	yn , 	g 	8 
 Republic, 19-20, 21, 23. 	 . 
. 	The use of the masculine third person singular indicates the fact that women were excluded from the 
political community of republican citizens both in the ancient and the modern period. 
8 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, passim, esp. 67-68, 527. 
9 	Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 52, 53-56, 61, 65-70; quoted phrase on 68. In a later attempt 
at clarifying the concept of public virtue that was being formulated in revolutionary America and the early Republic, 
Lance Banning emphasized that it was not regarded as a "conscious and continuing self-abnegation" of particular 
interests. Public good unfolded as-a result of conflicting interests, taking into consideration each taking each other 
into consideration. Once a political decision was made, however, particular interests were to be subordinated to 
public good, expressed through that decision. See Banning, "Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of 
Revolutionary Thinking," in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock (Lawrence, 
Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1988), 199, 198-200. Public virtue, then, meant the willingness and capacity 
of political actors—whether individual or communal—to follow the common good arbitrated in that way. 
0 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 67-68, 402, passim. 
t t 	Ibid., 84, see also 3 and passim. 
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thought to be viable only in relatively small countries with a homogeneous population. 12 Large 
countries implied heterogeneous peoples, with consequent greater difficulty in attaining the 
public good. 
A corollary was that in the case of a people with relatively homogeneous interest—when, 
for instance, the many ruled the republic—the pursuit of private interests of the individuals 
comprising the polity formed a major threat to the republic. Hence appeal was made to the 
common good and the (public) virtue of the people. By contrast, in a more heterogeneous 
republic, institutional means of providing representation for corporate interests was desirable, 
creating equilibrium among them, but more importantly, ensuring that all virtues and values 
in the political domain could make their contributions to the public good. In the latter model 
of civic humanist rhetoric, excluding one corporate interest from government or, conversely, 
assigning too much of a role to it, could result in corruption, hence the significance of mixed 
government in the sustenance of republican virtue. 
In republican vocabulary, virtue could also denote that trait of the individual's character 
that determines his social identity, making him a member of one of the social estates. The 
significance of such a conception of virtue is that each social order of the republic, incorpo-
rated into the citizen body, is expected to contribute its own virtue to the polity. 13 This notion 
explains the appeal of the mixed government ideal associated with the English constitution: 
it enables an estate to contribute its own particular virtue to the common good. This idea was 
the application of the Polybian concept of mixed government to the English monarchy, pre-
senting it as a classical republic in which stability has been lost and disorder has set in once the 
balance among the estates is destroyed. The difference and tension between particular inter-
ests and the common good was transposed to the relationship between estates and the com-
mon good. This is why their presence and balance were seen as indispensable to the stability 
of the constitution. 14 
Pocock argues that an important stage in the development of the republican paradigm can 
be associated with the seventeenth-century English political theorist James Harrington, who, 
in his political work Oceana (1656), made the possession of land a prerequisite for civic virtue 
by assigning the distribution of political authority to that of land. Following Renaissance 
political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli, Harrington also connected civic participation to the 
notion of the citizen soldier, who takes arms in order to defend the republic when need be and 
is ready to give his life to the res publica. In this way, Harrington also created a rationale for 
expansion as a means to provide landed property for an ever-growing population of virtuous 
armed citizens of the many.' 
12 	Ibid., 75; Howe, "Republican Thought," 159; see also Wood, Creation of f the American Republic, 57-58, 356, 
499-500. 
13 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 70-73. 
14 	Pocock, throughout his study of civic humanism, emphasizes the importance of the republican assumption, 
predominant at least until the appearance of modern commerce in the eighteenth century, that one major source 
of corruption was the exclusion of any particular good or virtue from the good of the whole (ibid., 115-16). The 
exclusion of one social estate from government led to the destruction of its virtue, at the same time resulting in the 
corruption of the virtue of the encroaching power and that of the whole republic (ibid., 364-65). 
is Ibid., 383-400. 
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These ideals and values constituting the core of the republican paradigm with its demand 
for public virtue at the same time form the basis of its strong critical potential exploited by 
its practitioners both in Britain and in America. Whenever people using republican language 
voiced their critique of those currently in power, they tended to do so within a framework 
essentially centered around the concept of corruption. Since the preservation of the republican 
order was a complex matter, in the eyes of eighteenth-century Englishmen its vulnerability 
exposed it to a multifaceted threat of havoc. In the first place, given the dangerously, though 
also creatively, dynamic nature of power, it was widely believed to have the tendency to 
tempt and corrupt people, making even the most virtuous man turn into a tyrant. 16 In the 
second place, British opposition writers of the eighteenth century picked up a line of argument 
developed by the "Neo-Harringtonians" of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
in order to claim that they detected signs of corruption of the English mixed constitution. In 
their eyes, the Crown was attempting to destroy its balance in order to establish its tyrannical 
rule over the two other components represented in Parliament. t' 
Suspicious observers of the age read current events as telling signs of corruption pointing 
toward the encroachment of despotic rule: ministerial influence in the House of Commons, 
patronage, the maintenance and expansion of standing armies obeying the Crown and the 
emergence of a "monied interest" living off the state debt all served as evidence that the 
Crown was up to making every politician dependent on itself and was about to concentrate 
all power in its own hands. 18 At the same time, it was not simply the corruption of the gov 
17 	Neo-Harringtonianism took shape from the 1670s onwards and involved the antithesis of the "Court" and 
"Country" parties in the British Parliament. It was the Country mainly consisting of landed property interests that 
launched its attack upon the Crown for its attempt to build a dependent loyal Court party in the House of 
Commons. Later, members of the Country acted as gadflies, harassing Walpolean "Robinocracy" with the rhetoric 
of corruption to be detailed below (see Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 406-408 and passim). In what has probably 
been the most concise attempt at a critique of elements in Pocock's civic humanist model, Michael P. Zuckert takes 
issue with his construction of Neo-Harringtonianism, questioning its connection with Harrington's thought, and 
most importantly, charging Pocock with missing the whole point of British Whig opposition rhetoric, the struggle 
"to secure a limited rather than an absolutist monarchy for England" See Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New 
Republicanism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 178. A similar concern is formulated by Lain 
Hampsher-Monk on the connection: Hampsher-Monk, "Political Languages in Time—The Work of J. G. A. 
Pocock," British Journal of Political Science 14 (1984), 107-108. Nonetheless, even this objective fitted in with the 
republican ideal of avoiding dependence on another man's will in the effort to realize all values in the polity. 
Absolutist rule, the tyranny of the one, was seen as a degenerated form of government in which one value was made 
to stand in for all the others. It is true that Shaftesbury was no Harringtonian; his concern was not about the many 
but the few, yet his concern was related to the same problem: the fear of losing independence, virtue, separate 
identity and function for the few in government . For instance , his denunciation of an army dependent on the King 
was a cry against confusing functions and virtues in balance within government, against the principles of the (mixed) 
Ancient Constitution, with its three distinct estates (Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 413-14). Leaving out one 
component from government meant loss of the balance and thus degeneration into absolute power that Zuckert's 
Whigs were anxious about. 
18 	Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time, 104 17; Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 426-27, and passim; Wood, 
Creation of the American Republic, 33; Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, 49n31; and Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 61. 
Ronald Hamowy argues, using ample textual support, that Cato's Letters, an important link between British and 
American republicanism in the eighteenth century, should be seen as an exercise in the Lockean idiom derived from 
natural rights rather than civic humanism (Hamowy, "Cato's Letters, John Locke, and the Republican Paradigm," 
History of Political Thought 11 (1990), 273-94. Yet, Cato's references to corrupt, "dishonored magistrates," "the 
16 	Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 60. 
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ernment that opposition writers expressed anxiety about. A return to the original, perfect 
state of the constitution was deemed possible provided that the people were virtuous. How-
ever, for critics of the times, the appearance of luxury, avarice, selfishness, extravagance and 
the deterioration of republican values such as frugality, simplicity and industry were signs that 
the people themselves had been contaminated by corruption, that public virtue was in decline, 
and thus there was no means of reforming government in order to return it to its original, 
ideal state . 19 
The basic components of this paradigm were adopted by the American colonists rebelling 
against Britain in the 1770s. 20 In the various measures of the British Parliament aimed at 
extracting additional financial contributions from the colonies, the colonists claimed to have 
Benefit and Safety of the People," or "the Benefit and Security of Society" (quoted in ibid., 281, 282, 283) clearly 
indicate republican concerns: corrupt magistrates qualify as such because they do not serve the public, and due to 
sparse elections, they do not feel dependent on the people, hence failing to represent their people's interest, the 
public good. As Pocock points out, the demand of Neo-Harringtonians (that is, radical Whigs) for frequently elected 
parliaments can be regarded as a means to secure the renewal of virtue in a Harringtonian manner: magistrates are 
sent back to the people, on whom they are supposed to depend, in order to be measured from time to time (Pocock, 
Machiavellian Moment, 407, 519). Cato's emphasis on independence and property as a way to it (see Hamowy, 
"Cato's Letters," 284) is also a republican feature, fitting in with Pocock's paradigm. Hence Cato's preference for 
a relatively equal distribution of property and power. See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 468; see also John 
Ashworth, "The Jeffersonians: Classical Republicans or Liberal Capitalists?" Journal of American Studies 18 (1984), 
430. (This aspect of Pocock's interpretation of Cato seems to be ignored by Hamowy.) 
19 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 34-35. John R. Howe also emphasizes the threat of luxury and 
wealth to virtue in republican rhetoric and remarks how in republican thinking the state of the people's character 
was seen to correspond to the rising or declining stage of the republican cycle (Howe, "Republican Thought," 156, 
162). Daniel T. Rodgers emphasizes the differences between the ways Bailyn, Wood and Pocock conceive of re-
publicanism, arguing that Pocock's "St. Louis" republicanism moved beyond Wood's "Harvard" republicanism, his 
"end of classical politics" (Rodgers, "Republicanism," 18-20). Michael P. Zuckert also draws attention to the dif-
ferences between the republican models developed by Bailyn, Wood and Pocock, and questions the viability of the 
effort to treat them together (Zuckert, New Republicanism, 150-64). He, for instance, distinguishes Wood's focus 
on the common good from Pocock's concern with political participation as the major criterion of the republican 
mindset. In claiming so, however, Zuckert ignores that Pocock manages to incorporate Wood's thesis through the 
concept of virtue: Public good cannot be realized without the participation of each social group in government 
contributing its own virtue. Furthermore, Pocock's extension of the republican paradigm backward and forward 
in time safely includes Bailyn's treatment of mixed government, whose significance in republican thought was fur-
ther elaborated by Wood and Pocock himself by connecting it to the problem of virtue. A similar misunderstanding 
of Pocock's conception of continuity in republicanism can be attributed to Garrett Ward Sheldon, who argues that 
in his II Principe and Discorsi, Machiavelli championed no Aristotelian virtue based on the notion of civic humanism. 
See Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas»efferson (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1991), 164-166. Pocock, however, is explicit that both works represent the issue of virtue based on participation. 
For the new prince as innovator, breaking with legitimate political rule, the major problem is dealing with a body 
of people who no longer possess virtue since they do not participate in ruling themselves. Therefore they are defined 
in relation tofortuna since the political system ceases to represent the university of values and becomes particular, 
hence exposed to contingency. The innovator has to rely on his own viral in confronting fonuna in order to rule such 
a people (Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 156-157). In the Discorsi, the problem is also how to confrontfortuna, Rome 
no longer being capable of relying on its citizens' virtue. Rome also existed in the world of political contingency and 
developed its own viral, based on the armed plebeians, in order to survive, starting expansion in an attempt to 
dominatefortuna (ibid., 198-99). In either case, paradoxically, it was through its absence that the citizens' virtue 
based on vivere civile played a role in Machiavelli's vision: he wanted to explain how viral as a surrogate had to be used 
in the world of particulars and contingency, dominated by fortuna, in the lack of universal values. 
20 	Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, 53-56. On republican virtue in an early American context, see also 
Howe, "Republican Thought," 155-56. 
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detected an emerging pattern of conspiracy designed to destroy their liberties. Consequently, 
they explained their decision to become independent of the mother country as an act to avert 
this danger and also to avoid the corruption plaguing Britain, which threatened to spread 
across the ocean and in turn corrupt the virtues of the colonists. In defying British rule, 
Americans began to regard themselves as a chosen people whose task was to achieve "re-
publican regeneration," to replace the old and corrupt government of Britain by a new and 
perfect system based on the principles of the original mixed constitution, thereby enabling a 
virtuous people to preserve its moral character. 21 
The Federalists' success in transforming the principle of mixed government into that of 
the separation of powers was an act of attuning an old principle to the new situation, one in 
which the government consisted of a single social estate, that is, the people. The new federal 
Constitution marked "the end of classical politics:" in the American Republic, the aim could 
no longer be to harmonize various social orders in a mixed government. At the same time, 
although at first imagined to be homogeneous, American society turned out to consist of in-
dividuals with often conflicting interests, which were deemed possible to keep under control 
within the framework of the Federalists' constitution. 22 
Pocock has argued that this shift, understood by Wood as moving from classical repub-
licanism to modern liberalism, was not accompanied by the abandonment of the virtue-
corruption dichotomy. He shows that the fear of corruption and the preoccupation with virtue 
retained their strong presence in the political vocabularies of the Federalists as well as Anti-
Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans. 23 He points out that in the young Republic, free 
21 	Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 94-136, 139-41; Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 112-13, 118-24. 
At the same time, they emphasized the experimental nature of their undertaking, the fragile nature of the republic 
(Howe,"Republican Thought," 154-55, 164). Isaac Kramnick argues that a shift in British opposition thought from 
republicanism to middle-class liberalism occurred starting in the 1760s, resulting in the development of "bourgeois 
radicalism" opposed to Court and Country alike. See Kramnick, "Republicanism Revisited: The Case of James 
Burgh," in The Republican Synthesis Revisited: Essays in Honor of George Athan Billias, ed. Milton M. Klein, Richard D. 
Brown and John B. Hench (Worcester: American Antiquarian Society, 1992), 22-23. Kramnick's main protagonist 
in this tradition is Protestant dissenter, James Burgh, who widely employed Locke in his texts. Nonetheless, he also 
argued for a more proportionate distribution of power for the manufacturing middle-class interests, a demand which 
was otherwise in accordance with the republican requirement to represent all social interests, balancing them in 
government (ibid., 30-31). In other words, Burgh can be seen to have argued simply for the inclusion of the rising 
middle classes in the British political structure in a republican participatory manner. 
22 	Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 606-7. Relying on Wood, Pocock points out that the crisis of 
virtue leading to the making of the new, federal Constitution was related to the recognition that in America there 
seemed to be no distinct categories of individuals within the people, who would have to consider each other's virtue 
(Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 316). Virtue lay in difference. According to Pocock, "consisted in a particular being's 
regard for the common good, and was contingent upon his association with other particular beings who regarded 
the same good through different eyes ... and without some theory of qualitative and moral differentiation between 
individuals, it was hard to see how the relations between citizens that constituted virtue could be established" (ibid., 
520). Also, according to republican ideology, the promotion of the public good could hardly be imagined without 
participation. Women practicing "Republican Motherhood," for instance, contributed to the common good through 
domesticity and not participation in public life (see Kerber, Women of the Republic), thus representing merely an 
intermediary stage to vivere civile. 
23 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 526-27, S28-33. Gordon S. Wood connects the Federalists assertions about 
disinterestedness as a requirement for the public official and belief in its impossibility with the Anti-Federalists. See 
Wood, "Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution," in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the 
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land (linked to the westward-moving frontier) was seen as the key to the sustenance of public 
virtue, a counterbalance to the corrupting effects of commerce and industry. The ideal of the 
independent yeoman, the American counterpart of James Harrington's propertied warrior, 
sustained by the constant expansion of the frontier, the continuous supply of land, and 
accompanied by the dynamic force of commerce, continued to live on in American public 
discourse. 24 
Further research confirms the survival of republican rhetoric well into the mid-nineteenth 
century, although not without transformation. For instance, the development of the second 
party system resulted in both Whigs and Democrats accepting practices originally denounced 
by republicanism, such as patronage or an active governmental role in the economy, iden-
tifying their own party as the one promoting the public good and emphasizing their role in 
fighting corruption. It was those politicians trying to keep themselves away from parties who 
still clung to the earlier ideal of independent, disinterested statesman. 25 
Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II (Chapel 
Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 83-103. For a republican perspective on the Federalist 
era, see Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800 (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). That the dichotomy of private interest and public good continued to 
inform the way in which American thinkers addressed problems related to political life can be illustrated by Jef-
ferson's famous dialogue of "the Head" and "the Heart," his letter to Maria Cosway in 1786. As the Heart reflects 
on revolutionary times, it warns that the War of Independence could not have been won without sacrificing private 
interest for the common cause (PTJ, 409-410). 
24 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 534-35,539-45. The Harringtonian conception of landed property as a 
prerequisite for political participation, due to its link to independence and virtue, in part, informed the American 
understanding of property in the early Republic. See William B. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness: American Conceptions 
ofPropertyfrom the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1977), 35,40-4-1 
and passim. Works that discuss the further relevance of republican discourse in antebellum America include 
Wilentz, Chants Democratic; Kruman, "Second Party System;" Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology 
of the Republican Party before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Rowland Berthoff, "Indepen-
dence and Attachment, Virtue and Interest: From Republican Citizen to Free Enterpriser, 1787-1837," in Unprooted 
Americans: Essays to Honor Oscar Handlin, ed. Richard Bushman, et al. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1979), 97-124; and Kelly, "Ideology and Political Culture."The relatively equal distribution of property 
as a prerequisite for a republican way of distributing power in the Harringtonian manner in early US republican 
thought has also been pointed out by John R. Howe (Howe, "Republican Thought," 157-58). In an interesting at-
tempt to reconcile liberal with republican interpretation, Jeffrey C. Isaac argues that Harrington's political thought 
exhibited liberal traces, while Adam Smith's political economy was not exempt from republican ones. See Isaac, 
"Republicanism vs. Liberalism? A Reconsideration," History of Political Thought 9 (1988), 349-77. This claim can be 
well taken, but Isaac's conclusion, namely that "liberalism incorporates Aristotelian, republican values" is hardly 
tenable, since Harrington's liberalism is very far from that of Adam Smith and so is the latter's republicanism from 
the former's (cf. ibid., 375). Harrington's world is still not that of the homo economicus and homofaber, like that of 
Smith, but of the unspecialized, political personality. His notion of independence, for instance, implies independence 
from the market—the lack of dependence on any factors and men outside the community of landowners (cf. ibid., 
365). Smith's economic man is, however, not independent in the republican sense, for he is part of an increasingly 
intricate network of mutual dependence in a world of specialization and diversified social personality and function. 
25 	Kruman, "Second Party System," 529-537. 
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Although the republican interpretation came to be modified in response to the challenge 
posed by the renascent argument about the Lockean liberal roots of American political phi-
losophy, mainly with regard to claims of its exclusivity, its major components have remained 
unaltered. 26 Pocock was accused by his critics of suppressing other traditions in his Machia-
vellian Moment and related works. In response to such charges about what might be called his 
"monolingual" bias, he reasserted the pluralism thesis in subsequent works, at the same time 
claiming that his exclusive emphasis on republicanism in Machiavellian Moment, "was a legit-
imate use of historiographical rhetoric.» 27 As a result of the ensuing debate over the relative 
importance of liberalism and republicanism in early American political thought, more and 
more scholars have pointed out the co-existence of idioms belonging to these traditions. 28 
26 	The republican interpretation evoked a strong reaction from scholars who advocated the primacy of 
Lockean liberalism as the basic intellectual tradition in early American history. Among others, for instance, Joyce 
Appleby has consistently argued that both economic and political liberalism, ultimately based on the sanctity of 
natural rights, constituted the ideological foundation of modern America from the Jeffersonian period onward. See 
Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York and London: New 
York University Press, 1984); and her conveniently collected essays in her Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical 
Imagination (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1992), or her recent reiteration and exten-
sion of her thesis in her Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of Americans (Cambridge and London: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2000). For the reassertion of the liberal thesis see also Isaac Kramnick, "Re-
publican Revisionism Revisited," The American Historical Review 87 (1982): 629-65; John Patrick Diggins, The Lost 
Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Diggins, 
"Comrades and Citizens: New Mythologies in American Historiography" The American Historical Review 90 (1985): 
614-38; Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philo-
sophy of Locke (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988); Steven M. Dworetz, The Unvarnished 
Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution (Durham, N.C. and London: Duke University Press, 1994); 
Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 1995); Zuckert, New Republicanism; Zuckert, Natural Rights Republic; and Zuckert, "Founder of the Natural 
Rights Republic," in Thomas Jefferson and the Politics of Nature, ed. Thomas S. Engeman, 11-58 (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2000). 
27 	Pocock, "Between Gog and Magog: The Republican Thesis and the Ideologia Americana ,"Journal of the History 
of Ideas 48 (1987), 345. See also Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly 
in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9, 16; and Pocock, "Cambridge para-
digms and Scotch philosophers: A study of the relations between the civic humanist and the civil jurisprudential 
interpretation of eighteenth-century social thought," in Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping f Political Economy in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, ed. István Hont and Michael Ignatieff (Cambridge, London, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 
235-52. 
28 	See Lance Banning, "Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the new American 
Republic," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3'd ser., 43 (1986), esp. 12; Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The 
Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1985); James T. Kloppen-
berg, "The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse," 
The Journal of American History 74 (1987): 9-33; Michael Lienesch, New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and 
the Making of Modern American Political Though (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); Pangle, Spirit 
of Modern Republicanism; Milton M. Klein, Richard D. Brown and John B. Hench, eds., The Republican Synthesis 
Revisited: Essays in Honor of George Athan Billias (Worcester: American Antiquarian Society, 1992); Richard C. 
Sinopoli, The Foundations of American Citizenship: Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992); Bailyn, Preface to the enlarged edition of Ideological Origins, vi; and Gordon S. 
Wood, afterword in Klein, Brown and Hench, Republican Synthesis Revisited, 145-146; Sheldon, Political Philosophy 
of Jefferson. 
For the argument that diverse political languages such as Lockean liberalism and republicanism could co-exist 
in the same person's thought, see John M. Murrin, "Can Liberals be Patriots? Natural Right, Virtue, and Moral Sense 
in the America of George Mason and Thomas Jefferson," in Natural Rights and Natural Law: The Legacy of George Mason, 
32 
With alternating emphasis on its elements, Calhoun was an active participant in this republican 
discourse. 
To many of his contemporaries, Calhoun embodied the virtuous politician, rising above 
particular party or personal interests. Even John Quincy Adams, one of his major political 
adversaries, shared this view, claiming that "He is above all sectional and factious prejudices 
more than any other statesman of the Union with whom I have ever acted." Calhoun also 
formulated similar views regarding himself. 29 
Such an image of Calhoun was a faithful expression of his own understanding of republican 
virtue. For him, in the words of Guy Story Brown, virtue consisted in "the love of the 
impartial and common good" and "moral perfection" as the major aim of government. 30 Very 
much in the original republican line, then, he understood virtue (and intelligence) as the 
ability and willingness to consider the good of the whole, instead of making the pursuit of 
particular interest a republican ideal. This belief, for instance, fuelled his hope in a successful 
resolution of the Missouri Crisis in 1820: "Our true system is to look to the country;" he 
declared, "and to support such measures and such men, without regard to sections, as are best 
calculated to advance the general interest." 31 
At the same time, he also stressed the need for particular interests to respect one another. 
As he wrote in 1838, the Republic must protect "the interest of all." For Calhoun, corruption 
began when one particular interest began to dominate the whole, thereby creating the 
"factious and despotick [sic] democracy." 32  Furthermore, in his political rhetoric he regarded 
virtue as an important component of the people's character, a prime factor in maintaining 
republican order. 
ed. Robert P. Davidow (Fairfax, Va.: The George Mason University Press, 1986), 35-65. Even such scholars as 
Isaac Kramnick, Joyce Appleby, or Michael P. Zuckert emphasizing the liberal component accept the presence of 
the republican line, too. See Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-
Century England and America (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990); Appleby, "Republicanism in Old 
and New Contexts," in Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 320-39; and Zuckert, Natural Rights Republic. Zuckert, for instance, 
claims that "the founding generation ... saw no line of division between their commitment to republicanism and 
to the natural rights/social contract account of the issues of political philosophy" (Zuckert, Natural Rights Republic, 
208). See also Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), 215. Even Jerome Huyler, who advocates the primacy of the Lockean 
stance in his assessment of Cato's Letters states that it "represented a comprehensive synthesis of republican and 
Lockean thought that would inform the American struggle for political independence" (Huyler, Locke in America, 210; 
see also 227, 228). 
29 	Merril D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun (New York and Oxford: Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, 1987), 86-87; quotation on 87; Papers of Calhoun, 25:668; See also William Freehling, "Spoilsmen and 
Interests in the Thought and Career of John C. Calhoun," The Journal of American History 52 (1965), 25-43. 
30 	Brown, Calhoun's Philosophy of Politics: A Study of A Disquisition on Government. Macon, Ga.: Mercer Uni- 
versity Press, 2000, 212; see also 387n57 on educating virtue. 
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REPUBLICAN VIRTUE AND 
THE CHARACTER OF THE PEOPLE 
The preservation of virtue, a central concern in republican ideology, assumed alternative 
perspectives. On the one hand, the republican genius or character of the people was held to 
be a prerequisite for republican stability; on the other, from time to time, it was claimed that 
political institutions should be constructed in a way to secure public virtue in society, vir-
tually, by "mechanizing" it through institutional means. Emphasis on the two factors alternated 
in republican discourse, often with the implication that if either means of securing virtue 
failed, the other was to be applied in its stead. For instance, in the revolutionary period, when 
republican rhetoric claimed the corruption of the "ancient English constitution,"—an in-
stitutional framework—attention was turned to the character of the people in the North 
American colonies. 33 At the same time, anxieties about the degeneration of the virtuous 
citizenry as the cause of the political unrest in the 1780s were claimed by Federalists to be 
eased by the new federal constitution of 1787. As Wood argues, they "looked to mechanical 
and institutional devices" and argued that only a properly constructed government could 
guarantee political virtue in a society where the people no longer possessed virtue. 34 
With varying degrees of emphasis, both of these arguments about the location and con-
ditions of virtue played a significant part in Calhoun's republican rhetoric, and it was not 
merely constitutional devices that he proposed to rely on in his effort to deal with the problem 
of republican virtue. 35 
33 Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 10-17,28-36,93-107. 
34 	Ibid., 428. 
35 	Drawing on Forrest McDonald's distinction between a New England "puritanical" and South Atlantic 
"agrarian" varieties of American republicanism (McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 70-77), H. Lee Cheek, Jr. 
associates Calhoun with the latter because of his emphasis on "dissent and diffusion of political power" as well as 
"localism in theory and practice" (Cheek, Calhoun and Popular Rule, 5-6). At the same time, he distinguishes him from 
that tradition by contending that Calhoun "challenges the `mechanistic' epistemology usually ascribed to the agrarian 
tradition" (ibid., 10). Nevertheless, according to my reading, Calhoun's republicanism seems to have been informed 
by both traditions, which we can see from the presence of institutional devices in his vision of the ideal republican 
polity, together with the moralistic aspect with his stress on the peoples' character. McDonald himself admits the 
overlaps between the two republican traditions, but demarcates the "puritanical" version from the "agrarian," claim-
ing the latter's abandonment of private virtue as a prerequisite for public virtue and instead advocating institutional 
means to guarantee it (McDonald, Novus Ordo Sedorum, 70; 75). It seems though, that such a regional distinction does 
not do justice to the simultaneous presence of these different senses of virtue in both traditions. In the first place, 
"the structure of political institutions" (ibid., 75) was just as important for New England Federalists, supporting the 
Constitution as an institutional device to ensure public virtue in the Republic as it was for John Taylor of Caroline, 
cited by McDonald. In the second place, his identification of the Southern agrarian "leisure ethic" as opposed to 
frugality and Puritan work ethic (ibid., 74)—attributes of private virtue—may not hold. Slaveholders, as con-
vincingly argued by James Oakes, who explicitly identifies them with the "Protestant work ethic," were believers 
in and practitioners of "upward mobility," "unlimited westward migration." See Oakes, The Ruling Race: A History 
of American Slaveholders (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 127. In a recent reading of the Disquisition, Guy Story 
Brown has denied that "the question of morality or virtue is ... a technical or mechanical question" for Calhoun 
(Brown, Calhoun's Philosophy of Politics, 43). Ironically, at the same time he argues that in his work Calhoun offers 
constitutional government, based on the concurrent majority, to handle the natural course of republican decline 
(ibid., 164, 168-169). Employing constitutional means to ensure stability is, in fact, a mechanical means of securing 
virtue in the republican tradition. 
34 
The assumption that the character of the people forms the bedrock of republican order  
entailed the notion that the decline of the republic was ultimately to do with the degeneration  
of republican morals. According to this logic, when the people turn corrupt, institutions and  
laws dependent on their moral condition cease to function properly. 36 In the young Republic,  
it was in the evolving debate over the federal Constitution that the consensual view on the  
moral character of the people began to change: increasing criticism was aimed against a  
morally decaying citizenry, exposed to the corrupting influences of luxury, materialism and  
power. Whereas, as seen above, the Federalists argued that only a properly constructed  
government could guarantee political virtue in a society where the people have been losing  
their virtue, the Anti-Federalists articulated the necessity of "moral reform and the  
regeneration of men's hearts" as a solution to the problems of the age. 37 
In spite of the shift to the mechanization of virtue advocated by the Federalists, references  
to the virtue and intelligence of the people continued to prevail in American political rhetoric.  
James Madison, for instance, paid tribute to such qualities of the American people in The 
Federalist 49 in deciding cases involving constitutional questions. 38 Moreover, the new federal 
Constitution from the moment of its creation, was viewed by some as being liable to  
degeneration; beliefs in its power to substitute for public virtue did not preclude future  
concerns about the moral character of the people.' It was the Anti-Federalists who continued  
to emphasize the significance of a virtuous electorate in maintaining the republic by pointing  
out their corruptible nature. Their worries about the future decline of the people's virtue also  
expressed their skepticism about the pervasive power of constitutional frameworks as a  
panacea to corruption. It was not only them who put their trust in a virtuous people. 40 
36 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 204-5. 
37 	Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 4-28. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that in the development  
of Federalist rhetoric there was also a moment when, because of the concept of natural aristocracy and the notion  
of recognizing those belonging to it, the argument about the moral character of the people assumed importance (cf.  
ibid., 518). 
38 	James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London:  
Penguin, 1987), 314-. In the Virginia state ratification convention, Madison made the point that a virtuous people  
was indispensable to republican government. They are the only ones to be able to perceive and choose appropriate  
representatives (see Banning, "Second Thoughts on Virtue," 194).  
39 	See Lance Banning, The J~ersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca and London: Cornell  
University Press, 1978), 111.  
4o 	Lienesch, New Order, 152. Such a belief was sustained also by Thomas Jefferson, for instance, who, in his  
Notes on the State of Virginia, in "Query 19", wrote, "It is the manners and spirit of a people which preserve a republic  
m vigor. A degeneracy in these is a canker which soon eats to the heart of its laws and constitution." (PTJ, 217). This  
emphasis on the moral character of the people was kept up in the early national period by the "Old Republicans,"  
a conservative faction within the Republican party. See, for instance, Robert M. Calhoon's discussion of Nathaniel  
Macon and John Randolph in his Evangelicals and Conservatives in the Early South, 1740-1861 (Columbia, S.C.:  
University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 167, 170. Instances of this attitude to the people's character appeared  
even as late as the Nullification era. One of them belongs to Wilson Lumpkin, Governor of Georgia, who, in a  
speech against nullification, called for reliance on "the virtue and intelligence of the people of the United States, to  
sustain her unquestionable constitutional rights." Quoted in Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy,  
States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 110.  
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Interpretations which address Calhoun's links to the republican tradition through his effort 
to mechanize virtue neglect the emphasis which he placed on the moral character of the people 
in his political rhetoric. Nonetheless, although institutional devices prominently feature in his 
republicanism, the moral character of the electorate, "the virtue and intelligence of the peo-
ple," as he repeatedly referred to this notion, also played an important role in his republi-
canism. Throughout his life, Calhoun expressed a consistent concern with a virtuous citizenry, 
regarding them as a key factor in the preservation of political stability and looking upon the 
American electorate as such. 
The clearest formulation of the view that Calhoun's republicanism was centered around 
the mechanization of virtue belongs to J. William Harris, who, similarly to other republican 
interpretations, downplays the importance of the moral argument in Calhoun's political rhet-
oric. He contends that, in contrast to late-eighteenth-century Americans, who "continued to 
be concerned with the importance of virtue in the people, ... [for] Calhoun ... virtue is 
a product of institutional—that is, constitutional—arrangements.n 41 Harris develops his ar-
gument relying mainly on Calhoun's theoretical writings such as his A Disquisition on Govern-
ment, his major work of political theory finished by 1849, 42 and neglects those utterances such 
as speeches in which the latter renders the virtue of the people a prerequisite for the main-
tenance of republican stability. Calhoun's other texts, nonetheless, reveal that he made the 
existence and reform of democratic institutions dependent on the people, whose moral 
character therefore did have a crucial role to play for him. 
It was during the War of 1812 that Calhoun first made repeated calls for national unity, 
and his strategy in Congress consisted of questioning the patriotism of those opposing the war. 
The debate in January 1813 over the new army bill proposing to increase the size of the in-
fantry provided him with an excellent opportunity to present his views. 43 Toward the end of 
his speech on the bill, Calhoun, in republican fashion, denounces the opposition as a faction 
whose particular interest is antithetical to that of the nation. 44 With him, the difference has 
never been greater between private interest and public good, and the harmful tendencies of 
the anti-war faction can be countered only by reliance on the people: "The evil is deeply 
rooted in the constitution of all free governments, and is the principal cause of their weakness 
and destruction. It has but one remedy, the virtue and intelligence of the people—it behooves 
them as they value the blessings of their freedom, not to permit themselves to be drawn into 
the vortex of party rage."45 The implications are obvious: for Calhoun, support for the new 
army bill is in line with the common good. Opposing it would be fatal to the republic; a wise 
and intelligent electorate should therefore support it. 
41 	Harris, "Last of the Classical Republicans," 264-65; see also Lacy K. Ford, "Recovering the Republic: 
Calhoun, South Carolina, and the Concurrent Majority," South Carolina Historical Magazine 89 (1988): 146-59; and 
Ford, "Republican Ideology," 411. 
42 	John Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of the Union: A Biography (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1988), 339. 
43 	Papers of Calhoun, 1:150-61. 
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In the post-war period Calhoun continued to make frequent appeals to the virtue and 
intelligence of the people when arguing his case. His ideal of the virtuous people also de-
termined his image of good government in this period: its decisions were to be morally ap-
propriate and wise in order to be acceptable to an intelligent and virtuous electorate. As he 
declared in 1816, 
The people, I believe, are intelligent and virtuous.... The very existence of 
your government proves their intelligence: for, let me say to this House that, 
if one who knew nothing of this people were made acquainted with its go-
vernment and with the fact that it had sustained itself for thirty years, he would 
know at once that this was a most intelligent and virtuous people. Convince the 
people that measures are necessary and wise, and they will maintain them. 46 
Owing to their high moral and intellectual standing, the people in Calhoun's discourse are 
contrasted to parties which are driven by their selfish interests. As he contends, "The people 
are always ready, unless led astray by ignorance or delusion, to participate in the success of 
the country, or to sympathize in its adversity' 
Calhoun continued expressing his belief in the high moral standing of the people even in 
1825, after the making of the "corrupt bargain" resulting in the elevation of John Quincy 
Adams to the presidency. As he declared in a speech at Abbeville, South Carolina, "From the 
commencement of my public course to this day, I have under all circumstances been directed 
by one great leading principle, an entire confidence in the virtue and intelligence of the 
American people."48 
The significance of Calhoun's emphasis on the moral and intellectual capacities of the 
electorate lies partly in the republican assumption that only a people possessing such qualities 
are capable of perceiving and electing competent magistrates. 49 It also lies partly in the fact 
46 	Ibid., 1:328-29. 
4' 	Ibid., 1:160. 
48 	Ibid. , 10:21; see also Calhoun's letter to Andrew Jackson dated June 4, 1826, ibid. , 10:110. This questions 
the thesis that, after the "corrupt bargain" between Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams which raised the latter into 
power, Calhoun saw the South as the only place in the Union where virtue had survived: in this regard, he kept 
referring to the people of the United States in general, making no sectional distinction (cf. Gutzman, "Paul to 
Jeremiah," esp. 3, 18-19). 
49 	In republican thinking, the many are supposed to recognize the talented few, or the natural leaders in the 
republic. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 133, 394-95, 515. For the survival of this notion in American political 
rhetoric see also Thomas Jefferson's oft-cited letter to John Adams (October 28, 1813): "I think the best remedy, 
[to the political machinations of the pseudo-aristocracy in the American Republic] is exactly that provided by all our 
constitutions, to leave the citizens the free election and separation of the aristoi from the pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat 
from the chaff. In general they will elect the really good and wise." See Jefferson, Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson 
(New York: The Library of America, 1984), 1306; see also ibid. 1309-10. Calhoun's continual praises for the 
"virtue and intelligence of the people" when addressing national political issues also informed, covertly though, his 
views on state politics when opposing its further democratization. He argued that in rural South Carolina the 
electorate could have no proper knowledge of political candidates and would stand a good chance of making the 
wrong choice. Therefore, for instance, the election of presidential electors could not be entrusted to the popular 
electorate. See Lacy K. Ford, Origins, 287. In such a case, the people could not be virtuous and intelligent enough 
to choose the most suitable representatives having hardly any knowledge about them. 
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that in republican thought, elections serve to renew political virtue. As Pocock argues, 
Machiavelli's concept of ridurre ai principii, restoring republican order, informing Harrington' s 
idea of the rotation of office, was viewed as a means to secure the constant renewal of virtue 
in the republic, achieved through elections. so 
William W. Freehling maintains that in late 1827 Calhoun privately expressed his doubt 
about the "wisdom and intelligence" of the peoples' This assertion is in accordance with 
previous republican interpretations of Calhoun's political thought, suggesting that it was 
during the Nullification Controversy that he formulated his state veto doctrine as an in-
stitutional substitute for the lost virtue of the people. Even so, textual evidence bears out the 
presence of the moral argument in his rhetoric in this period, when South Carolina's nullifiers 
conducted their campaign against the federal tariff laws of 1828 and 1832. 
In his "Fort Hill Address,'s ' published on July 26, 1831, in the Pendleton, S.C. Messenger, 
to make known his sentiments supporting the states' rights doctrine, Calhoun makes it clear 
that he regards state veto as a legitimate means of resisting and containing federal power; yet, 
he does not advocate its immediate application because of his faith in the people. He argues 
that "artificial" means of securing liberty and restraining power can be dispensed with only 
when the people maintain a state of high morals and intelligence, which implies that "every 
class and every section of the community are capable of estimating the effects of every meas-
ure, not only as it may affect itself, but every other class and section." 53 
In this case Calhoun applies the republican tenet that social groups are to wield power 
respecting the interests of one another, subordinating their own interest to the public good, 
and that under such conditions a harmony of interests can be achieved without having to rely 
on institutional arrangements. In other words, he implies that institutional devices for pre-
serving public virtue are unnecessary when the people are virtuous and therefore able to 
respect the interests of others. 
However, he continues, this ideal is no longer met in the American Republic: "I fear ex-
perience has already proved that we are far removed from such a state, and that we must 
consequently rely on the old and clumsy, but approved mode of checking power in order to 
prevent or correct abuses.» 54 Calhoun, then, offers a state veto, or "state interposition," as he 
preferred to call it, as a means of achieving this aim. Nevertheless, with a somewhat sudden 
turn, he proposes to postpone the application of state interposition, saying, "[Nut I do trust 
that though far from perfect, we are at least so much so as to be capable of remedying the 
present disorder in the ordinary way," relying on "enlightened public opinion.» 55 What 
Calhoun suggests here is that through the reduction of tariff duties, it is still possible to restore 
republican normalcy without having to apply the mechanical device of state interposition. In 
SO 	Cf. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 205, 394, 519. 
s' 	William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (Harper 
& Row, 1965; New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 155. Citations refer to the Oxford 
University Press edition. 
52 	Papers of Calhoun, 11:413-39. 






other words, he contends that the people, although having declined from the original perfect 
state of their character, are still virtuous and intelligent enough to be relied on to avoid the 
application of state veto. 56 
Calhoun also employed the moral argument in the wake of President Jackson's willingness 
to enforce the tariff law in South Carolina, expressed in the President's special message to 
Congress on January 16, 1833. His speech on the Force Bill, evoked by Jackson's message, 
delivered on February 15-16, 1833 57 is not a simple reiteration of the nullification doctrine, 
but rather a diagnosis of the corruption of the republican order, characterized by "the growth 
of faction, corruption, anarchy," due to "a departure from the fundamental principles of the 
Constitution." At the same time, Calhoun also assures his audience that "the morals and virtue 
of the community at large have been advancing in improvement.i 58 For him, therefore, the 
Nullification Crisis and the decline of the republican order have affected the government but 
not the morality of the people. 
In the post-Nullification era, Calhoun preserved his trust in the firm moral standing of the 
American people and made an appeal to it whenever he perceived signs of the degeneration 
of republican institutions. For instance, in a speech delivered on April 9, 1834, denouncing 
in retrospect the Force Bill of the Nullification Crisis and demanding its repeal, 59 he diagnoses 
corruption and decay, which he attributes to the concentration of power in the the executive 
branch of the federal government having taken place since the passing of the bill. An alter-
native explanation could be, he says, the people's "want of sufficient intelligence and virtue 
for self-government," but then, he immediately adds, if that were truly the case, the republic 
would be in an irredeemably disastrous situation: "If such be the fact, that our people are 
indeed incapable of self-government, I know of no people upon earth, with whom we might 
56 	Lacy K. Ford maintains that Calhoun "like most republicans of the Jeffersonian persuasion had great faith 
in the good judgment of the people" (Ford, Origins, 135n96). Referring to a letter of Calhoun to Duff Green in 
1828, Ford presents such an understanding of the people's character in Calhoun's rhetoric with regard to the 
Nullification Controversy. He suggests that Calhoun attributed the South Carolinians' endorsement of nullification 
to their sound moral condition. Nonetheless, Ford fails to prove that Calhoun's optimism concerning the moral state 
of the people, who "will find a remedy for" the tariff law of 1828 (ibid.) was a reference to their willingness to nullify 
it. Instead, it seems more reasonable to argue that since he was still hopeful of achieving a change of administration 
as a result of the upcoming election at the end of 1828, what Calhoun meant was that the people would elect the 
Democrats into power, who would, then, repeal the tariff law. With their prospective victory in mind he still 
believed that South Carolina would not have to apply state veto as a "remedy." See Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, 
157; Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 1782-1828 (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, 1944), 374-, 379. Hence Ford's implication about Calhoun's trust in an electorate which is virtuous 
because of endorsing nullification is not tenable. Instead, it seems more reasonable to argue that Calhoun held the 
people to be virtuous and intelligent because, in his eyes, they were capable of changing the course of political events 
by making the correct choice—that is, voting Democrat—in the upcoming election. Bearing in mind the possibility 
of appeal to a sympathetic audience, he really hoped to avoid arguing that the electorate no longer possessed the 
intelligence and virtue and hence was in need of institutional means to substitute for public virtue. Moreover, the 
upcoming election of 1832 promised a chance to reduce tariff duties. Calhoun tended to emphasize the virtuous 
character of the American citizenry, mostly with their electoral capacity in his mind, that is, their power to replace 
magistrates. 
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58 	Ibid., 12:86. 
59 	Ibid. , 12:277-98. 
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not desire to change condition. When the day comes, when this people shall be compelled to 
surrender self-government ... it will be indeed a day of revolution, of convulsion and blood, 
such as has rarely, if ever, been witnessed in any age or country."60 
Later in the speech, trying to dispel worries about the sound character of the people, he 
concludes that Andrew Jackson's reelection as president in 1832 had hardly anything to do 
with the corruption of a wise electorate and explains that the president "retained his power 
among an intelligent and patriotic people," and that his success was a result of the "working 
of the system."61 
From the mid-1830s on, Calhoun did, in fact, voice anxieties about the state of the 
character of the people. One possible source of such corruption for him was executive 
patronage or the spoils system, President Jackson's policy of providing his followers with 
government offices. As he argued in 1836, that practice would even be a cause of the cor-
ruption of the character of the people, applying the republican tenet that once the people of 
the republic have become corrupt, their virtue cannot be restored: "Piracy, robbery, and 
violence, of any description, may, as history proves, be followed by virtue, patriotism, and 
national greatness; but where is the example to be found, of a degenerate, corrupt, and sub-
servient people, who have ever recovered their virtue and patriotism? Their doom has ever 
been the lowest state of wretchedness and misery; scorned, trodden down, and obliterated 
forever from the list of nations." 62 
Calhoun's understanding of the people's character and its liability to change can be ex-
plained by the important distinction between man's "first nature," referring to man's essence 
in the abstract, and his second nature, expressing man's identity or the "genius" of a people 
acquired through social custom. 63 Republican self-government requires a high level of virtue 
and intelligence, which was a result of development and civilization and also prone to de-
generation. In republican terms, then, Calhoun also suggested that the second nature of the 
people had the tendency to undergo some transformation with the concomitant change of the 
loss of self-government. Diminishing virtue and intelligence were bound to result in the end 
of republican government due to change in the second nature of the people unless some other 
means was found to secure it. 
With the rise of the abolitionist movement and the growing sectional divisions, Calhoun 
made diminishing reference to a wise and virtuous electorate, hoping for their votes in defense 
of Southern interests. Yet, from time to time, he did voice his belief in a virtuous and in-
telligent people as a prerequisite to changes necessary to evoke in the political system and 
return the republic to the right track. In 1840, for instance, he refused to put down the 
current vices of the system to the departure from the original principles to "the want of 
sufficient patriotism and intelligence in the people for self government.» 64 
60 	Ibid., 12:285. 
61 	Ibid., 12:287. 
62 	Ibid., 13:229. 
63 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 25, 85. 
64 	Papers of Calhoun, 15:281-82. 
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Moreover, even when employing different terms for the virtue and intelligence of the 
people, he repeatedly expressed his hope in an electorate capable of making judicious decisions 
for the public good. In 1844, for instance, when arguing against electing Henry Clay as Pres-
ident because of Clay's opposition of the admission of Texas, Calhoun pointed out that Clay's 
unwillingness would allow the expansion of Britain on the American continent. "I trust," he 
claimed, "the good sense and patriotism of the American people, by defeating Mr. Clay & 
electing Mr. Polk will avert the danger & disasters to which the madness of faction has 
exposed both countries [i.e. Britain and the ÜSA]."65 
By the end of his life, Calhoun felt the sectional division was becoming far too deep to 
permit him to talk about a wise electorate prepared to use its voting power to make a virtuous -
decision, harmless to the South. With the reformulation of political parties on a sectional 
basis, in his view elections could no longer serve to guarantee the renewal of republican 
virtue. 66 His attention became increasingly focused on constitutional measures, institutional 
means of mechanizing virtue in the American republic. Calhoun's concept of the government 
of the concurrent majority, fully developed in his Disquisition, was intended to be such a 
constitutional device. Nevertheless, even there, the moral character of the people is still a 
concern for him: the importance of the government of the concurrent majority, in part, lies 
in the fact that it has the capacity not only to substitute for the lost virtue of a corrupt people 
as an institutional device but also to restore it. Arguing for the beneficial effect of the govern-
ment of the concurrent majority, Calhoun claims in the Disquisition, "So powerful, indeed, is 
the operation of the concurrent majority ... that, if it were possible for a corrupt and 
degenerate community to establish and maintain a well-organized government of the kind, it 
would of itself purify and regenerate them.»67 
In identifying the people as sufficiently virtuous and intelligent, Calhoun fused two lines 
of early modern republican rhetorical strains: one emphasizing the virtue of the many, the 
other the prudence of the few as represented by Renaissance Florentine political theorist 
Francesco Guicciardini. Machiavelli's preference for the popular element in government was 
coupled with his constructing the people as virtuous—mainly due to their military virtue (cf. 
popolo armata). In contrast to the democratic element, Guicciardini, champion of the Flor-
entine elite, gave primacy to the aristocratic element, which employed its wisdom or pru-
dence in order to meet the challenges offortuna. 68 In other words, through Calhoun's idiom, 
the people or many also came to manifest a virtue of the aristocracy. 
During most of his career, then, the moral character of the people, a guarantee for po-
litical virtue and hence republican stability, was a permanent preoccupation for Calhoun, and 
65 	Ibid., 19:632. 
66 	In June 1848, he did not refer to the people of the United States as one virtuous and intelligent body but 
rather placed his hope in "the patriotic and intelligent in every quarter" (ibid., 25:533). 
67 	Disquisition, 39 (emphasis added). Harris himself quotes this passage without being aware of Calhoun's 
emphasis on the idea of transformation instead of substitution, that the doctrine was meant to restore the virtue of the 
citizenry instead of substituting for it (see Harris, "Last of the Classical Republicans," 265). Guy Story Brown also 
points out such a regenerative impact of the government of the concurrent majority (Brown, Calhoun's Philosophy 
of Politics, 214; see also Cheek, Calhoun and Popular Rule, 58, 158). 
68 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 238, 252. 
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in view of this, he can be rightly considered an heir to the Machiavellian-Harringtonian 
tradition. Even with his proposed shift to institutional devices through his advocacy of the 
concurrent majority, he did not mean to substitute for the people's virtue but to regenerate 
it. 69 Calhoun's insistence on the people's virtue testifies to his consistent appeal to a na-
tionwide audience and to his attempts to be part of a national discourse outside any peculiar 
kind of regionalism. 
In addition to turning to institutional devices when perceiving moral decadence in the 
people, in his early national period, Calhoun evoked military virtue as a means of preventing 
the deterioration of public virtue, of preserving the virtue and patriotism of the people. 
MILITARY VIRTUE IN CALHOUN'S REPUBLICANISM 
An important line of argument in Pocock's construction of republicanism pertains to the 
concept of the citizen soldier, an ideal involving the fusion of military and political virtue. 
Pocock has shown that, with a varying degree of emphasis, this ideal functioned as an im-
portant component of civic humanist thought. From Leonardo Bruni and Niccolo Machiavelli 
of Renaissance Florence through Harrington and eighteenth-century British opposition po-
liticians, it was held that for its defense, the ideal republic was to rely on its own citizens, who 
alternated their involvement in fighting with participation in political life. 70 The antithesis of 
the citizen soldier was embodied by the mercenary or paid soldier, possessing no such virtue. 
This model also emphasized the role of the citizen army in sustaining republican order: in 
addition to being a soldier, the citizen of the republic practices his active virtue by being part 
of the republic that he fights for. He is virtuous because in defending his own liberty he also 
defends the liberty of the whole, thereby serving the common good. Machiavelli had no 
reverence for the peaceful stability of Venice achieved at the expense of its people having lost 
their virtue and liberty. The citizens' duty to bear arms in defense of themselves and the 
republic had been taken over by mercenaries, that is, full-time paid soldiers whose interest 
69 	Calhoun's continual references to a virtuous and intelligent people do not seem to bear out the generalizing 
contention that he "displayed a strong skepticism about the virtue of a majority of the citizenry." See Manisha Sinha, 
The Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina (Chapel Hill and London: The Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 2000), 26. The obvious reason for Calhoun not to discard the Anti-Federalist 
reverence for a virtuous electorate and fully to embrace the Federalist alternative of mechanizing virtue possibly had 
to do with the unfavorable reception of both South Carolina's state veto in 1832 and his concept of the concurrent 
majority. This might also account for the fact that although from Nullification onward the mechanization of virtue 
did appear in his vision, the Roman ideal of the virtuous people did not vanish from his republicanism. Calhoun's 
support for the broadening of the boundaries of political citizenship in South Carolina in the form of the extension 
of the suffrage to propertyless white adult males in 1810, indicating his advocacy of democratization also bears out 
his emphasis on a virtuous people. See Papers of Calhoun, 16:499-500; and also Lacy K. Ford, "Republics and De-
mocracy: The Parameters of Politcal Citizenship in Antebellum South Carolina," in The Meaning of South Carolina 
History: Essays in Honor of George C. Rogers, Jr., ed. David R. Chesnutt and Clyde N. Wilson (Columbia, S.C.: Uni-
versity of South Carolina Press, 1991), 125-26, 128. (Calhoun, wrongly, associated the extension of suffrage with 
the Compromise of 1808.) 
70 	See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, esp. 89-90; 124-25; 199-201; 385-86 and 410. 
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was not necessarily identical with that of the republic, and hence could be employed to 
destroy republican liberty for material gains." 
Once the people decided to give up their arms and thus their capacity and duty to defend 
their republic and their liberties—whether in Machiavelli's Rome or in Harrington's "Gothic" 
England, prior to the coming of the Tudors 72—they lost their military virtú and excluded 
themselves from political decision-making. Their military duty was taken over by the profes-
sional regular army. Pocock points out that British Neo-Harringtonians were preoccupied 
with the problem of standing armies paid and sustained by the state, which they contrasted to 
the virtuous militia and interpreted as a sign of corruption. Of early-eighteenth-century Neo-
Harringtonians it was Andrew Fletcher who provided the most systematic articulation of 
anxiety over the emergence of standing armies. He connected their appearance with pro-
fessional specialization in the early modern period. For him, the end of the Gothic age equaled 
the end of the citizen warrior leading a simple and frugal life. The modern age brought about 
the accumulation of knowledge, luxury, and refinement characteristic of the Renaissance man, 
the hero of the new era, who, at the same time, started to hire others to have his own liberty 
defended. 73 
By the same token, concern about standing armies became a constant idiom in the vo-
cabulary of American colonists at the time of the Revolution. 74 Moreover, early-nineteenth-
century Americans also drew upon the opposing concepts of the militia and standing armies 
when they strove to account for Andrew Jackson's victory over the British "standing army" 
at New Orleans in January 1815. In Pocock's reading, according to the explanation of pa-
triotic Americans, the mythical Kentucky riflemen were able to win the battle because they 
represented the virtuous citizen army consisting of independent yeoman farmers, successful 
in their effort to defend their liberty against a corrupt British standing army. The former, as 
the myth went, aided by some "natural and popular energy," overwhelmed the "training, 
experience, and intellect" embodied by the British. 75 
The issue of the citizen army first became relevant for Calhoun during the War of 1812. 
Similarly to the previously mentioned proponents of military virtue, he linked the main- 
71 	Ibid., 197-201. 
72 	Ibid., 211-12; 388. 
73 	Ibid., 411, 430-31. A similar analysis of the effects of refinement and culture on specialization and 
transformation of the military organization was given by Adam Ferguson (ibid., 499-500). For a positive assessment 
of the rise of the professional army in Britain as an expression of growing specialization and complexity of society 
as well as an answer to the military challenges of the modern world, see Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: 
The Army and the Militia in American Society to the War of 1812  (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1982), 25-32. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 434. 
74 	Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 61-63, 112-14. 
75 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 536. John William Ward, whose analysis Pocock draws upon on this point, 
has demonstrated the gap between fact and fiction concerning the event. According to his analysis, Andrew Jackson's 
success at New Orleans had very little to do with the marksmanship of the Kentucky riflemen. Instead, several other 
factors, such as cannon fire and other units of U.S. troops, made a greater contribution to the American victory. 
See John William Ward, Andrew Jackson—Symbol for an Age (1953; New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 
13-29, esp. 21, 26. Citations are to the Oxford University Press edition. 
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tenance of civic virtue with the holding of arms and saw the citizen army as a means to sustain 
or, if necessary, revive virtue and patriotism in the Republic. 
Persisting naval and commercial hostilities between the United States and Britain at the 
beginning of the second decade of the nineteenth century prepared the ground for open 
military confrontation. The American attitude gradually came to be controlled by the War 
Hawks, young representatives from the western regions of the country who, in defense of 
their country's honor and trading interests, advocated massive military development in 
preparation for an impending collision. They labored hard to achieve the transformation of 
a peacetime army and navy into a more efficient defense force through a series of resolutions 
which they introduced in late 1811. These included swelling the ranks of the regular army 
from the existing 2,765 to 10,000 troops, raising an additional force of 25,000, authorizing 
the use of militia, and reinforcing the navy by building new frigates and arming commercial 
ships. 76 
Responding to the most active antiwar advocate, John Randolph of Virginia, who objected 
to the resolution to increase the size of the regular army, Calhoun took the floor on December 
12, 1811, with the aim of dispelling doubts about the expediency of the proposed measure.' 
As he argues in the speech, a regular army of the citizens of the republic poses no danger to 
liberty; on the contrary, such an army, in fact, tends to contribute to its security. In his 
argumentation he draws upon the Machiavellian tradition of fusing military and civic virtue 
praising the ideal of the citizen soldier in the USA: "The ardent patriotism of our young men, 
and the reasonable bounty in land, which is proposed to be given, will impel them to join their 
country's standard and to fight her battles; they will not forget the citizen in the soldier, and in 
obeying their officer, learn to contemn their Constitution.'78 
Employing republican language, too, Calhoun then counters Randolph's charges about 
attempts to establish a standing army in America by pointing out that the additional troops to 
be raised would have their roots in the citizen body. His praise for the regular army of the 
citizens echoes the Federalists' earlier defense of the regular army of the Republic: since it 
draws its members from the people, it cannot be an equivalent of European standing armies 
designed to "keep the people in slavery.»79 Furthermore, it proves to be more efficient since, 
as Calhoun describes the proposed citizen army, "their untaught bravery is sufficient to crush 
all foreign and internal attempts on their country's liberties." so 
Despite the successful performance that the general public associated with the milita, 
mainly as a result of the US victory at New Orleans, the War of 1815 testified to its low 
efficiency in the US war effort. Lack of organization, low morale, poor discipline and failure 
76 	See Wiltse, Calhoun: Nationalist, 55-62. 
77 	Papers of Calhoun, 1:75-8S . 
78 	Ibid., 1:81; emphasis added. 
79 	Words quoted in Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 355; See also Madison, Hamilton and Jay, Federalist Papers, 
113-18. 
80 	Papers of Calhoun, 1:81. Although arguing for a shift toward a professional army, Calhoun was, indeed, using 
republican rhetoric derived from the militia ideal, to argue his case. Cf. Michael O'Brien, Conjectures of Order: 
Intellectual Life and the American South, 1810-1860, vol. 2. (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Ca-
rolina Press, 2004), 927. 
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of the federal government to coordinate uniformly characterized the militia before, during and 
after the War of 1812. Attempts to improve efficiency and organization, however, were 
aborted, and militias could not become the basis of a centralized national army mainly for fear 
of the federal government's employing them against the people's liberty. 81 At the same time, 
growing understanding of the deficiency of the militia system as a defense force contributed 
to its erosion as a military ideal after the War of 1812 and resulted in increasing support for 
the professionalization of the army. 82 
Although Calhoun saw military virtue as a factor in the cultivation of the general re-
publican virtue of the people, which he regarded as ultimate, he was aware of these problems 
and had a leading role to play in the actual as well as conceptual shift from a citizens' army of 
wartime to a regular (standing) army of citizens. He was instrumental in the process of com-
bining the standing army principle with the militia: a regular citizen army at the time of peace, 
seemed to possess the military virtue connected with the citizen. 
The War of 1812, besides highlighting problems with US military organization, also re-
sulted in a surge of nationalism, the effects of which could be felt well after the peace treaty 
of Ghent. The proliferating voices in Congress demanding an intensive development of do-
mestic industry and the military included that of Calhoun. As a member of the House of 
Representatives and Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, he contributed a 
speech in support of maintaining the direct tax, a measure introduced during the war, again 
in response to John Randolph's attack. 83 A substantial part of the speech, which he delivered 
on January 31, 1816, was devoted to the problem of military virtue, as a basic component of 
the people's patriotism. 
Calhoun's major claim in the speech consists in the argument that national defense is to 
be developed in preparation for another potential military confrontation with Britain. One of 
the first measures to be taken in this regard, he maintains, should be to reinforce the navy, 
since, in the first place, doing so would not require such a grave financial sacrifice on the part 
of the nation, and, in the second, the navy would be the safest part of the military to 
develop. $¢ 
In arguing this second point, Calhoun employs Neo-Harringtonian language, more spe-
cifically, argumentation developed by advocates of Britain's naval expansion in the late 
seventeenth century. One of these advocates, Charles Davenant, for instance, emphasized that 
the importance of the navy lay not only in destroying the trade of rival nations such as France 
or Spain, but also in the idea that seamen cannot pose as great a threat to the liberty of Britain 
as a standing landed army can. Hence, of all the branches of the army, Davenant considered 
81 	C. Edward Skeen, Citizens Soldiers in the War of 1812 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 2-3, 
7-8, 38, chapter 3. Leonard D. White argues that the bulk of the problem in creating efficient militias was rooted 
in the fact that powers over them were divided between federal and state governments, thereby frustrating any effort 
at uniform and efficient action. See White, The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801-1829 (The Mac-
millan Company, 1951; New York: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan, 1965), 529, 535. Citations are 
to the Free Press—Collier-Macmillan edition; see also Skeen, Citizen Soldiers, 5. 
82 	Skeen, Citizen Soldiers, 178, 184-. 
83 	Papers of Calhoun, 1:316-330. 
84 	Ibid., 1:323-324. 
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the navy the least likely to be used against the liberty of the republic. 8S Calhoun argues in a 
similar fashion: "We have heard much of the danger of standing armies to our liberties—the 
objection cannot be made to the navy. Generals, it must be acknowledged, have often ad-
vanced at the head of armies to imperial rank and power; but in what instance had an admiral 
usurped the liberties of his country? Put our strength in the navy for foreign defence, [sic] and 
we shall certainly escape the whole catalogue of possible ills." 86 
The next measure that Calhoun proposes in the speech is the extension of the time of 
militia service for American citizens to allow them enough time for training, thus increasing 
their efficiency as soldiers. 87 He argues for the maintenance of a permanent landed army of the 
citizens, regularly drafted in defense of the Republic, and contrasts this way of organizing a 
national army to the recruitment of soldiers solely for the time of war. A permanent citizen 
army, he points out, would help preserve the spirit of patriotism and military, as well as civic 
virtue. Opting for the militia alternative, by contrast, would have fatal consequences for the 
security of the country: 
Thus compounded our army, in a great degree, lose that enthusiasm which 
citizen-soldiers, conscious of liberty, and fighting in defence of their country, 
have ever been animated. 
All the free nations of antiquity entrusted the defence [sic] of the country, 
not to the dregs of society, but to the body of its citizens; hence that heroism 
which modern times may admire but cannot equal. 88 
The exercise of military virtue is a prerequisite for the preservation of liberty in a Republic. 
For Calhoun, therefore, the unwillingness of the citizen to participate in regular military ser-
vice is a sign of the decline of military virtue and hence the beginning of the general corruption 
of public virtue. The ultimate cause of that decline is the appearance of luxury, the pursuit of 
particular interests and the consequent decline of patriotism. Such a decline of virtue, on the 
other hand, necessitates measures ultimately fatal to the liberty of the citizens. As Calhoun 
warns, "Large standing and mercenary armies then become necessary; and those who are not 
willing to render the military service essential to the defence of their rights, soon find, as they 
ought to do, a master."89 
Such a line of argument by Calhoun resounded with the major tenet of republican writers 
such as the above-mentioned Fletcher, namely that with the growth of material wealth, 
refinement and specialization the citizen becomes increasingly reluctant to take arms and 
practice his military virtue. He begins to hire others to defend his liberty and thus loses his 
independence. At the same time, Calhoun also seems to follow the Neo-Harringtonian re- 
Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 4-42. 
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publican argument when claiming that military training for the citizens can promote the  
cultivation of civic virtue as well and thus forms the basis of their patriotism. 90 
By emphasizing the virtuous nature of a peacetime regular army consisting of citizen  
soldiers, Calhoun also attempted to dissipate republican fears attached to the image of a  
corrupt government coercing citizens to serve in the army. From 1818 onwards, however,  
he abandoned his plan to establish and maintain a peacetime militia, due to the nation's re-
luctance to finance a military of wartime size. Hence the regular army he advocated designing  
would mainly consist of officers but ready to be expanded when war came. By the 1820s,  
then, Calhoun had moved away from the idea of a virtuous peacetime militia in order to  
embrace and advocate a small-sized, professional army.9 1 He was ready to point out in 1820,  
for instance, that "Not all the zeal, courage and patriotism of our militia, unsupported by  
regularly trained and disciplined troops, can avert [dangers to the Republic in peace time]."  
His concern was no longer with virtue but with officers' and soldiers' pay, rationing, and  
creating a standing army of professional soldiers. 92 
In this way, Calhoun played a decisive role in generating a conceptual change in the  
language of the republican citizen army by establishing an intermediary stage in the shift to a  
regular professional army in the United States. 93 At the same time, in a wise and gradual  
manner, he steered the shift from the wartime militia to a permanent standing army as a  
desirable ideal. In 1818, for instance, he still praised the militia for its role in national defense,  
yet belittled the danger that a regular army might pose to republican liberty. As he argued,  
"our ultimate reliance for defense, ought to be on the militia. Its most zealous advocate must,  
however, acknowledge, that a standing army, to a limitted [sic] extent, is necessary." Fur-
thermore, since the standing army of the United States was not concentrated in one small area  
but was spread out, he assured, there was no such danger. 94 
The concept of military virtue, then, formed an important component of Calhoun's re-
publican vocabulary during his nationalist period. He, in Machiavellian fashion, linked it with  
civic virtue and saw it as a condition for the maintenance of liberty in the Republic. At the  
same time, he also built on the national tradition and employed Federalist rhetoric when he  
strove to dissipate fears over developing a regular army of the Republic for the time of peace.  
90 	See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 432. 
91 	Cress, Citizens in Arms, 173, 174-75, 176. 
92 	December 12, 1820, in Papers of Calhoun, 5:482; ibid., 3:374-86; and ibid., 5:480-90. C. Edward Skeen  
demonstrates how political strife within the Republican party served as a background to the debate over the re-
duction of the size of the army in 1818-21, in which Calhoun argued for reducing the number of privates instead  
of the officer corps, thereby allowing Crawfordites to accuse his plan, in the republican manner, of supporting the  
standing army principle. They intended to employ the issue to discredit Calhoun as a viable political rival in the next  
election. C. Edward Skeen, "Calhoun, Crawford, and the Politics of Retrenchment," South Carolina Historical Mag-
azine 73 (1972), 141-55. 
93 	As Secretary of War (1817-1825), Calhoun played a decisive and positive role in reorganizing the army,  
doing a great service to national defense, as widely acknowledged by his contemporaries. See White, TheJ~erson-
ians, 246-50. 
94 	Papers of Calhoun, 3:347. Moreover, as late as 1841, with regard to the settlement of public lands, he was  
still ready to use the language of the citizen soldier, when he argued for relying on the military capacities of "small  
freeholders, ... the class that would furnish the hardiest and best soldiers" (ibid., 15:435).  
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Since this army was to consist of citizen soldiers, it was not to be seen as the equivalent of 
corrupt, state-employed standing armies of earlier times. Calhoun's preoccupation with the 
defense of the republic, however, also became manifest through his efforts to find other means 
of securing virtue, including various ways of mechanizing it. 
CALHOUN AND THE MECHANIZATION OF VIRTUE 
In spite of his persistent references to a virtuous people as the bedrock of republican order, 
Calhoun was familiar with and utilized important registers of the institutionalization of virtue 
in his rhetoric, more than pointed out by existing scholarship. He saw the need for the 
mechanization of virtue in modern society as a consequence of progress and civilization, 
resulting in an increase in the number of interests, which were to be managed by govern-
mental means. 95 
Scholars analyzing Calhoun's concern with republican virtue and his attempt to mechanize 
it have largely focused on his doctrine of state veto of federal acts and his concept of the 
government of the concurrent majority. 96 Based on the principle of strict constructionism 
limiting the powers of the federal government to those explicitly granted by the federal 
Constitution, Calhoun's doctrine of state veto, formulated at the time of the Nullification 
Crisis of 1828-1833, vindicated the right of individual states, by virtue of their sovereignty, 
to judge the constitutionality of federal acts. According to this principle, a single state has the 
power to nullify a federal act, that is, to declare it null and void within its domain on account 
of its being against the constitution. 
At the core of Calhoun's theory of the government of the concurrent majority is the 
principle that the major interests of society are to have veto power over each other's political 
decisions, which, consequently, are made on a consensual basis, excluding legislation harmful 
to their interests. In this way, minority rights could be protected on the level of national 
politics, since instead of the rule of the numerical majority, the minority was to be provided 
with an equal share of power in political decision-making. Calhoun offered these doctrines as 
a means of mechanizing virtue and in elaborating on them, he appropriated strains of the 
republican paradigm. This element has been missed by existing scholarship. 
Since the fullest explication of the mechanization of virtue by Calhoun can be found in his 
Disquisition, I now turn to this text. In his analysis of the Disquisition, J. William Harris argues 
that Calhoun's republicanism originated in Renaissance Italian republicanism as interpreted 
by Pocock. 97 Harris's contention, nevertheless, needs to be qualified as to his understanding 
of the republican tradition; his interpretation of the Disquisition misses several crucial points 
with regard to Calhoun's ideas about the mechanization of virtue through the concurrent 
majority. 
95 	Disquisition, 15-16, 30-31. 
96 	See Harris, "Last of the Classical Republicans;" Harp, "Taylor, Calhoun, and Decline;" Ford, "Republican 
Ideology;" Ford, "Recovering the Republic;" and Ford, "Inventing the Concurrent Majority." 
97 	Harris, "Last of the Classical Republicans." 
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Drawing upon Pocock, Harris associates Calhoun's republicanism with notions and ideals 
constituting the "myth of Venice," which enjoyed widespread popularity in Renaissance Italy. 98 
In doing so, however, Harris ignores a crucial distinction that Pocock makes between two 
strains of contemporary political thought. One of them is the Machiavellian tradition, placing 
emphasis on active virtú as the key to the survival of the republic, with the ancient Roman 
republic and the "new prince" as its ideal repositories. The other strain concerned itself with 
passive virtue or prudence, a trait attributed to the few (the ottimati, that is, aristocrats in 
Renaissance Florence), characteristic of the model championed by such contemporary 
Florentine thinkers as Guicciardini. It was the advocates of the latter variety of republicanism 
that turned to the myth of Venice, finding the perfect embodiment of republican government 
in the Venetian mixed constitution, where stability was seen as the result of an institutional 
arrangement ultimately based on the virtue of the local aristocracy. 99 
Inasmuch as he considers Calhoun's concept of the concurrent majority a mid-nineteenth-
century American attempt at the mechanization of political virtue in the Venetian fashion, 
Harris's reading of Pocock and the Florentine tradition leaves Calhoun's appropriation of the 
original republican language in the Disquisition unexplained. Significantly, Calhoun makes no 
reference, explicit or implicit, to the government of Renaissance Venice as a precursory 
model of his concurrent majority or as the ideal way of ensuring political virtue by con-
stitutional means. Instead, for him, it is the republic of ancient Rome that serves as the ex-
emplary government of the concurrent majority. 100 
Considering his choice of a political ideal, then, Calhoun is closer to Machiavelli than to 
Guicciardini, the latter preferring the Venice of political stability to the active Rome of 
permanent conflict and expansion. 101  Moreover, in a vein similar to Machiavelli, Calhoun also 
links the birth of the ideal Roman system with the establishment of the tribunate. For him, the 
plebeians used their veto power in order to bring the political power of the patricians under 
control, thereby putting the principle of concurrent majority into practice. 102 Thus, Rome 
becomes a model for Calhoun for the same reason that Guicciardini or other Florentine 
ottimati regarded Venice as their ideal: because of its stability based on mechanized virtue. 
Nevertheless, the causes of that stability are different in each case. While Florentines saw 
the roots of stability in the one, the few, and the many as being represented in the Venetian 
government, for Calhoun, the stability of the Roman mixed constitution is based on the 
balance of the few and the many, the two politically significant social groups of the ancient 
republic. It was through lifting the few into government by means of the tribunate that the 
Roman system got reinforced. According to Calhoun, "The [Roman] government was, indeed, 
powerfully constituted; and, apparently, well proportioned both in its positive and negative 
98 	Ibid., 265-66. According to the myth of Venice, the government of the Venetian city state was exception- 
ally stable due to its mixed nature based on the participatory principle: it incorporated each element of society—the 
one, the few and the many, creating a perfect balance among them (see Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 102). 
99 See ibid., chaps. 7-8; and above. 
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organs. It was truly an iron government. Without the tribunate, it proved to be one of the 
most oppressive and cruel that ever existed; but with it, one of the strongest and best.» 103  
Calhoun, then, in his praise for the Roman tribunate as an antecedent of his concurrent 
majority, places emphasis on the role of the popular element, that is, the plebeians, who 
insured the stability of the constitution of the ancient Republic. This suggestion is, none-
theless, in contrast to Guicciardini's and other Renaissance Florentine ottimati's desire to 
attribute the success and stability of the Venetian mixed government to the virtues of the 
participating aristocracy. 104 At the same time, Calhoun's republican ideal differs from Mach-
iavelli's, too, because, although the latter regards the plebeians, that is, the many as the key 
to Rome's success, he does this on grounds different from the ones presented in the Dis-
quisition: Machiavelli does not emphasize the role of the plebeians in achieving social harmony 
in the Roman republic; instead, he highlights the ongoing conflict between the few and the 
many, attributing the longevity of the Roman system to external expansion in which the 
military virtú of the armed plebeians had a crucial part to play. '05 
In the Disquisition, Calhoun also draws upon another strain of republicanism to persuade 
his readers of the viability of his concept of the concurrent majority as a means of mechanizing 
virtue: he finds the British mixed constitution, supposedly based on that concept, a living 
model of perfect government. 106 Similar to the proponents of the English mixed constitution, 
Calhoun assigns a prominent role to the Lords in keeping the balance of the system: it 
functions as a filter between the King and the Commons in Parliament. For him, the Lords 
is essential to the balance existing between the "tax-consuming interest"—the monarch—and 
the "taxpaying interest"—the people because they can prevent the latter two from initiating 
a deadly conflict. The Lords has a stake in keeping the equilibrium since the victory of either 
interest over the other would weaken their position in the government. 107 
In comparing the Roman republic and the British mixed constitution, Calhoun points out 
that their fates were affected differently by conquest: while Rome's decline can be attributed 
to territorial expansion, Britain has succeeded in expanding its territory without having im-
paired the stability of its political system. He argues that the reasons for the latter's defiance 
of corruption rooted in expansion lie in its hereditary executive, which prevents the emer-
gence of political factions and results in its "conservative character. i08 Paradoxically enough, 
while patronage, as Calhoun argues, was the main cause of Rome's fall, in the British system, 
it has a tendency to contribute to its stability. His implication is that, by means of patronage, 
103 	Disquisition, 62. 
104 	See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 254-55. 
105 	See ibid., 194, 198-99. 
106 	Calhoun, Disquisition, 58 
107 	Ibid., 64-65. Cf. the language of the Answer to the Nineteen Propositions: "And the Lords, being trusted with 
a judicatory power, are an excellent screen and bank between the prince and people, to assist each against any 
encroachments of the other[sj, and by just judgements to preserve that law which ought to be the rule of every one 
of the three" (quoted in Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 363-64). 
108 	Disquisition, 66-67. In republican thought, political factions, as representing private, selfish interests, posed 
a danger to the public good (Howe, "Republican Thought," 158-59; see also Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 
58-59). 
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the conservative element of the British government—the Lords—is reinforced and, con-
sequently, can exert a greater and, in his view, beneficial impact on the stability of the whole 
system. The expanding Roman republic lacked both these features, and it was unable to avoid 
corruption through patronage and factions. Britain, however, Calhoun maintains, is capable 
of increasing its domain almost infinitely within the limits imposed by the people's tolerance 
of the increase of the burden of taxation, the main financial resource for its maintenance. 109 
Thus the British government has "a greater capacity of holding under subjection extensive 
dominions, without subverting the constitution or destroying liberty, than has ever been 
110 possessed by any other. ' 
Calhoun's argument about the special features of the British constitution offers links with 
further strains of republicanism surfacing in his Disquisition. His positive evaluation of pa-
tronage in connection with the British government echoes eighteenth-century Court praises 
for the system in the face of Country attacks. 11 ' Court representatives, such as moral 
philosopher David Hume, argued that influence by the Crown through the device of patronage 
was an indispensable element of British constitutional stability. It functioned to work toward 
a unity of interest within government amidst the one, the few, and the many, even though, 
admittedly, constricting liberty. 112 
By stating that the stability of Britain, mainly derived from its mixed constitution, makes 
it suitable for expansion, Calhoun also follows James Harrington, who fuses the stability of 
the Venetian mixed constitution with Rome's capacity for expansion.' 13 Yet, while Harrington 
finds the key to that special blend in the virtue of the many, the citizen soldiers of Oceana, 
Calhoun emphasizes the importance of the constitutional checks exerted by the three estates 
of the British government over one another. 
In his own version of the republican language presented in the Disquisition, then, 
Calhoun—similarly to Machiavelli—sets the example of Rome as the model republic. None-
theless, in contrast to the latter, who focuses on the active virtú of the armed Roman plebeians 
and Roman instability, Calhoun lays emphasis on Rome's harmony and stability, which he 
attributes to its mixed government. Thus, by means of his principle of the concurrent ma-
jority, he does speak the republican idiom of the mechanization of virtue in connection with 
109 Disquisition, 67. 
110 	Ibid. 
111 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 481, 495. Calhoun's leaning toward the British Court's attitude to patronage 
can be explained by the fact that his major source on Britain and its history is provided by Hume (See Brown, 
Calhoun's Philosophy of Politics, 156). Nevertheless, it has to be added that, for Calhoun, patronage as such does not 
feature as a positive phenomenon in the American Republic, only in the peculiar context of the British system of 
government that worked, in his eyes, according to the doctrine of the concurrent majority. 
112 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 494-95. On the relevance of the Country-Court dichotomy to the 
understanding of political debates in the early Republic involving Federalists and Anti-Federalists on the one hand, 
and Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans on the other, see James H. Hutson, "Country, Court, and Constitution: 
Antifederalism and the Historians," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3`d ser., 38 (1981), 337-68; Banning, Jefersonian 
Persuasion, 92-302; and John M. Murrin, "The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the 
Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816)," in Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 
1776, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 368-453. 
113 	Pocock reads Harrington on this as follows: "Oceana was to be a Rome in respect of unlimited expansion, 
[while] a Venice in respect of perpetual stability, liberty, and virtue" (Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 393). 
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Rome, but in doing so he, in fact, "venetianizes" the ancient republic. For him , unlike for the 
Renaissance admirers of Venice, the Roman republic did not fall because of the constant strife 
between its plebeians and patricians; on the contrary, in his interpretation, it appears as a 
system whose stability is comparable to that of the Venice in the Florentine ottimati' s vision. 
At the same time, according to Calhoun's republican argumentation, the Roman republic's 
failure to survive was due to the fact that its "concurrent majority" had not been designed to 
tackle the problem of corruption emerging as a result of expansion; expansion is better dealt 
with by Britain, whose mixed constitution makes it stable and thus suitable to conquer and 
possess other territories. Apparently, that stability, for Calhoun, does not lie, as it did for 
Harrington, in the (military) virtue of the many, but rather in the balance of the three estates 
with special emphasis on the "conservative department" of the Lords. Their amplified role in 
Calhoun's image of the British mixed constitution makes them occupy as important a place 
in it as they did in the Neo-Harringtonian version of British history in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries. 114 
Given the democratic sentiments of contemporary America, Calhoun's employment of the 
Roman ideal with its focus on the popular element, the many, seemed an appropriate choice: 
he modified the Florentine republican language in a way that made the Roman tribunate the 
exemplifying locus of the mechanization of virtue. Yet, ironically, he also drew upon the more 
aristocratic, Neo-Harringtonian version of English republicanism when depicting the English 
system as balanced by the Lords. 
In Pocock's reading, it is when the people have lost virtue that Machiavelli's new prince, 
relying on his own vine], takes over. The rule of the many is then replaced by the rule of the 
one. t t5 For Calhoun, in the case of Rome and Britain, the mechanization of virtue was an 
alternative to a declining republic with no virtuous people to rely on. Mechanization was a 
way to avoid despotic rule—although not the only one: Calhoun also offered the slave-holding 
South as a conservative force in the republican system of balance of powers. 
THE VIRTUE OF THE SOUTH 
An important variety of mechanizing virtue in Calhoun's thought concerns the South and its 
capacity to ensure virtue in the Union. Interestingly, such a vision of the South enabled 
Calhoun to fuse the two strains of republican language, that is, evocation of a virtuous people 
and the mechanization of virtue. In Calhoun's system, the South functions as a means of 
mechanizing virtue in the Republic at the federal level, resulting in republican harmony 
through its balancing force, in an artificial way. However, it is capable of achieving this only 
because it itself is constructed so that it epitomizes non-mechanical virtue, with its unity and 
114 	Neo-Harringtonianism emphasized the decline of the "Ancient Constitution" of England, regarding English 
history after "Gothic" medieval times as permanent degeneration, at the same time focusing on the aristocracy as 
a key element in the political structure of the country. See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 4-15-17. 
1 is 	Ibid., 156, 157, 161. 
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homogeneity of interest, a prerequisite of stability resting on a virtuous people. It is basically 
the North that needs virtue mechanized by the virtuous South. 
In pointing out the significance of space in republican thought, Pocock argues on the basis 
of Henry Nash Smith's analysis 116 that American followers of the republican tradition looked 
upon the West not simply as a reservoir of free land but also as a source of civic virtue. In 
their eyes, the frontier provided an infinite supply of free land to sustain an increasing number 
of freeholding farmers, whom they regarded as the bulwark of the Jeffersonian and later the 
Jacksonian vision of the American republic. At the same time, Pocock, curiously enough, fails 
to consider another significant ideal, briefly discussed by Smith, also significant in antebellum 
America, namely the Southern plantation relying on black slave labor for its basic work 
force. t17 Especially from the 1830s on, this plantation ideal had a widening appeal to southern 
slaveholders, and, as such, it functioned as the major rationale for their defense of the slavery 
system. 18 Calhoun, with a brief lag following his shift from nationalism to sectionalism, joined 
those Southerners who began to regard slavery as a "positive good," and in doing so, he 
contributed to the creation of the ideal of the South as a geographical and cultural unit with 
its own virtue, rooted in the slavery system and indispensable to the stability of the Republic 
through its balancing force. t t9 
Pocock points out that one understanding of virtue in civic humanism is linked to the 
Aristotelian notion of virtue as a character trait essential to one's identity, making it distinct 
from others. 120 The South also had such a trait, according to Calhoun. In Calhoun's eyes, the 
South as a geographical and cultural entity exhibits peculiar characteristics distinguishing it 
from the rest of the Union, making it a crucial factor in preserving political balance and hence 
118 	See William R. Taylor's classic Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and American National Character (New York: 
George Braziller, 1961); and Oakes, Ruling Race, 153-60. In a more recent analysis, Jeffrey Robert Young has 
emphasized the influence of bourgeois sentimental family ideals of the North in the southern defense of slavery by 
the 1830s. He argues that instead of the paternal ideal of the reciprocity of obligations, planters would claim their 
relationship with slaves was governed by familial love, expressing the equal status of the partners. Slaveholders of 
Georgia and South Carolina widely held the belief that they actually treated their slaves in a benevolent manner. See 
Young, Domesticating Slavery: The Master Class in Georgia and South Carolina, 1670-1847 (Chapel Hill and London: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1999). For a similar view of sentimental love underpinning slave-master relations 
in the rhetoric of proslavery writers, see Jan Lewis, "The Problem of Slavery in Southern Political Discourse," in 
David Thomas Konig, ed., Devising Liberty: Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Republic (Standford, 
Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 288-89. 
119 	Young points out that the "positive good" argument appeared in the South as early as 1820, although the 
image of slavery as "necessary evil" among Southern planters did not disappear immediately. Young, Domesticating 
Slavery, 164-65. Calhoun's contention that the South contributed to the equilibrium of the Republic has been re-
cognized by other studies, without an attempt to address this problem in terms of republican virtue, which, none-
theless, I hope to show, can be viewed as a concept that provides the central perspective for his understanding of 
the relationship between the South and the rest of the Union. See Richard Hofstadter, "John C. Calhoun: The Marx 
of the Master Class," in Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made It (1948; New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 67-91. Harris, "Last of the Classical Republicans," 260; and Ford, "Republican Ide-
ology," 421-23. 
12b" 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 41. 
116 	Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (1950; Cambridge, Mass. and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1970). 
117 	See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 535; Smith, Virgin Land, 145-54. 
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republican order. The identity of the South, its "character" is, at the same time, determined 
by the institution of slavery. It is in one of his attacks upon abolitionist petitions addressed to 
Congress in 1836, where Calhoun makes obvious this connection between slavery and the 
identity of the South. As he argues, the abolitionist petitions are part of "a war of religious and 
political fanaticism, mingled, on the part of the leaders, with ambition and the love of no-
toriety, and waged, not against our lives, but our character. The object is to humble and debase 
us in our own estimation, and that of the world in general; to blast our reputation, while they 
overthrow our domestic institutions ." 121 
Referring to the South as a distinct entity with its peculiar features constituting its identity, 
Calhoun evokes the argument of civic humanism rooted in the Aristotelian-Polybian 
assumption about the necessity for each social order to participate in government with its own 
virtue structuring its character and identity. Their balance is required for the attainment of 
political stability. If one particular group strives to rule without respecting the common good, 
subjecting the goods of the others, the outcome is the corruption of its own virtue, ultimately 
resulting in the decline of the polity. 122 
In Calhoun's analysis, then, slavery is the key to the stability of the South and hence, that 
of the Union since, in the South, the relationship between the black and white "races" is ideal, 
excluding any difference of interest between master and slave. The southern slaveholder, 
ruling his plantation community as a benevolent patriarch or pater familias "concentrates in 
himself the united interests of capital and labor, of which he is the common representative.» 123  
Southern plantation households, in Calhoun's analysis, thus fulfill a function similar to 
Aristotle's oikos: 124 they are the basic economic units of Southern society; they make up a 
harmonious community, excluding the labor-capital conflict from among themselves as well 
as from the relationship among one another, thereby insuring the political stability of the 
South. As Calhoun points out this advantage of the South over the North: "The condition of 
society in the South exempts us from the disorders and dangers resulting from this conflict;" 
he says, and "explains why it is that the political condition of the slave holding States has been 
so much more stable and quiet than those of the North." 12s 
By defending its character the South also defends the Union, Calhoun argues. Through its 
stability, it represents a force that functions to keep the conflict between Northern capital and 
labor under control by exerting its conservative influence "against the aggression of one or the 
other side, which ever may tend to disturb the equilibrium of our political system. »126 Fur 
121 	Papers of Calhoun, 13:105; emphasis added. 
122 	See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 73-76, 116. 
123 	Papers of Calhoun, 14:84. This unity of interest of slaves and masters as part of Calhoun's republican defense 
of slavery is emphasized by Jan Lewis (Problem of Slavery, 293). That Calhoun himself followed the principles of 
paternalism in his treatment of his own slaves is convincingly argued by Irving H. Bartlett in his John C. Calhoun: A 
Biography (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1993), 279-81. 
f 	See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 68. 
125 	Papers of Calhoun, 13:396; see also ibid. , 16:111, and ibid. , 18:278. 
126 	Ib id ., 14:85-86, quotation on 85. Calhoun makes an eloquent statement on the significance of the South 
reaching beyond its boundaries: "I have long regarded the South as the balance wheel of our beautiful, but complex 
system of government, and I consider its Union, not only as necessary to its own prosperity and safety, but indis- 
pensable to the proper working of the whole machine. Circumstances to which I need not refer, have given the State 
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thermore, in his reasoning, with progress and economic growth, due to the resulting 
intensification of the conflict in the North, the significance of the pacifying impact of Southern 
harmony is bound to increase. 127 This is why Southern interests, and most of all, the in-
stitution of slavery, are to be respected. Since the South contributes its own virtue, rooted in 
slavery, to the good of the whole, the abolition of slavery would be fatal to the entire Republic 
in that it would destroy that virtue. 
In this way, through his identification of the South as a guardian of republican virtue, 
Calhoun resurrected the republican notion of social estates, conceiving of the Union as con-
sisting of three major social groups: 128 industrial laborers, capitalists and Southern slave-
holders—the last one standing between the former two opposing interests. It is ultimately 
through the Southern slaveholders that the whole Union is kept in balance due to the supposed 
harmony of master and slave interests, resulting in the stability of the South. For Calhoun, 
then, the South fulfills the same role that in Neo-Harringtonian rhetoric the Lords did in the 
British mixed constitution, that is, keeping the balance between the one and the many, the 
King and the Commons. In doing so, he sublimated the concept of mixed government, con-
structing a new balance of powers. 
Calhoun's vision of the South as a region dominated by the planter class or his conception 
of the North determined essentially by the capital-labor dichotomy had no place for the yeo-
man farmer, a crucial element in the Jeffersonian version of republicanism. Such a suppression 
of the freeholders of the South on Calhoun's part may indicate his rhetorical effort to forge 
a unity within the South along lines determined by the planters' value system. 
The notion of the South as an entity offering a means of mechanizing virtue in the Republic 
was promoted by Calhoun on the understanding that the Union had become divided by the 
plurality of interests, but precisely because the South supposedly managed to avoid that, it 
could compensate for this lack of homogeneity on the federal level. In this way, Calhoun can 
be argued to have followed the Anti-Federalist fashion of imagining the South as the ideal 
republic, a homogeneous political entity, whereas regarding the entire Union, he adopted the 
Federalist line of mechanizing virtue in a heterogeneous society, with a parallel emphasis on 
the virtue and intelligence of the people. All this may also indicate Calhoun's increasingly 
desperate effort to keep the South's position in the federal power structure, proving its own 
importance in contributing to the (federal) common good through its own virtue, rooted in 
slavery. 
CALHOUN'S REPUBLICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 
A significant part of Calhoun's republicanism concerns issues of political economy; he ap- 
propriated several idioms of mainstream republican language related to the problem of eco- 
a prominence and influence far beyond its extent, population or wealth" (ibid., 14:392). See also ibid., 24:190; and 
ibid., 25:669-70. 
127 	Ibid., 13:396. 
128 	In doing so, Calhoun revived the "classical politics" in the Woodean sense. 
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nomic dependence, its consequences as well as the ways to deal with them. He drew upon the 
notion of expansion both territorial and economic—when offering solutions to the problem 
of population growth and unemployment, as well as the special capacity of the South to fight 
the vicissitudes of the modern market economy by returning, if only temporarily, to the 
classical ideal of self-sufficiency. His support of commerce or the denunciation of the "mon-
eyed interest" link him with eighteenth-century Country as well as Court republicanism, 
whereas his emphasis on territorial and market expansion aligned him with the agrarian and 
commercial republicans of the early Republic. 
Lacy K. Ford and Clyde N. Wilson have already addressed several aspects of Calhoun 
political economy, emphasizing its double nature, naming him both as a free trade liberal and 
a republican thinker with regard to various elements of his thought. 129 What they have failed 
to do, however, was to place him in the republican tradition identified by Pocock, hence 
missing important features of Calhoun's political economic thinking. 
Perhaps the single most important structuring theme in Pocock's interpretation of the 
development of republicanism in modern times is the replacement of the classical concept of 
unified personality with the modern fragmented self. Whereas the classical citizen was to 
represent the political, the economic and the military selves as united, with the proliferation 
and specialization of social functions, republican discourse became increasingly focused on the 
loss of that unity and its concomitant consequences. Modernity implied growing specialization 
and interdependence of the members of society; the individual's dependence on others for 
subsistance, in turn, involved the possibility of corruption, serving particular interests instead 
of the public good. 13' The classical unity of political participant and economic producer in the 
person of the citizen of the republic was gone: the modern self appeared as a fragmented one, 
incapable of performing all social functions necessary to sustain republican order. This change, 
at the same time, resulted in speculation over the means to fight it, and political economy 
became the field where the split between homo politicus and homo economicus generated tensions, 
calling for treatment by economic means. The conception of the modern self also explains the 
contrast between the liberal and the republican concepts of liberty, which are so crucial to the 
understanding of Calhoun's political economic thinking. 
Liberal thinking has often been characterized as being based on the negative concept of 
liberty, that is, freedom from governmental interference, while its positive conception of 
freedom to participate in political life has been associated with republicanism. 131 Nonetheless, 
the concept of negative freedom was also present in the language of republicanism. As Pocock 
argues, a precondition for republican virtue was independence, freedom from others' will. 
It underlay the argument of Country politicians when they identified the roots of corruption 
as dependence of one governing component on the other: members of the legislature de-
pendent on the Crown for their subsistence, receiving offices, pensions for their loyalty—in- 
129 	Ford, Origins, and Ford, "Republican Ideology;" and Clyde N. Wilson, "'Free Trade: No Debt: Separation 
from Banks:' The Economic Platform of John C. Calhoun," in Slavery, Secession, and Southern History, ed. Robert Louis 
Paquette and Louis A. Ferleger (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 81-100. 
'0 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, chap. 14, esp. 501-502, 551. 
131 	Banning, "Liberal and Classical Ideas," 17, 18; see also Ford, "Republican Ideology," 419. 
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dependence, in turn, they saw to be secured by landed property ownership. 132 In other words, 
what these typical Court representatives lacked was liberty from the Crown, because it had 
the power to make them dependent. The Country, by contrast, possessed landed property, 
which secured their independence. 
The sharp distinction, then, between the negative and positive concepts of liberty as liberal 
and republican ways of seeing the individual's relationship to government may not be as 
unequivocal as it may first seem. The protection of liberal rights from government as ex-
pressed by negative freedom can be successful only if the individual becomes a participant in 
political decision-making. Paradoxically, only by controlling government can one be free from 
it, and in this sense, the negative and positive varieties of liberty go hand in hand: the latter 
can be seen as a means to achieve the former. 133 At the same time, when it came to issues 
related to political economy the concept of negative liberty and independence proved crucial 
in republican ideology. 
Political economy in the early republic evolved largely in response to processes of mo-
dernization, accommodating itself to critical changes taking place in the economy and society. 
Therefore, since its very beginnings, a major concern of thinkers of republican political eco-
nomy in the USA had been to devise an economic policy to deal with problems generated by 
tensions between social change and republican ideals resulting from the shift from self-
sufficiency representing economic independence to a market economy based on mutual 
dependence. Jeffersonian agrarians, for instance, promoted the vision of a republic that would 
presumably avoid the problems of European countries undergoing modernization, having 
reached the "commercial" stage of social development with all its undesirable side effects. 
Hoping to keep the numbers of urban poor low in America in order to save the nation from 
great social inequalities and possible unrest, these agrarian republicans advocated reining in 
industrial development to slow down the transition to the commercial stage of development. 
The key to their efforts was westward expansion: they hoped that by bringing new lands into 
132 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 126, 232, 407-8; On the importance of the link between property-holding 
and independence for revolutionary Americans, see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of f the American Revolution 
(Alfred A. Knopf, 1992; New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 234. On the role of independence in revolutionary 
republican ideology see also Richard L. Bushman, "'This New Man': Dependence and Independence, 1776," in 
Uprooted Americans: Essays to Honor Oscar Handlin, ed. Richard L. Bushman et al. (Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 
77-96. He clearly demonstrates that discourse about dependent wage laborers and debtors was a republican concern 
(ibid., 92; see also Berthoff, "Independence and Attachment," 107, 113-15). Liberal economic thinking seems to 
have understood independence only in relation to the economic competition of individuals and government inter-
vention in economy: the moral aspect of independence was outside its focus. 
133 	Concerning positive and negative liberty in the United States, Judith Sklar concludes that they were in- 
timately intertwined as far as the problem of slavery was concerned—freedom from government for masters as a 
guarantee against enslavement and positive liberty for black slaves, a fight to achieve rights being privileges for white 
persons. See Judith N. Sklar, "Positive Liberty, Negative Liberty in the United States," transl. from the French by 
Stanley Hoffmann, in Redeeming American Political Thought, ed. Stanley Hoffmann and Dennis F. Thompson (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 111-26. 
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cultivation to provide subsistence for immigrants from the East, it would be possible to build 
up a society of independent yeoman farmers—virtuous citizens, devoted to the public good. 134 
Even though accepting the transition of American society to commercialism as an inevi-
table process, being only the question of time, republican critics believed that accelerating the 
process through artificial promotion of commerce by government interfered with the natural 
course of economic and social development. 135 At the same time, even though Jeffersonians 
promoted the ideal of the self-sufficient yeoman farmer, they gradually accustomed them-
selves to the idea of commercial agriculture with American farmers producing for markets 
increasingly located overseas. In this way, defying time, that is, slowing down the shift to a 
commerce-based society, entailed not merely expansion through the constant acquisition of 
land for an ever increasing virtuous agricultural population but also markets for them. 136 James 
Madison, for instance, himself advocated westward expansion in the 1780s as part of his effort 
to secure free navigation of the Mississippi, unhindered by foreign powers. Such free navi-
gation would provide an alternative to the growth of domestic manufacturing, at the same 
time encouraging trade with European countries to exchange US agricultural goods for their 
industrial ones. Furthermore, the agricultural surplus was to be used for acquiring manu-
factured goods produced in the sweatshops of a decaying Europe, rather than having sweat-
shops in America—this still serving the Jeffersonian agrarian ideal. i3' 
Nevertheless, Jefferson was willing to subordinate his agrarianism to the republican notion 
of independence, and this can be illustrated by the fact that during the Embargo of 1807 he 
134 	Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in J jfersonian America (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 185-95; and Lienesch, New Order, 88-89. Republican political economy 
stressed having few wealth-based distinctions in society through the relatively equal distribution of landed property, 
and associated Europe, especially England, with a capitalist economy producing large differences in wealth, a situ-
ation to be avoided in a republic. See the views of Jefferson and Madison in the mid-1780s, in Banning, "Political 
Economy and the Creation of the Federal Republic," in Devising Liberty: Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New 
American Republic, ed. David Thomas Konig (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 33-34, 41; see also 
Ashworth, "Jeffersonians," 431-32; and Lienesch, New Order, 89. The link between industrialization and growing 
social inequality was also claimed by proslavery thinkers such as Thomas Roderick Dew. See Allen Kaufman, 
Capitalism, Slavery, and Republican Values: Antebellum Political Economists, 1819-1848 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1982), 103. Robert G. Kennedy has recently pointed out that Jefferson's vision of a republic of fee-simple yeoman 
farmers never came to be realized in the South due to the expansion of the plantation system, which kept constantly 
pushing small producers westward. See Roger G. Kennedy, Mr. Jflerson's Lost Cause: Land, Farmers, Slavery, and the 
Louisiana Purchase (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Furthermore, due to their commercial 
dependence, Jefferson's yeomen became "extensions of the workforce of the mills" in Britain (ibid., 114). 
135 McCoy, Elusive Republic, 171-74,175; and Banning, Sacred Fire of Libeny, 359. This was the theoretical basis 
on which Jeffersonian Republicans criticized protective Federalist economic policies (McCoy, Elusive Republic, 175; 
see also Banning, "Political Economy," 32-33). 
136 	Drew McCoy, Elusive Republic, 197-99, 207-8; Appleby, "Commercial Farming and the `Agrarian Myth' 
in the Early Republic," TheJournal ofAmerican History 68 (1982), esp. 844-45. Hence Michael Lienesch seems wrong 
when placing Jefferson in a category distinct from the one that he defines as "agricultural market thinkers" (cf. 
Lienesch, New Order, 88-89, 89-96; phrase quoted from 91, 93). Kramnick also emphasizes the commercial nature 
of agricultural production in the early republic as part of the Jeffersonian ideal (Kramnick, "Republican Revisionism 
Revisited," 644). 
137 	Banning "Political Economy," 30-33, 34; see also Banning, Sacred Fire of Liberty, 62. See Jefferson's oft- 
quoted remarks on the desired form of the division of labor between Europe and America: Notes on the State of 
Virginia, "Query 19," in PT], 216-17. 
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supported household manufacturing so that the country would be less dependent on imported 
foreign manufactured goods. Furthermore, following the War of 1812, which was a critical 
incentive to domestic industrial and market development, Jeffersonian Republicans looked 
upon manufacturing and commerce with less suspicion, arguing that when combined with free 
trade, these would not tend to breed corruption and misery in American society as they had 
in mercantilist Europe. 138 In watching the evolution of the capitalist economic system with 
reservations, mainly due to its side effects, Jeffersonians advocated a "pre-capitalist" version 
of commerce. They clearly denounced the loss of republican independence that the capitalist 
relations of production entailed in making the wage laborer dependent upon the owner of the 
means of production. For them, the acquisition of arable lands as well as markets for in-
dependent, virtuous producers was a major strategy for preserving this pre-capitalist inde-
pendence. 139  
One alternative to this vision was offered by "commercial republicans," who saw no 
tension between manufacturing and republican virtue, and they regarded urbanization rather 
than Western lands as the safety valve for any excess population that found no more oppor-
tunities in farming. These republicans had no intentions whatsoever of preserving US society 
and economy in the agricultural stage; in fact, they advocated governmental intervention in 
the economy to promote the transition. 140 In search of new outlets for channeling surplus 
goods and thereby dealing with the problem of unemployment, Madison gradually adopted 
such a stance, envisioning a republic with the surplus population employed in manufacturing, 
producing foods for markets both in the agricultural South and in Latin America. By the 
1830s, he had accepted the idea that manufacturing had the potential to provide a safety valve 
for the US population surplus, which would contribute to republican stability; moreover, he 
also argued that sectional strain could be handled by the South adopting manufacturing as a 
major occupation for its laborers. 141 As will be seen, a significant portion of these consi-
derations came to inform Calhoun's republican political economy. 
Drew McCoy has pointed out that in early American republicanism "a corrupt political 
system" was regarded as an "artificial" source of corruption of a people. In addition to it, he 
has identified another "natural" one derived from uncontrolled population growth, accom- 
138 	McCoy, Elusive Republic, 227-28, 246. 
139 	Ashworth, "Jeffersonians," 431-32. 
140' Lienesch, New Order, 96-102, 101; see also McCoy, Elusive Republic, 101. In connection with republican 
political economy, Ralph Lerner also uses the expression "commercial republicanism," but in a slightly different, 
more general sense. He discusses the rise of the "man of commerce" in the eighteenth-century Anglo-American 
world, propelled by economic ambitions and the benefits that commerce may bring, identifying his own interest 
with the public good, having no worries about the future commerce will bring. Yet, at the same time, even he points 
out that while welcoming such changes Americans voiced mixed feelings. See Ralph Lerner, "Commerce and 
Character: The Anglo-American as New-Model Man," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3`d ser., 36 (1979), 22-23. 
Interestingly, though, he does not talk about Jefferson in this way, but groups him among the "commercial repub-
licans" (ibid., 19n46). 
14' 	Drew R. McCoy, The Last ofthe Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 183-85, 189, 190-91. 
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panied by the end of the supply of free land. 142 Although with Calhoun, it was the artificial 
way of corruption and its consequences to confront—hence his various efforts to secure virtue 
in the American republic in a political way, by institutional means—the Jeffersonian idiom of 
land supply as a cause for concern did have some relevance to him. Although he never seems 
to have regarded the acquisition of new land specifically as a solution to the problem of labor 
and capital tension, the issue emerged in his rhetoric connected with the problem of po-
pulation growth and expansion in the 1840s. 
Calhoun drew upon this idiom of republican political economy during the Mexican War 
when he strove to justify the acquisition of Mexican territories. Sharing the Jeffersonian-
Madisonian concern about US overpopulation, he advocated the occupation of California and 
New Mexico in a speech that he delivered in the Senate on February 9, 1847. For him, these 
territories with low population densities provided America with the safety valve that Jefferson 
and other agrarian republicans had associated with the Louisiana Territory at the beginning of 
the century. "What we want is space for our growing population," Calhoun argued. "We want 
room to grow." The pace at which the American population was growing at the time required 
more and more land for new generations. 143 As he claimed in another speech, "For this rapidly 
growing population, all the territory we now possess, and even that which we might acquire, 
would, in the course of a few generations, be needed. It is better for our people and insti-
tution[s], that our population should not be too much compressed." The area had already been 
penetrated by settlers representing an "industrious and civilized race" which would be able to 
develop it into a prosperous economy.' Like Jeffersonian republicans, then, Calhoun hoped 
to use the fruits of territorial expansion to compensate for the perils of progress by providing 
the population surplus with subsistence based on land. Furthermore, he also employed the 
idioms of economic expansion and free trade for similar purposes. 
Scholars have already identified free trade as an important issue in Calhoun's political 
economy, emphasizing his advocacy of it as a liberal economic policy. Ford, for instance, 
associates Calhoun with the classical liberal tenet of economy free from government inter-
vention aimed at fostering its advancement mainly through protectionism, thus favoring cer-
tain economic factors over others. 145 At the same time, such an attitude by Calhoun, however 
liberal it may seem, I argue, can also be regarded as one serving republican ends, unexplored 
in the literature, fitting in with the mainstream understanding of the role of free trade in 
republican political economy. 
In addition to territorial expansion as a means to deal with the surplus of agricultural 
population, for Calhoun, free trade also played an important role in economic expansion, 
which, as in the case of Jeffersonian republicans, he also regarded as a way to respond to 
population growth and the problem of unemployment. 
142 	McCoy, Elusive Republic, 189. 
143 Papers of Calhoun, 24:311. 
144 	Ibid. , 24:121, 122. Calhoun also supported the settlement of public lands by members of a large, though 
poor class," who by acquiring land would turn into "small freeholders," precious to the Republic (ibid., 15:435). 
145 	Ford, "Republican Ideology," 419; see also Wilson, "Free Trade." 
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Free trade played a pivotal role in the republican political economy. It insured a way for 
the agricultural surplus of the virtuous American producers to reach overseas markets and be 
exchanged for manufactured goods produced by societies having attained the commercial stage 
of social development. Free trade was thus a key both to westward expansion and to acquiring 
markets, a means to achieve republican goals and integrate liberal principles into a republican 
political economy. Furthermore, Jeffersonian political economists regarded any connection 
between government and economic interests as "unnatural" and thus inimical to republican 
goals.' Their economic policy favoring free trade was given up only as a result of the pres-
sures in the wake of the War of 1812, when protective governmental policy and the Second 
Bank of the United States were established to meet the challenges posed by economic deve-
lopment. These, at the same time, were seen as necessary to keep the republic on course in 
development and were not seen as threats to republican virtue. 147 
Free trade was vital for Calhoun for two reasons. First, as he understood, protective eco-
nomic policy indirectly contributed to the impoverishment of Southern exporters by reducing 
their capacity to compete in the world market, undermining the subsistence of cotton planters 
as virtuous producers. Second, free trade was a key to expanding markets, and thus, indi-
rectly, an important means of preserving virtue in the Jeffersonian manner. 
In this sense, in Calhoun's mind, commerce was to fulfill the same role for the Northern 
economy as it did for republican thinkers who considered commerce a dynamic force when 
coupled with the expansion of land. 148 The Machiavellian-Jeffersonian virtú of agrarian ex-
pansion could be transformed into industrial expansion by acquiring new markets in the name 
of free trade, instead of relying on constricted home markets kept limited by protective 
economic policy. Calhoun applied such arguments about the need to create outlets for US 
producers, advocating free trade and competition as a solution to market problems and, 
consequently, hoped to tackle population growth as well as unemployment in the North. 
Calhoun attributed pre-eminent, almost transcendental significance to free trade in his 
diatribes against protective economic policy. In his argumentation, he depicted unrestricted 
trade as the indispensable catalyst for generating growth and wealth, a derivation of liberty 
that made progress possible: "The freedom of trade has its foundation in the deep and durable 
foundation of truth, and will indicate itself," as Calhoun maintains. "It draws its origin from 
on high. It emanates from the Divine will, and is designed in its dispensation to perform an 
important part in binding together in concord and peace the nations of the earth, and in ex-
tending far and wide the blessings of civilization."' 49 
Banning, "Political Economy," 34,41,47-48. 
147 	Ibid., 49. Those opposing the adoption of free trade policies, however, also did so on republican grounds, 
arguing that similarly to England, America would be exposed to its harmful consequences, first and foremost, in the 
form of degraded labor. Separated from their tools of production, propertyless wage laborers would by no means 
represent the republican ideal. Furthermore, free trade opponents claimed to perceive the first victims of such a 
process, poor whites of the South. Thus they advocated protective policy and a controlled distribution of property 
in order to prevent excessive inequalities of wealth. In the vision of the protective thinkers, laborers appeared 
propertied and skilled and thus independent producers whose status was maintained through the intervention of a 
state aiming to minimize the degrading impact of capitalism (Kaufman, Capitalism, and Republican Values, 44-59). 
148 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 539-40. 
149 	Papers of Calhoun, 16:188. 
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However, Calhoun also put his finger on the side-effects of the expansive nature of laissez-
faire: it leads not only to economic growth and efficiency but also, consequently, the sat-
uration of the home market. Highly developed nations are capable of producing far more than 
necessary for supplying themselves. As he says, "all civilized people, with little exception, are 
producing their own supply, and even overstocking their own market. It results, that no 
people, restricted to the home market, can, in the present advanced state of the useful arts, 
rise to greatness and wealth by manufactures." tso 
The solution to this problem, Calhoun argues, is foreign markets: domestic producers of 
developed economies must seek markets outside, in the developing ones: "they must compete 
successfully for the foreign market, in the younger, less advanced, and less civilized coun-
tries."' st  The same strategy is to be followed by the US, a developed economy, Calhoun 
argues, since its saturated home market cannot accommodate more domestic manufactures, 
which would result in rising unemployment in industry, adversely affecting the economy of 
the North: "The home market cannot consume our immense surplus production of provisions, 
lumber, cotton, and tobacco; nor find employment in manufacturing, for home consumption, 
the vast amount of labor employed in raising the surplus beyond the home consumption, and 
which can only find a market abroad." Therefore, laborers in industries producing for sluggish 
home markets must face either "loss and impoverishment" or "be forced into universal com-
petition in producing the protected articles for the home market' s' 
Protective policy, then, would not ameliorate the problems of oversupply and unemploy-
ment. This is partly why Calhoun calls on Northern producers to give up advocating high 
import tariffs on manufactured goods and instead to compete in the world market, like 
Southerners. "Instead of looking to the home market, and shaping all our policy to secure that, 
we must look to the foreign, and shape it to secure that," he demands.' s3 
In Calhoun's mind, then, free trade as a means of both economic expansion and territorial 
expansion would not only spread the blessings of civilization but would also serve the purposes 
of republican political economy, preserving republican order. He proposed to achieve this by 
avoiding tensions caused by groups that could find no subsistence due to the shortage of space 
or markets. He regarded free trade as a republican way of expansion compensating for losing 
virtue as a result of modernization, in a Machiavellian-Jeffersonian fashion. Industry was no 
cause of trouble for Calhoun, as long as it was combined with free trade. 
As far as Calhoun's attitude to free trade and commerce is concerned, despite certain views 
otherwise, it was very much in line with the Country republican version: as has been seen, he 
150 	Ibid., 16:369. 
151 	Ibid. 
152 Ibid., 16:370. Thus, Calhoun's economic vision was not necessarily agrarian, based on "independent though 
morally responsible freeholders," (cf. Wilson, "Free Trade," 98, 85) since it did not exclude the industrial North 
relying on dependent wage labor. That he was far from being a politician against industry or commerce has also been 
pointed out by Theodore R. Marmor. See Marmor, The Career of John C. Calhoun: Politician, Social Critic, Political 
Philosopher (New York: Garland, 1988), 154-206; and Marmor, "Anti-Industrialism and the Old South: The Agrar-
ian Perspective of John C. Calhoun," Comparative Studies in Society and History 9 (1966-67), 377-406. 
153 	Papers of Calhoun, 16:368; see also ibid., 15:92. 
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had a positive view of it, far from regarding it as a natural source of dependence and therefore 
corruption. This was the way eighteenth-century republican thinkers in Britain related to 
commerce. 
Lacy K. Ford contends that certain aspects of Calhoun's political economy can be shown 
to differ from Country ideology partly because, unlike the members of the Country party, he 
did not regard commerce as a source of corruption. Identifying the Country with classical 
republicanism, he contends, "Calhoun was certainly not a classical republican in the traditional 
sense. Calhoun never considered commerce, in and of itself, an enemy of virtue, nor did he 
advocate agrarian self-sufficiency and the creation of a hermetic economy as an alternative to 
continued commercial development." Later he adds, "Calhoun's republicanism had long since 
lost whatever naked anti-commercial or anti-market characteristics that might properly be 
attributed to classical republicanism.i 154 These assertions, however, should be re-considered 
with regard to .the anti-commercial nature of Country ideology and, hence, to the links that 
Calhoun's political economy had with republicanism. 
However, to regard British Country ideology as unambiguously anti-commercial is 
somewhat problematic. Country writers of Queen Anne's reign joined their Court adversaries 
in their assertion that trade played a positive role in the economy of the times, since, for 
instance, it provided land, the main economic basis of the Country, with value. Commerce, 
per se, was not disapproved by Country writers, either; they refrained from criticizing mer-
chants involved in commerce. The anti-commercial image of the Country-Tory party of the 
age was, in part, created by their Whig opponents. "The problem of trade," Pocock argues, 
"was ... the last to be perceived among the causes of the new corruption.» 155 Hence Calhoun 
can be justly regarded as an appropriator of the Country version of republican language on 
account of his embracing commerce as an economic activity. This is the result of the inquiry 
both into the general modern British and American republican attitudes to commercialization. 
At the same time, his attitude to commerce in general and free trade in particular, as modern 
means of securing republican independence for certain segments of society, did not prevent 
him from offering other means as well, more specific to the South. 
Modernity brought about growing economic interdependence in areas shifting from a sub-
sistence economy to a market economy, and the process also affected the plantation South. 
Lacy K. Ford has pointed out how the ideal of "country-republicanism," as he puts it, in-
formed the ethos of white male South Carolinians with its emphasis on personal independence 
based on "productive property," which distinguished themselves from dependent slaves. 
Nevertheless, this republican independence was threatened by involvement in international 
market economy: through cotton production growers moving beyond a subsistence economy 
became dependent on the market as well as on relationships with other actors. 156 
155 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 446-47, 450. The anticommercial nature of British republicanism has also 
been denied by Lance Banning ("Political Economy," 21) For the same position, also in view of a Jeffersonian con-
text, see Banning, "Liberal and Classical Ideas," 5-6. 
156 	Ford, Origins, 50-51, 54-55, 94, 52. 
154 	Ford, "Republican Ideology," 417, 422. 
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Therefore the truly independent economic actor in the South was the yeoman farmer 
producing all the necessities that guaranteed self-sufficiency. Commercial farmers as well as 
planters, as Roger G. Kennedy points out, were equally dependent on markets, the latter also 
depending on their slaves' labor. As he argues in regard to Virginia, planters' dependence was 
deepened by the fact that their investments in a monocultural economy—tobacco and later 
cotton—frustrated the development of a diversified economy, resulting in Southern producers 
falling prey to the vicissitudes of fluctuating overseas markets. 1S7 
Neither complete self-sufficiency nor full devotion to the market could protect, for 
instance, South Carolina Upcountry farmers and planters from the threat to personal inde-
pendence, so they were compelled to combine both economic strategies in order to preserve 
their property, avoiding its exposure to the fluctuations of the market, the key to their sur-
vival as independent producers. 158 As Joyce E. Chaplin has pointed out, South Carolina plant-
ers were able to alternate commercial economic activity with self-sufficiency in accordance 
with the cyclical nature of market demands. They managed to adjust their production to 
fluctuating market demands by combining elements of domestic and commercial agricul-
tue.159 Calhoun also regarded himself and Southern planters as independent producers, 
capable of making such a shift if need be. 
We have seen how Calhoun employed republican language in depicting the South as being 
virtuous due precisely to the institution of slavery, which contributed to securing virtue on 
the federal level in a mechanical way, through its potential to counterbalance a precarious 
North plagued by the labor and capital dichotomy. Yet, the plantation South also played a pre-
eminent role in his political economy: he envisioned it as an economic system able to fight 
dependence caused by free trade through republican independence. He vindicated the capacity 
of the plantation system to fight both, depicting it as a flexible economic system, capable of 
oscillating between self-sufficiency and market economy. 
Such a stance was intimately linked to the problem of negative liberty. As Paul Boller 
points out, the liberal, negative concept of liberty also had a place—a major one—in 
Calhoun's thought. For him, like for Locke, liberty assumed a negative aspect, insofar as 
Locke and Calhoun both understood it as freedom from restraint, freedom from authority. 
As Boller says, liberty meant "absence of external compulsion and restraint upon overt 
157 	Kennedy, Jelerson's Lost Cause, 43-46, 85, 47, 59. Kennedy describes Southern dependence on Britain for 
its market as its "recolonization." (ibid., 86) Having achieved political and economic independence, the South grad-
ually became dependent on Britain for its imports of manufactured products as well as its exports of cotton. Thus, 
the lack of economic diversity became a major factor in the dependence and recolonization of the South (ibid., 89-
90, 106-107, 109-14, and passim). 
158 	Ford , Origins, 56-84; see also ibid., 2-3. 
159 	Joyce E. Chaplin, "Creating a Cotton South in Georgia and South Carolina, 1760-1815," The Journal of 
Southern History 57 (1991), 173-74. The dependence that masters could feel in relation to their slaves did not neces-
sarily impair their sense of independence as republican producers. See Kenneth S. Greenberg, Masters and Statesmen: 
The Political Culture of American Slavery (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 85, 137; 
see also Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy &Society of the Slave South (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1965), 32. 
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action." 160 Nonetheless, the republican version of negative liberty through the problem of 
dependence also was crucial in Calhoun's political economic thinking. 
Calhoun strongly argued for the supremacy of"independent producers," who are free from 
government or other people's intervention, whose freedom was made possible by the 
"ownership of productive property." He also viewed slave owners as such producers. 161 In 
other words, what Thomas Jefferson or most of his fellow Southerners would identify as the 
virtuous yeoman, the ideal producer of the republic, Calhoun found in Southern planters.' 62 
It was not "the once proud, hardy, and independent yeomanry of New England" now 
depending on the blessings of the protective policy of the government that he regarded as 
capable of fulfilling the expectations of republican independence. 163 Rather, it was Southern 
planters who managed to remain virtuous by preserving their independence from government, 
since they were not forced to rely on its protection and could thrive on free trade. Thus, in 
Calhoun's rhetoric, the South came to embody the same ideal as the independent yeoman did 
for Jefferson primarily because of its potential for self-sufficiency. 
The Southern planter operates in an economic system that, according to Calhoun, is 
capable of adopting itself to various economic situations, leaving the home or the world 
market when necessary and returning to self-sufficiency. As the South Carolinian argues, 
A plantation is a little community of itself, which, when hard pressed, can 
furnish within itself almost all of its supplies. Ours is a fine provision country, 
and, when needs be, can furnish most of its supplies of food and clothing from 
its own resources. In prosperous times, when the price of our staples is high, 
our labor is almost exclusively directed to their production, and then we freely 
and liberally part with their proceeds in exchange for horses, mules, cattle, 
hogs, and provisions of all description from the West, and clothing and all the 
products of the arts with the North and East; but when prices fall and pressure 
comes, we gradually retire on our own means, and draw our own supplies 
from within. [When this happens, h]ousehold industry revives; and strong, 
substantial coarse clothing is manufactured from cotton and wool, for their 
families and domestics. In addition to cotton, corn and other grains are culti-
vated in sufficient abundance, not only for bread, but for the rearing of stock 
of various descriptions—hogs, horses, mules, cattle, and sheep. 164 
160 	Paul F. Boller, Jr. "Calhoun on Liberty," South Atlantic Quarterly 66 (1967), 396. 
161 	See Ford, "Republican Ideology," 422. 
162 	John Ashworth remarks that such an image of planters, as "cultivators of the earth" also characterized the 
Democratic party's ideology. See Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic, vol. 1, Commerce 
and Compromise, 1820-1850 (Cambridge, New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 338-39; quoted 
phrase on 338. 
163 	Papers of Calhoun, 16:431. 
on account of labor efficiency (ibid.). In doing so, he internalized the proslavery view that due to racial and climatic 
factors, the South was an exception to the rule of relative slave labor inefficiency. This was in response to "the 
bourgeois critique of slavery," claiming the lower efficiency of slave labor. See James Oakes, "The Peculiar Fate of 
the Bourgeois Critique of Slavery," in Slavery and the American South, ed. Winthrop D. Jordan (Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 2003), 29-48. 
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Paradoxically, then, in Calhoun's argument, it is the South's capacity for republican self-
sufficiency and thus independence from market economy that provides it with an advantage 
over Northern manufacturers, so specialized and advanced that they cannot make themselves 
independent from markets; they must depend on the federal government for economic 
protection as well as on wage laborers. By contrast, when compelled, the South is able to 
make the shift from modern market capitalism back to pre-modern ways of production in 
adapting itself to sluggish markets. In this way, Calhoun emphasized economic interde-
pendence among the sections of the US, as well as the ability of the South to make itself free 
from such a bind when necessary, implicitly refuting the claim of Southern economic de-
pendence on foreign and home markets. 165 
Calhoun, then, found several ways rooted in republicanism to deal with the problem of eco-
nomic dependence for both the North and the South. Moreover, he also followed republican 
principles when offering a means to break the links between the federal government and 
financial interest. 
Scholars have pointed out that Calhoun advocated the separation of banks and government 
as a condition for the right use of paper currency and credit to disempower the "moneyed 
aristocracy." These scholars, however, fail to identify this advocacy as a reassertion of the 
Country and Court attitudes to the financial revolution of the eighteenth century. For in-
stance, Gillis J. Harp maintains in connection with the difference between John Taylor of 
Caroline and Calhoun as regards their attitudes toward political disharmony caused by go-
vernment, that the former viewed monied interest as the main source of corruption and 
proposed to safeguard republican virtue by eliminating it. t66  However, Harp seems to ignore 
the presence of the same trait in Calhoun's republicanism. Ford, unlike Harp, does not neglect 
this aspect of political economy, but he links Calhoun's denunciation of "the moneyed a-
ristocracy" to the liberal half of his political economy as part of his fight "in defence of eco-
nomic liberalism against a potentially reactionary alliance of Government and capital.'167 
Nevertheless, it seems more appropriate to argue that this component of Calhoun's 
political economy is informed by Country and Court republican rhetoric rather than by liberal 
ideology, since both of these political groupings regarded the connection between government 
and economic interests as a major source of the corruption of republican virtue. British 
165 	Interestingly, Calhoun's emphasis on the republican features of the planters' economic capacity may add 
to James Oakes' analysis of the "ideological change" in the Old South. Cf. Oakes, "From Republicanism to Liber-
alism: Ideological Change and the Crisis of the Old South," American Quarterly 37 (1984): 551-71. The shift from 
the republican ideal of free white farmers to the planters' liberal world, which, according to Oakes, was spreading 
alongside the plantation system in space and time as well was, in fact, imagined by Calhoun as involving the possibility 
for planters to revert to a republican world of political economy. Roger G. Kennedy argues that despite Calhoun's 
daims about the independence of plantations, they were very much dependent—on overseas markets. "Powerless 
against the vagaries of the international market, the planters nonetheless sought to persuade themselves that they were 
living in self-sufficient communities insulated from the world outside" (Kennedy, Jefferson's Lost Cause, 111). 
166- See Harp, "Taylor, Calhoun, and Decline," esp. 114. 
167 	Ford, "Republican Ideology," 421; and 418; see also Ford, Origins, 92-93; O'Brien, Conjectures of Order, 
932-33; and Wilson, "Free Trade," 93-97. 
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opposition ideology, as Bernard Bailyn has shown, regarded "monied interest" as one of the 
forces responsible for the conspiracy against liberty and the corruption in England. Pocock 
also points out that British Tory and Whig spokesmen of the Augustan period, in spite of their 
ideological differences, unanimously denounced "monied interests" living off the public debt. 
"No writer of either party," he argues, "presumed to defend stockjobbing, the speculative 
manipulation of the market values of shares in the public debt; it was universally agreed to be 
evil." Instead of the merchant who became associated with the public good through his 
commercial activity, financiers, thriving on the public debt came to be seen as negative actors 
in society. "[I]t was through the image of the rentier, the officer, and the speculator in public 
funds, not through that of the merchant or dealer upon a market," Pocock says, "that 
capitalism imparted its first stock and became involved in its first major controversy in the 
history of English-language political theory. »168 It was the republican conception of de-
pendence as a sort of corruption that they had in mind when denouncing the links between 
government and financiers, who through financing the public debt were regarded as parasites, 
"corrupting parliament and society," making them dependent. 169 They were identical with 
Calhoun's "stock-jobbers," "speculators," and "moneyed aristocrats." 
Calhoun also looked upon "monied interest" as an antirepublican force. With the economic 
crisis of the late 1830s setting in, he increasingly denounced the system of "pet banks" intro-
duced by the Jackson administration for handling federal deposits, at the same time criticizing 
Whig plans for restoring the Bank of the United States as an antidote to the economic 
problems of the country. Instead, he strongly supported Martin Van Buren's proposal for an 
independent treasury for federal deposits, since he saw such a treasury as a guaranteed sep-
aration of government and economic interests. 170 In his attack upon the connection between 
the federal government and banks in 1838, he claimed that "the larger the patronage of the 
General Government, the greater its expenditure, and the greater its surplus, so much more 
were the profits of the Banks increased, and that therefore this powerful monied interest was 
directly interested in promoting all these antirepublican ends, and would assuredly lend its 
influence to promote them ." 171 
Calhoun, thus, attacked monied interest directly on the basis of its links with the go-
vernment, but, ultimately, he condemned it following the Country—and Court—republican 
principle that dependence breeds corruption and the destruction of the Republic. As he argued 
in 1841, the Whig party was about to revive old economic policies including a national bank, 
protective tariff and connection between the government and the banks. He, however, 
depicted the end of the process as even more formidable, arguing that power would finally be 
shifted from the people to the monied interest: "The seat of the Government and power 
would change, and pass from the people into the hands of one of the most corrupt and 
Bailyn, Ideological Origins, 49, 123; and Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 447, 4489, 460. 
Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 427, 439ff. 
Wilson, "Free Trade," 93-94. 






exacting moneyed oligarchies, of which history has left any record. n12 It seems, then, that as far 
as his attitudes toward monied interests are concerned, Calhoun followed the eighteenth-
century Country (and Court) line of republican argument, which, undeniably, fit with the 
liberal one with its emphasis on the separation of government and business as well as on the 
positive role of commerce in the economy. 
Calhoun, then, in a republican fashion, was concerned with the problems that specialization 
caused in the modern transformation of the public personality. His solution connected him 
to both the agrarian and the commercial versions of American republicanism: when promoting 
territorial expansion, he supported Southern and Western interests, but when advocating 
finding overseas markets for American industrial goods, he proposed to serve Northern 
interests by easing the labor-capital tension in industrial areas. His republican political eco-
nomy was neither exclusively agrarian nor industrialist, but rather embraced elements of both 
strains. Nonetheless, emphasizing the South's ability to shift between market production and 
self-sufficiency, he also evoked the classical idiom, thereby reinforcing the image of the South 
as a stable, indigenous domain of virtue within the union. In Calhoun's mind, the modernist 
dependence on markets was to be compensated either by their expansion or turning away 
from them. 
To sum up, Calhoun appropriated a considerable selection of idioms that formed an 
integral part of the political language of republicanism. He seems to have exhibited no pre-
ference for any particular strain of the tradition but he boldly appropriated ideas and values 
that had often been held by representatives of opposing views. Thus, he employed several 
senses of virtue, ranging from an understanding of the morally capable people through military 
virtue as well as its mechanistic, institutionalized version, which he even expanded on to 
secure protection for the South with its peculiar institution of slavery. In doing so, he tended 
to draw upon opposing components of the tradition in mechanizing virtue in the republic, 
such as ones utilized by Anti-Federalists versus Federalists or the Harringtonian-Machiavellian 
military virtue of the many as opposed to the Neo-Harringtonian emphasis on the few. 
Calhoun's pluralistic attitude to the republican tradition also manifested itself in his use of the 
idioms of economic expansionism as well as his denunciation of the monied interest or his 
stress on the South's ability to shift between self-sufficiency and commercial agriculture. 
In order to make his case, Calhoun spoke republican languages of diverse idioms that were 
supposed to appeal to a contemporary political community. This can explain why he, for in-
stance, made the popular element in the Roman constitution the lynchpin of the system in a 
country where the people's rule was taken as an axiom. Nonetheless, his emphasis on the 
moral character of the people as a prerequisite for republican virtue and stability in the 
republic clearly separated hire in this regard from the Founders on account of their emphasis 
on assuring virtue by institutional means. Furthermore, by assigning military virtue to the 
regular army of the people that the republican tradition originally associated with a wartime 
citizen army, Calhoun also relied on contemporary republican sentiments. At the same time, 
172 	Papers of Calhoun, 15:584; emphasis added. Calhoun also refers to them as "the banking and other associated 
interests," such as "stock jobbers, brokers, and speculators" (ibid., 16:374). 
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he expanded on the republican tradition represented by the Founders, who devised a political 
system for America based on the mechanization of virtue: Calhoun applied that notion to his 
own vision of the South as a balancing force within the union. As for his usage of the political-
economic idioms of the republican tradition, he followed Jefferson and Madison in their 
expansionist attitude to providing the nation with a sufficient amount of arable land in the 
West as well as free trade opportunities, as opposed to their Federalist adversaries. Yet, all 
things considered, republicanism was not the sole political language that Calhoun employed 
in order to drive his point home in the rhetorical arena of antebellum politics, with similar 
force, Lockean liberalism also constituted a significant part of his political rhetoric. To this 





AND LOCKEAN LIBERALISM 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars investigating Calhoun's political thought have tended to emphasize his difference 
from Lockean liberalism.' I contend, however, that Lockean liberalism was a major force in 
the political rhetoric of Calhoun, who selectively drew upon its various elements. Despite his 
explicit rejection of Locke's natural rights theory, Calhoun, in fact, extensively drew upon 
the political language of Lockean liberalism, although with important distinctions, without 
accepting its premises, yet adopting and utilizing a number of its implications. Paradoxically, 
he embraced Locke's ideas, discarding his state of nature yet, at the same time, retaining 
several of idioms and tenets of the Lockean language. 
This ambiguous attitude toward Locke is indicated by the sporadic, yet still explicit 
references Calhoun made to Locke throughout his career, and, even more peculiarly, ap-
provingly naming him as one of the thinkers whose principles had informed the creation of the 
US political system. At times, Calhoun even understood Locke's natural rights theory as 
grounds for this connection. In 1816, for example, he referred to the American government 
For instance, H. Lee Cheek claims that Calhoun's explicit denial of the state of nature or the social compact 
makes a strong case against a Lockean connection and thus contends the irrelevance of Calhoun's references to social 
contract theory. See Cheek, Calhoun and Popular Rule: The Political Theory of the Disquisition and Discourse (Columbia 
and London: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 17, 96-97. He also points out that for Calhoun, the Declaration 
of Independence was not a document based on natural rights. Instead, the South Carolinian referred to the 
"chartered rights of Englishmen" as mentioned by the Declaration, thereby clearly arguing from a position necessarily 
un-Lockean, rooted in the historical rather than the natural rights tradition (ibid., 139-40). Another recent arti-
culation of the distinction between "social contract philosophy" and Calhoun's "true science of government" is by 
Guy Story Brown, who argues that through his Disquisition, Calhoun intended to establish a new political science by 
replacing the state of nature hypothesis associated with Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
others. See Brown, Calhoun's Philosophy of Politics: A Study of A Disquisition on Government (Macon, Ga.: Mercer 
University Press, 2000), x, and 4; see also 39, 353n79, 122, 261, 310. For other discussions of Calhoun's political 
thinking pointing out his rejection of the Lockean state of nature and derived natural rights, see Eugene D. Ge-
novese, The Southern Tradition: The Achievement and Limitations of an American Conservatism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1994), 53; Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made; Two Essays of Interpretation (New York: Pan-
theon Books, 1969), 158, 211-13; Harry V. Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil 
War (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 412-14; John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in 
the Antebellum Republic, vol. 1, Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850 (Cambridge, New York, etc.: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1995), 206; and Charles A. Kromkowski, "The Declaration of Independence, Congress, and Pres-
idents of the United States," in The Declaration of Independence: Origins and Impact, ed. Scott Douglas Gerber (Wash-
ington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2002), 128. 
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as one "founded on the rights of man, resting not on authority, not on prejudice, not on 
superstition, but reason." 2 By approving of the "rights of man," formulated by Tom Paine, and 
ultimately derived from natural rights, Calhoun clearly allied himself with Lockean liberalism 
at that time. 
Furthermore, in 1821, clearly referring to the Declaration of Independence, Calhoun 
wrote of the United Sates as a country where "equality [was] first proclaimed.» 3 Calhoun's 
endorsement of the American liberal tradition was emphatically underlined by his call for 
support of the resolutions of the Democratic caucus made public in 1840, including 
endorsement of "the liberal principles embodied by Jefferson in the Declaration of 
Independence, and sanctioned in the Constitution" which "have ever been cardinal principles 
in the Democratic faith."¢ In this way, he expressed support for tenets derived from Lockean 
liberalism, and which he would later denounce. With the emergence of the slavery issue, it 
would not have been feasible for Calhoun to uphold Lockean-based "rights of man" rhetoric, 
while asserting his belief in the natural inequality of man as part of his proslavery argument.' 
The fascinating tension between his refutation of the Lockean state of nature and his em-
ployment of its implication is worth closer scrutiny. 
Links between Calhoun's and Locke's political philosophy have been discussed by previous 
scholarship. Overlaps between Calhoun's and Locke's conceptions of liberty were briefly 
referred to by Paul F. Boller, while Gillis J. Harp showed the presence of the Lockean concern 
with the disharmonizing effect of government in Calhoun's political thought. Darryl Baskin, 
2 	Papers of Calhoun, 1:329. 
3 	Ibid., 6:38. 
4 	Ibid., 15:329. 
S 	Calhoun's ambiguous, half-hearted rejection of Lockean principles can also be illustrated through his 
attitude to Robert Filmer's absolutist creed, which Locke strove to refute first and foremost in his Two Treatises. 
Peter Laslett, introduction to John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (1960; repr., Cambridge, 
etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. 50-51. As opposed to the view of H. Lee Cheek, who detects several 
parallels between Calhoun and Filmer, mainly by way of the influence of Aristotle (Cheek, Calhoun and Popular Rule, 
97-98), there seems to be not a connection but a fundamental gap between them, and this difference positions 
Calhoun closer to Locke than to Filmer. Calhoun explicitly demarcated himself from Filmer as a theoretician of the 
absolute power of the monarch to rule, derived from God. See Papers of Calhoun, 13:391 and ibid., 17:285. The 
purpose for which Calhoun employs Filmer is to denounce democracy based on numerical majority as a form of 
absolute government, no different in nature from the one supported by the latter. Thus their respective critiques 
of democracy are diametrically opposed: Filmer proposes absolute rule as an alternative, whereas Calhoun offers 
the concurrent majority to deal with the democracy of "absolute" majority, i. e., for the latter absolutism is the 
problem, while the former finds it a solution to the problem of authority and order. Furthermore, as we shall see 
below, Calhoun makes the expedience of absolute rule relative: it fits some people, but not others, depending on 
the degree of their rationality and morality. Filmer's stance also allowed for the appropriation of private property 
without consent, which, as will be seen later, Calhoun would never approve. Finally, it was a revealing rhetorical 
moment when, on February 6, 1837, Calhoun refuted the claim that he was a follower of Filmer, in response to the 
charges of Senator William C. Rives of Virginia, who identified his "positive good" thesis of slavery with the denial 
of natural rights. Rives also identified the American revolutionary tradition as one rooted in natural rights, which 
Calhoun did not deny. Still, when characterizing his own views, he associated himself with liberty, not qualifying 
it as "natural." See Charles Grier Sellers, Jr. "The Travail of Slavery," in The Southerner as American (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 46. This, then, also indicates Calhoun's disturbing relationship to Locke-
an liberalism: although accepting it as a basis of the American political tradition, which he would strongly identify 
with, he was compelled to embrace it in a qualified manner, so as not to subvert his own claims about natural human 
inequality. 
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in turn, drew a parallel between Lockean individualism and Calhoun's pluralism. Perhaps the 
most comprehensive treatment of the connection between Locke's and Calhoun's ideas has 
been offered by Hartz, who emphasized the appeal of the Lockean state of nature to Calhoun 
on the level of states in spite of Calhoun's explicit denial of such a state as well as Lockean 
natural rights. Carl Degler identifies Calhoun as a liberal thinker on account of his theory of 
the concurrent majority, based on the presumption that in its recognition of minority 
interests, the political majority is led by reason, a liberal trait.' 
Calhoun, nevertheless, adopted and employed Lockean language in more ways than 
recognized by these scholars, appropriating idioms of the Lockean language as they are 
featured in John Locke's Second Treatise of Government, in a number of instances, modifying 
them. I will concentrate on those elements of convergence between Locke's and Calhoun's 
liberal idioms that have received no attention in existing scholarship. The connection between 
Lockean liberalism and Calhoun's thought yet unexplored can be problematized through the 
following topics: Calhoun's conception of liberty and rationality; the links between property, 
slavery and government; his appropriation of the Lockean notions of self-preservation and the 
rights of revolution and resistance; the significance of majority rule in his theory of go-
vernment; and finally, the problem of the state of nature, social contract and sovereignty. I 
contend that these issues offer points of convergence between Calhoun's and Locke's political 
theory. 
Calhoun appropriated these important idioms from Lockean terminology through their 
being embedded in the American political rhetorical tradition. Therefore, it is necessary to 
discuss Locke's ideas together with their appearance in the American context from the period 
of the Revolution to Calhoun's time. 
Locke's significance in the making of the USA and its political value system has long been a 
subject of discussion. Concentrating on his Two Treatises of Government, especially on the Second 
Treatise, scholars have considered how and to what extent his concepts of natural rights, the 
law of nature, the social compact and related issues informed documents of the early national 
period, often claiming exclusive interpretive force of Lockean liberalism in explaining early 
modern American political thought.' 
6 	Paul F. Boller, Jr., "Calhoun on Liberty," South Atlantic Quarterly 66 (1967): 395-408; Gillis J. Harp, 
"Taylor, Calhoun, and the Decline of a Theory of Political Disharmony,"Journal of the History of Ideas 46 (1985): 
107-20; Darryl Baskin, "The Pluralist Vision of John C. Calhoun," Polity 2 (1969): 49-66; Louis Hartz, The Liberal 
Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, 1955; San Diego, etc.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991), 158-66. Citations refer to the 1991 edition.; 
Carl Degler, Place over Time: The Continuity of Southern Distinctiveness (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1977), 
86-87. 
' 	 These works include Carl L. Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas 
(1922; repr., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American 
Tradition of Political Libeny (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953). On the American revolution-
aries'adoption of the Lockean concept of the state of nature, see ibid. 364. For the same in the case of John Taylor 
of Caroline, see Leslie Wharton, Polity and the Public Good: Conflicting Theories of Republican Government in the New 
Nation (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1979), 15-16. Mainly as a result of the republican reconsideration 
of the roots and character of the founding era, most recent proponents of the Lockean liberal paradigm give 
testimony to the presence of Locke in America in one way or another, at the same time admitting the relevance of 
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Locke's premises about the natural rights of life, liberty and property and their ubiquitous 
character became influential in North America from the mid-eighteenth century on. 
Nevertheless, the concept of liberty had gained increasing preeminence even prior to the 
revolutionary period. The lack of constraints on the ownership and exchange of land, the 
denial of feudal primogeniture and entail as well as the introduction of religious tolerance in 
some of the colonies can be seen as Locke's principles put into practice. American colonists 
drew extensively upon the English natural rights tradition, which emphasized the sanctity of 
these rights in the face of governmental power.' 
The Declaration of Independence, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, was embedded in the 
Lockean natural rights tradition as formulated in the Second Treatise. As Forrest McDonald 
writes, "Almost to a man, Patriots were agreed that the proper ends of government were to 
protect people in their lives, liberty, and property." Similarly, Michael P. Zuckert claims that 
"Doctrinally and verbally ... the Declaration and the Two Treatises are remarkably alike. It is 
clear that by the time of the Revolution the American Whigs had adopted the Lockean political 
philosophy. »9 
other intellectual strains. See Michael P. Zuckert, "Founder of the Natural Rights Republic," in Thomas) Person and 
the Politics of Nature, ed. Thomas S. Engeman (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 11-58; 
Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1996); Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton, N.J.: Prin-
ceton University Press, 1994); Steven M. Dworetz, The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Re-
volution (1990; Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994); Jerome Huyler, Locke in America: The Moral Phi-
losophy of the Founding Era (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of A-
merican Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Joyce Appleby, 
Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York and London: New York University 
Press, 1984); Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern, vol. 3, Inventions of Prudence: Constituting the American Regime 
(Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994); and Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Se-
dorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, Kans.: The University Press of Kansas, 1985). Even 
Pocock himself did not deny the importance of Locke in eighteenth-century Anglo-American political thought, but 
he associated Lock with "radical," off-mainstream ideology, demarcating his use from the "official" one, having no 
part to play in the contemporary virtue—commerce debate. See Pocock, "The Myth of John Locke and the Ob-
session with Liberalism," in J. G. A. Pocock, and Pocock, and Richard Ashcraft, John Locke: Papers Read at a Clark 
Library Seminar 10 December 1977 (University of California, Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 
1980), 7-8, 17. 
8 	Huyler, Locke in America, 177-87, and passim; Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., American Interpretations of 
Natural Law: A Study in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931; repr. , New 
York: Russell and Russell, 1962), 9. 
9 	McDonald, Novus Ordo Sedorum, 1; Zuckert, Natural Rights Republic, 18; see also Allen Jayne, J Person's De- 
claration of Independence: Origins, Philosophy and Theology (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1998), 41-56; 
Ronald Hamowy, "Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Garry Wills' Inventing America: Je, fferson's 
Declaration of Independence," William and Mary Quarterly, 3`d ser., 36 (1979): 512-14; Jaffa, New Birth of Freedom, 410; 
and Morton White, The Philosophy ofthe American Revolution (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 
passim. Gary Wills' attempt to connect the Declaration with Scottish moral philosophy was to suggest another alter-
native tradition. See Garry Wills, Inventing America: )Person's Declaration of Independence (Doubleday and Company, 
1978; repr., New York: Random House, 1978). Citations refer to the Random House edition. However, as Ronald 
Hamowy has persuasively argued, the father of this tradition, Francis Hutcheson, referred to by Wills himself, 
adopted several Lockean tenets which thus appear in the Declaration. See Hamowy, "Jefferson and the Scottish 
Enlightenment," 508-509. In a similar vein, trying to dissociate the Declaration from Locke, Wills connects it with 
Tom Paine's Rights of Man (Wills, Inventing America, 207). Yet, it was also a writing conceptually informed by 
Locke's theory of natural rights. 
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In the spirit of the Declaration, the Ü.S. Constitution of 1787 was a reassertion of Lockean 
tenets. According to the spirit of the document, government was established to protect rights 
as natural rights. Furthermore, together with other Americans of the time, the Federalists 
retained Locke's tenet about the equal creation of humans, "deserving of equal protection 
under law."' 
This tradition based on Locke also affected Southern slaveowners' political ideas. As Louis 
Hartz emphasizes, however strenuously the southern proslavery political thinkers of the 
antebellum period strove to denounce the Lockean-Jeffersonian liberal tradition of natural 
rights, "Locke ... was too real, too empirical, too historical in America to attack." This 
strong presence of Locke, in turn, compelled slaveholding southerners to develop a proslavery 
argument that could be accommodated to the Lockean theory of natural rights." It is no 
peculiarity, then, that Calhoun also appropriated elements of the Lockean tradition. 
CALHOUN AND THE LOCKEAN STATE OF NATURE 
Calhoun's ambiguous relationship to Locke is truly expressed through his rejection of the state 
of nature, which he, nevertheless, understands as being rather different from Locke's own 
construction of it. In fact, the original Lockean state of nature exhibits several features also 
advocated by Calhoun himself. Calhoun's Locke stands for a "hypothetical and misnamed state 
of nature" that is asocial and hence characterized by unlimited liberty. Accordingly, such a 
reading of Locke turns the state of nature into anarchy or war. Calhoun's eradication of the 
law of nature from his application of the Lockean language warrants this view as well as the 
negation of its logical consequence, the natural equality of men. 12 
One of the reasons that Calhoun refutes Locke's state of nature as having real existence 
is that, as he claims, it is a state of perfect freedom. He describes Locke's state of nature as 
"a state of individuality," where "[ejvery man would be his own master, and might do just as 
he pleased.n 13 Such a state cannot exist since, according to Calhoun, man is "by nature 
social,n 14 and only an individual by him/herself can live in perfect freedom without subjecting 
others or being subjected to them. Calhoun also rejects the concept of the natural state of man 
because, in his view, it is identical with anarchy, and, as he argues, "any, the worst form of 
government, is better than anarchy." For him, the natural state of man is the social and the 
political, with government necessary "to protect society against anarchy within or destruction 
without.n 15 In other words, Calhoun identifies anarchy with the absence of government, the 
10 	Scott Douglas Gerber, To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation 
(New York: New York University Press, 1995), 19-94; Richard C. Sinopoli, The Foundations ofAmerican Citizenship: 
Liberalism, the Constitution, and Civic Virtue (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 7; quotation in 
Huyler, Locke in America, 261. 
1 1 	Hartz, Liberal Tradition, 153, 151. 
Papers of Calhoun, 25:537. 
Ibid., 25:535-36; see also Disquisition, 39. 







bedrock of political society. If there is no government, there is no control of individual liberty, 
which, in turn, leads to the destruction of society (and the individual). Calhoun, then, 
constructs the state of nature as a pre-political formation that can have no existence. This is 
why he terms it "hypothetical:" he identifies it with the state of anarchy or no government, 
which, at the same time, has no natural, i. e. preceding, existence before the social state. 
Interestingly, a closer look at Locke's theory reveals that Calhoun's painful awareness of 
the limits of liberty is a far cry from the former's concern with the problems of unlimited 
freedom. The movement from the individual to the government of the concurrent majority 
is not peculiar to Calhoun: such a movement is a crucial organizing principle in Locke's Second 
Treatise, where it is, in fact, the failure of constraint of the individual self in the state of nature, 
when judging in cases involving himself, that necessitates a third party and thus civil 
government. 
In fact, Calhoun offers a misreading of Locke's state of nature, identifying it with the state 
of unrestrained liberty, a claim that Locke himself clearly denies in the Second Treatise. As 
opposed to Calhoun's perception, for Locke, in the state of nature, the law of nature exerts 
constraints upon man's freedom by preventing the invasion of the natural rights of others. The 
state of nature is not the state of perfect freedom, or as Locke says, "not a State of Licence," 
because it is regulated by the law of nature. 16 Individuals are bound by the law of nature, thus 
far from being "free to do as they please," as Calhoun argues. (This is, in fact, the main reason 
that he calls Locke's state of nature "purely hypothetical.") 17 
Another point in Calhoun's reading of Locke concerns the role of government. Thomas 
L. Pangle argues that for Locke, the major attribute of the state of nature is that it is without 
government, that is, it is a state precariously preserved only through the law of nature. This 
precariousness, in turn, generates the demand for government. With Locke, the state of 
nature, in Pangle's words, "is just beneath the surface of all civil existence and explains the 
raison d'étre of that existence. The latent becomes actual when law and order break down, or 
when men find themselves temporarily beyond the reach of the `terror' of civil govern-
ment. »18 
Discussing Calhoun's conception of individual, society and government, H. Lee Cheek 
suggests that for Calhoun, all the possible means of "restraint" in the polity ultimately fail to 
work on the various levels of the individual, society and government. From this failure comes 
the need for the government of the concurrent majority, which is to provide a harmony of 
diverse political forces by limiting these spheres of power. Cheek lucidly demonstrates the 
movement in the Disquisition from self-motivated individuals in society through the need for 
government to concurrent majoritarian rule, each move driven by the failure of implemented 
16 	Second Treatise, sec. 6. Unless indicated otherwise, emphases in the Locke quotations will be from the 
original. 
Papers of Calhoun, 25:536; see also Disquisition, 39. 
18 	Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Phi- 
losophy of Locke (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 246-47. 
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restraint. He also marks this as a major trait of Calhoun's work, suggesting that the successive 
shifts are the results of successive failures to achieve political stability. 19 
At the same time, in a vein similar to Calhoun, Locke is concerned with failure of the 
means of restraint. The law of nature is a restraining force; however it cannot fully work in 
the state of nature due to the natural executive power of man: executing God's law when it 
affects one's or a friend's own case may lead to injustice since man is selfish, motivated by 
"Self-Love.n 20 This necessitates the social compact, erecting a civil government providing 
independent judicial and executive power to protect individuals in their estates. The main 
rationale for establishing civil government, then, is fundamentally to provide impartial leg-
islation, execution and judiciary power. In this way, as Locke says, "all private judgement of 
every particular Member being excluded, the community comes to be Umpire, by settled 
standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties." For him, the major criterion of 
"Political Society" is the community assuming these powers. Where there is no such common 
judge, that society is in the state of nature. 21 
Furthermore, Calhoun's own understanding of the natural, that is the social, state of man 
exhibits several overlaps with Locke's language. As we have seen, Calhoun offers the social 
state as man's natural state; for him, man is a social animal. Yet, for all the differences from 
Calhoun, with Locke, man is also a social being even when in the state of nature: "God having 
made Man such a creature, that, in his own Judgement, it was not good for him to be alone, 
put him under strong Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and inclination to drive him into 
Society. "22 
Government, as envisioned by both Calhoun and Locke, serves to deal with a society in 
which individual liberty may go out of control. For both thinkers, selfish sentiments of the 
individual, with no governmental control, will result in a state inimical to the existence of 
individual and society. For Locke, selfish and partial individuals in the state of nature exe-
cuting the law of nature in their own law cases necessitates government as an impartial arbiter; 
Calhoun's individuals in the "state" of anarchy, being a threat to society and ultimately to 
themselves, also require government as a controlling body. 
In either case, then, whether it is Locke's state of nature or Calhoun's social state, the 
natural state of man is neither of unlimited liberty nor asocial. In the first place, as we have 
seen, Calhoun's "hypothetical" natural state is, in fact, not that of Locke, whose individuals 
are not "free to do as they please," being under the constraints of the law of nature. In the 
second place, Calhoun's "empirical" social state is identical with that of Locke in terms of 
conditions regulating liberty and equality. 
19 	See Cheek, Calhoun and Popular Rule, chap. 3; see also 11-13. 
20 	Second Treatise, sec. 13. 
21 	See ibid. , sec. 87. Calhoun obviously went beyond Locke in that he did not find the consent of the governed 
a sufficient mode of restraint on governmental power. Expanding republican skepticism from the individual to the 
majority, Calhoun also found the element of selfish unrestraint on the level of (majority) government and attempts 
to tackle it through the concurrent majority. 
22 	Second Treatise, sec. 77; see also Zuckert, Natural Rights Republic, 24; Zuckert, New Republicanism, 286; 
McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 62. 
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What Calhoun also ignored in connection with Locke, although he never came to discuss 
it, is the latter's admission of the inequality of individuals in the concrete sense. Calhoun's 
claim about the state of nature being "hypothetical," in fact, does not necessarily equal a 
complete refutation of Locke as far as the connection between liberty and equality is con-
cerned. At the same time, while discarding the natural right of equal liberty, Calhoun drew 
upon Locke's understanding of the connection between rationality as a criterion for liberty 
and self-government, an issue that I now turn to. 
LIBERTY AND RATIONALITY 
Paul F. Boller argues that, for Calhoun, throughout most of his political career, the liberty of 
the individual "was intimately bound up with the liberty of the community—nation, section, 
state—to which one belonged," and it was subordinated to the latter. First it was the nation, 
then the section and the state, and finally the few as masters whose liberty he was concerned 
about. 23 Nonetheless, perhaps it is more important to point out that as far as liberty is 
concerned, Calhoun makes a clear distinction between those entitled to and those unworthy 
of either kind of liberty. 
Calhoun's conception of liberty distinguishes him from the American liberal tradition, 
based on the tenet that liberty is a natural, hence inalienable, right of the individual. Calhoun, 
as seen above, denies the existence of the state of nature and therefore any right derived from 
it that would be ubiquitous, available for everyone. Calhoun's denial of the state of nature is 
linked to his assumption about the inequality of individuals: some of them are entitled to 
liberty, others not. 24 Boller also compares Calhoun's notion of liberty and Abraham Lincoln's 
understanding of it. While for Calhoun it denoted privilege for "the aristocratic few," Lincoln 
regarded it as a "promise." Lincoln, according to Boller, believed that liberty and equality, 
because of the reality of black chattel slavery, did not exist as facts in contemporary America, 
but "as moral ideals to be endlessly striven for in the present and in the future." 25 
As I will argue below, in a sense, through his very strong emphasis on progress and the 
perfection of the moral and intellectual capacities of the individual, Calhoun also suggested 
the notion of liberty as a promise for those lacking it. Therefore, he can be claimed to have 
extended Locke's argument about the development of the child's rational faculty as a pre-
requisite to his full enjoyment of freedom. Thus, although Calhoun's conception of liberty is 
23 	Boller, "Calhoun on Liberty," 395-96, 397, 398, 406-407. 
24 	This_has_been-pointed out by several _writers. See, for instance, Charles Edward Merriam, "The Political 
Philosophy of John C. Calhoun," in Studies in Southern History and Politics 13, ed. James W. Garner (New York: 
Columbia University Press 1914; Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1964), 328-30. Citations are to the 
Kennikat Press edition.; Hartz, Liberal Tradition, 145-72; Robert A. Garson, "Proslavery as Political Theory: The 
Examples of John C. Calhoun and George Fitzhugh," South Atlantic Quarterly 84 (1985), 200, 202-203; Boller, 
"Calhoun on Liberty," 400-403; Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought,. vol. 2, The Romantic Re-
volution in America, 1800-1860 (1927; repr., New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1954), 73-76; and August 
O. Spain, The Political Theory ofJohn C. Calhoun (New York: Bookman Associates, 1951), 84-89. 
25 	Boller, "Calhoun on Liberty," 407. 
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fundamentally different from the Lockean version in that for him it is closely bound up with 
the idea of inequality, he justifies this yoking by means of Lockean language. The argument 
that there is a correlation between the unequal moral and intellectual level of development 
of the individual or a group of people and the degree of liberty they are entitled is arguably 
derived from the Lockean idiom about the intimate link between the individual's liberty and 
rationality. 
A basic tenet of Lockean liberalism is the close relationship between equality and liberty. 
Locke emphasizes human equality in the state of nature, in the sense that the equality of liberty 
characterizes man. As Zuckert puts is, "Human beings are naturally equal in their original 
freedom.'26 At the same time, Locke admits that although individuals are equal in the sense 
that they are equally entitled to natural freedom and cannot dominate one another, they 
cannot be equal in other respects: "Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the 
Common Level: Birth may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance 
to those to whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due.» 27 
Yet, natural equality eliminates such differences. In the state of nature, every individual 
is entitled to the same degree of liberty; this liberty is limited only by the law of nature, which 
the individual is capable of conceiving by means of reason. 28 In this way, Locke makes rat-
ionality the condition of freedom. Only individuals with the full capacity to reason are capable 
of conceiving either the law of nature or positive laws. As Locke argues about the individual, 
it is the "State of Maturity wherein he might be suppos'd capable to know that Law, that so 
he might keep his Actions within the bounds of it.n 29 According to Locke, the child does not 
yet possess this degree of reason and, consequently, his liberty is limited not so much by the 
laws which, lacking full reason, he could not obey, but by the fact that he is under the au-
thority of his father: his life, liberty and property are under the father's control. 30 Until reason 
is fully developed in the child, and he reaches maturity, his liberty is limited by his father. 
"Thus we are born Free," says Locke, "as we are born Rational; not that we have actually the 
Exercise of either; Age that brings one, brings with it the other too.... A Child is Free by his 
Father's Title, by his Father's Understanding, which is to govern him, till he hath it of his 
own." 31 As McDonald also points out, with Locke, each individual starts with a clean slate, and 
it is education and their conditions that are to result in differentiation with regard to their 
identities as adults. 32 
26 	Zuckert, New Republicanism, 16; see also McDonald, Novus Ordo Sedorum, 53. 
27 	Second Treatise, sec. 54. 
28 	Ibid., sec. 4-6; and Laslett, introduction to Two Treatises, 94-95. 
29 	Second Treatise, sec. 59. 
30 	Ibid., sec. 59. 
31 	Ibid., sec. 61; see also ibid., secs. 58, 170. 
32 	McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 53. On the centrality of the child's dependence on parental custody due 
to his nonrational condition in Anglo-American Enlightenment political and legal thought see Holly Brewer, By Birth 
or Consent: Children, Law, and the Anglo-American Revolution in Authority (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Caro-
lma Press, 2005). 
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Locke traces the lack of a fully developed rational faculty in the child to the Calvinist 
argument that although Adam, the first man, being perfect in the prelapsarian state, was in 
possession of a share of divine reason, his descendants, that is, all individuals brought to life 
following him were born without that capacity: they "are all born Infants, weak and helpless, 
without Knowledge or understanding." 33 Liberty without reason, which enables the individual 
to conceive of the limits of that liberty, at the same time, leads to his degradation. In Locke's 
words: "To turn him loose to an unrestrain' d Liberty, before he has Reason to guide him, is 
not the allowing him the privilege of his Nature to be free; but to thrust him out amongst 
Brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a Man as 
theirs.»34 In other words, providing the child with liberty prematurely equals excluding him 
from civil society even before he has the opportunity to enter it. 
Thus, for Locke, the child, with the help of his parents, gradually develops his under-
standing of the law of reason, learns how to exercise his own reason and to obey that law. 
Until he becomes capable of doing so he has no free will; his liberty is limited by his parents, 
who, as fully rational beings can comprehend the law of reason. It is only when the child 
reaches maturity, adulthood and the full capacity to exercise his reason that his father's au-
thority over him ceases to exist because he can understand the law that limits his liberty. 3s 
Colonial thinkers adopting Lockean liberty also linked it to human rationality, contending 
that reason makes it possible for the individual to act independently without encroaching upon 
others' liberty. This notion was accompanied by the idea of self-improvement, the individual's 
capacity to enhance his moral and intellectual abilities and retained its significance into and 
beyond the revolutionary period. 36 Colonials also understood Locke's emphasis on rationality 
as a prerequisite for liberty. As one of his American followers claimed, musing on equality and 
liberty: "Altho true it is that children are not born in this full State of Equality, yet they are 
born to it.... So that we are born Free as we are born Rational.»37 In asserting the rights of 
American colonists, for instance, in 1764, James Otis claimed: "In order to form an idea of 
the natural rights of the Colonists, I presume it will be granted that they are men, the com-
mon children of the same Creator with their brethren of Great-Britain. Nature has placed all 
such in a state of equality and perfect freedom, to act within the bounds of the laws of nature 
33 	Second Treatise, sec. 58. 
34 	Ibid., sec. 63. 
35 	Raymond Polin, "John Locke's Conception of Freedom," in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives: A Collection 
of New Essays, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 17; see also Laslett, intro-
duction to Two Treatises, 95; and Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 224. Such a conception of the link between the degree 
of the individual's rational capacity, his liberty and the development of human understanding is rooted in Locke's 
anthropology and his theory of the human mind discussed in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. For him, 
the individual is born without inherent ideas, possessing only the faculties of reason and sense-experience (see Hans 
Aarsleff, "The State of Nature and the Nature of Man in Locke," in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives: A Collection 
of New Essays, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 108. 
36 	Huyler, Locke in America, 186-87, 198, 207; 220. 
37 	Quoted in Fletcher Wright, Natural Law, 46-47. 
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and reason, without consulting the will or regarding the humor, the passions or whims of any 
other man, unless they are formed into a society or body politic." 38 
The clearest expression of the Lockean version of liberty during the Revolution is con-
tained in the Declaration of Independence, which expresses the natural equality of men in 
Lockean fashion. However, in the making of the Constitution of 1787 Locke was also evoked 
to justify the protection of the "natural rights of individuals.n 39 The Constitution also has other 
Lockean features: the Preamble, for instance, echoing the Lockean principle of "the consent 
of the governed," or the Bill of Rights "most concerned with" natural rights, the first A-
mendment securing "the individual's natural rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness," 
and the fifth concerning the right to property. 40 
Various state constitutions incorporated elements of the natural rights theory. The Bills 
of Rights in most state constitutions included Locke's natural rights of life, liberty and 
property, and well into the 1820s, Lockean principles found their way into political discourse. 
The debates of Virginia's constitutional convention of 1829-30 revealed a very strong concern 
with property rights, for instance. 41 
The Anti-Federalists and later the Jeffersonian Republicans also utilized the Lockean 
concept of liberty when emphasizing the importance of individual rights and liberties as well 
as the need to protect these from the federal government's centralizing tendencies. 42 This 
concern over the protection of liberty from government became characteristic of Andrew 
Jackson's rhetoric in the early nineteenth century, too, and he held, in Robert Rimini's 
words, "that individual freedom was best protected by a strong, united nation.» 43 By this time, 
for Americans, liberty included Lockean elements, meaning that "no white man would be 
subject to the arbitrary rule of another" or the "freedom of the individual to improve himself, 
both morally and materially; freedom from an established religion" and also "that liberty was 
not the same as `license,' or the absence of all personal or social restraints.» 44 Furthermore, 
those proslavery thinkers who defended slavery on natural rights grounds had to face the 
paradox of claiming that certain men were not entitled to natural rights. They tried to find a 
38 	James Otis, "The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved," in Some Political Writings ofJames Otis, 
part 1, collected with an introduction by Charles F. Mullett. The University of Missouri Studies. A Quarterly of Research 
4 (1929), 65-66. 
39 	Jayne, Jefferson's Declaration, 58-59, 60; quoted phrase in Fletcher Wright, Natural Law, 129. 
41 	Fletcher Wright, Natural Law, 112-23, 209; Richard Schlatter, Private Property: The History of an Idea 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1951), 188-89. Most conspicuously, the constitution of Virginia articulated 
natural rights as stated by the Declaration (Fletcher Wright, Natural Law, 116). 
42 	Garrett Ward Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas fJJerson (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1991), 83; and Huyler, Locke in America, 266-75. 
43 	Robert V. Remini, The Legacy ofAndrewJackson: Essays on Democracy, Indian Removal and Slavery (Baton Rouge 
and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 12. 
44 	Harry L. Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990), 
43-44. 
40 	Gerber, To Secure These Rights, 60, 68, 69. 
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way out by implicitly regarding blacks as naturally inferior beings, appropriate for en-
slavement. 45 
As a counter-explanation for the presence of Lockean language in the early republic, it has 
been suggested that at the time of the American founding, alongside the natural rights 
tradition, colonials, regarding themselves as British subjects, also championed "the rights of 
Englishmen," derived from English common law and custom; Lockean natural rights were 
affirmed alongside the Englishmen's rights tradition, colonists often fusing them with the 
more abstract, Lockean concept. 46 However, even when revolutionary colonials referred both 
to Englishmen's rights and natural rights, the latter seemed more comprehensive for them. 
They regarded English law as an expression of natural, unalienable rights but by no means 
thought it exhaustive. As Bernard Bailyn writes: "Laws, grants, and charters merely stated the 
essentials (which everyone summarized, with minor variations in phrasing, as `personal 
security, personal liberty, and private property') insofar, and only insofar, as they had come 
under attack in the course of English history. They marked out the minimum, not the 
maximum boundaries of right.n47 Furthermore, in the course of their conflict with the mother 
country, revolutionary colonists gradually shifted their emphasis from Englishmen's liberties 
to natural rights and the republican concept of positive liberty as they realized that their 
argument about the Englishmen's rights was receiving no favorable response from the Crown. 
They were compelled to employ the natural rights of Locke in order to appeal to the whole 
of mankind. 48 
With independence won, rights other than those derived from natural ones ceased to 
inform arguments of the Americans. As McDonald argues, "to claim rights on the basis of 
natural law was to go outside the forms and norms of English law and the squint toward 
independence.... When the decision for independence was made, all claims to rights that 
were based upon royal grants, the common law, and the British Constitution became 
theoretically irrelevant."49 
For instance, references to Magna Carta in the spirit of Englishmen's rights could no 
longer make sense: the document derives all particular liberties from the king, not from 
nature, as Locke's Declaration does. Also, through the act of declaring independence, Amer- 
45 	William B. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness: American Conceptions of Property from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth 
Century (Bloomington, kid.: Indiana University Press, 1977), 102. 
46 	See McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, chap. 2; Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the 
Making of the Constitution (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 293; and Huyler, Locke in America, 221. 
47 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967; enlarged ed., Cambridge, Mass. and 
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1992), 77, quotation on 78. In other words, when com-
pared to Englishmen's rights, natural rights enjoyed precedence over the former. See also Zuckert's Natural Rights 
Republic, 110-11, where he points out Rakove's source, John Philip Reid's ignorance of the natural rights references 
in his own text. 
48 	See Appleby, Capitalism, 16-22; and Rahe, Republics, 13. Garrett Ward Sheldon emphasizes a similar shift 
to natural rights language in the case of Jefferson. See his Political Philosophy ofJefferson, 186. 
49 	McDonald Novus Ordo Sedorum, 13, 58, quotation on 41; see also McDonald, States' Rights and the Union: 
Imperium in Imperio, 1776-1876 (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 7. 
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icans created a new identity for themselves, diametrically opposed to that of their once fellow 
countrymen, thus ceasing to regard themselves as Englishmen. 5o 
The key to the presence of Lockean liberalism in Calhoun's discussion of liberty lies in his 
understanding of man and society. One of the basic premises in his Disquisition is that man is 
born into the social state, which is necessary for him fully to develop "his moral and 
intellectual faculties or raise himself, in the scale of being, much above the level of the brute 
creation.n 51 It is in the social state, according to Calhoun, that the individual can best develop 
his faculties: "To man, he [i.e. God] has assigned the social and political state as best adapted 
to develop the great capacities and faculties, intellectual and moral, with which he has 
endowed him."52 
At the same time, he argues, there are differences between individuals in the degree of the 
development of their moral and intellectual faculties. In Calhoun's words, "[A]s individuals 
differ greatly from each other in intelligence, sagacity, energy, perseverance, skill, habits of 
industry and economy, physical power, position and opportunity, the necessary effect of leav-
ing all free to exert themselves to better their condition, must be a corresponding inequality 
between those who may possess these qualities and advantages in a high degree and those who 
may be deficient in them."53 This inequality of condition is to be accompanied by a cor-
responding inequality of liberty, argues Calhoun. For instance, absolute monarchy, being the 
simplest form of government allowing the lowest degree of liberty, requires the minimum 
level of intelligence from the people. 54 Furthermore, individuals, born into the social state, 
are not born free: they are under the control of their parents and the laws of the state. In his 
words: "instead of being born free and equal, [men] are born subject, not only to parental 
authority, but to the laws and institutions of the country where born, and under whose 
protection they draw their first breath." 55 
This assertion, however, is, in fact, not a denial but an appropriation of Locke's notion 
about the limits of liberty in the social state. As seen above, for Locke, liberty is not without 
limits in the social state: laws and parental authority place restrictions on it. Calhoun's claim 
regarding the infant's relation to liberty can also be argued to be an adaptation of Locke's 
proposition about the link between reason and liberty. 
Calhoun provides a more detailed exploration of this issue in his "Speech on the Oregon 
Bill," delivered in the Senate on June 27, 1848, to rebut the proposed amendments to restrict 
50 	See Edward J. Erler, "The Great Fence to Liberty: The Right to Property in the American Founding," in 
Libeny, Property, and the Foundations of the American Constitution, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul and Howard Dickman (Albany, 
N.Y.: State University of New York, 1989), 49, 60-61n28. Englishmen's rights expressed privileges granted by 
the monarch, difficult to sustain when he no longer had power over his formal subjects. 
51 Disquisition, 7. 
52 	Ibid., 10. 
53 	Ibid., 38-39. 
54 	Ibid., 38, 54. 
55 	Ibid., 39, 40. 
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the right of southerners to move with their slave property into the Oregon Territory. S6 Here, 
in a vein similar to Locke, he emphasizes the child's inability to use his rational faculty. 
Ironically, he argues this when striving, at the same time, to refute the Lockean-Jeffersonian 
proposition about equality. "Men are not born," he says. "Infants are born. They grow to be 
men.... They are not born free." Calhoun also denies the principle of the equal creation of 
men as asserted in the Declaration: "All men are not created. According to the Bible, only 
two, a man and a woman, ever were, and of these one was pronounced subordinate to the 
other."" 
There is a qualitative difference between child and adult in the social state, which, ac-
cording to Calhoun, manifests itself in the presence or lack of reason and liberty. As he 
continues, "While infants they are incapable of freedom, being destitute alike of the capacity 
of thinking and acting, without which there can be no freedom. Besides, they are necessarily 
born subject to their parents, and remain so among all people, savage and civilized, until the 
development of their intellect and physical capacity enables them to take care of themselves. 
They grow to all the freedom of which the condition in which they were born permits, by 
growing to be men.» S8 Thus, similarly to Locke, Calhoun makes the appropriate degree of 
rationality indispensable to liberty, but whereas in the Second Treatise the development of this 
faculty is confined to childhood, with Calhoun, moral and intellectual development is ex-
tended into adulthood in the case of the individual. Hence, it seems reasonable to argue that 
he appropriates and develops Locke's conception of childhood, in which learning and 
education play a crucial role in the development of the individual, extending the idea to the 
world of adults. Calhoun also differs from Locke in arguing for the unequal level of de-
velopment of the individuals' moral and rational faculties and their unequal conditions in-
cluding their differences in liberty. Yet, like Locke, he acknowledges the possibility of the 
(infant) individual reaching the condition of liberty by means of education, improving his 
faculties. 
For Calhoun, then, liberty seems intimately bound up with progress. If, with Locke, 
liberty is a potential which can be realized by every human individual like a child developing 
into rational adulthood, with Calhoun, it is rather a promise, the fulfillment of which depends 
on the successful perfection of the individual, whose development, as opposed to what Locke 
contends, is not completed by the end of infancy. Instead, for Calhoun, the development of 
56 	Papers of Calhoun, 25:513-39; and John Niven,John C. Calhoun and the Price of the Union: A Biography (Baton 
Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 315. 
sr Papers of Calhoun, 25:534. 
58 	Ibid. The lack of fully developed reason in the child probably also accounts for Calhoun's understanding 
of childhood as a state of low level "self-knowledge and awareness" (cf. Brown, Calhoun's Philosophy of Politics, 230) 
Here, in fact, Calhoun discusses two different norms fused in his understanding of development: one is abstract—
children, independent of any culture are to be able "to take care of themselves" to count as adults, whereas, in turn, 
freedom for adults is qualitatively dependent on their "conditions." In other words, independence from parents is 
a ubiquitous criterion of abstract freedom for children in order to count as adults, whereas different conditions result 
in different degrees of freedom, more in a concrete sense. For Calhoun, then, when it comes to freedom and 
independence, the adult world is diversified, whereas that of children is not; his abstract world of the universal child 
is identical with that of Locke, his world of adults, however, is not, it being not universal but concrete, based on 
differences admitted by Locke which, for Calhoun, eliminate the principle of natural equality of adult men. 
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the moral and intellectual faculties is never-ending in the life of the individual, and inequality 
plays the crucial role in development as the motive for emulation. It drives the individual to 
improve his condition, thus contributing to civilization and progress. As he argues, the 
"inequality of condition, while it is a necessary consequence of liberty, is, at the same time, 
indispensable to progress ... [since] the main spring to progress is, the desire of individuals 
to better their condition.... It is, indeed, this inequality of condition between the front and 
rear ranks, in the march of progress, which gives so strong an impulse to the former to 
maintain their position, and to the latter to press forward into their files. This gives to 
progress its greatest impulse." 59  
In his conception of human bondage, Calhoun extended to blacks Locke's understanding 
of childhood as the period of the individual's rational and moral development, connecting it 
with the notion of liberty being a precondition to progress. He, in the Lockean manner, also 
talked about children being under the guidance of their parents until they were developed 
enough "to take care of themselves,i60 and he employed such notions in his understanding of 
slavery. From the 1830s onward, with the emergence of abolitionism, Calhoun took great 
pains to quiet voices denouncing slavery for its degrading effect on black slaves. In response 
to the abolitionists, he argued that slavery in the South had a beneficial effect on the moral and 
intellectual development of black slaves, since through it, they had reached a "comparative 
level of civilized condition" and their emancipation would lead to the destruction of one race 
or the other. As far as black slaves were concerned, he claimed that "Never before has the 
black race of Central Africa, from the dawn of history to the present day, attained a condition 
so civilized and so improved, not only physically, but morally and intellectually." This is why 
he declared that slavery "is, instead of an evil, a good—a positive good.'6 ' He, in this way, 
attributed the black slaves' achievement of civilization to the paternalistic nature of the 
relationship between master and slave, that is, the extension of the father-child relationship, 
in which the development of the latter was supposedly guaranteed. 
The subjection of black slaves to white masters was also essential to the social and political 
order of the South, according to Calhoun. He believed abolitionism posed a threat to the 
South by destroying the existing race relations "by raising the inferior to be the favored and 
superior, and sinking the superior to the inferior and despised." 62 Abolition would have 
disastrous consequences for slaves, because they would be raised to a level of liberty inap-
propriate to their developmental level: "the effect of what is called abolition, where the num-
ber is few, is not to raise the inferior race to the condition of freemen, but to deprive the 
negro of the guardian care of his owner, subject to all the depression and oppression belonging 
to his inferior condition." 63 
59 	Disquisition, 38-39. Harry V. Jaffa contends that American revolutionaries understood the "enlightenment" 
of citizens as a prerequisite for free government. Jaffa, New Birth of Freedom, 419. With his emphasis on reason as a 
basis of self-government, then, Calhoun was clearly part of an American tradition. 
60 Papers of Calhoun, 25:534. 
61 	Ibid. 13:395; see also ibid. 13:63; ibid. 14:84; ibid. 15:99; ibid. 16:112,342,349; and ibid. 18:278. 
62 	Ibid., 25:667; see also ibid., 24:190. 
63 	Ibid., 19:576; see also ibid., 18:278. 
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To provide blacks with liberty that they were unsuited for would have been destructive 
to social relations, according to Calhoun's logic, and the improvement of blacks would be 
inhibited. Their level of development was not sufficient to enable them to live in civil society. 
Calhoun, however, did not believe that black slaves were capable of infinite advancement or 
of achieving a degree of development that would make slavery unnecessary." He did not see 
blacks as being capable of growing up, leaving their supposedly childlike conditions. Hence, 
he constructed slavery as perpetual (Lockean) childhood for blacks. 
In this way, Calhoun tempered his racism by connecting it to Lockean and contemporary 
American discourse about progress and self-improvement. He strove to justify this inequality 
by connecting the development of human rationality with liberty, which was Lockean lan-
guage, extended into the time of adulthood. 
SLAVERY, PROPERTY, AND GOVERNMENT 
A close reading of Calhoun's texts reveals that he appropriated Lockean language in his 
explanation of the connections among slavery, property, government and the rights of 
revolution and resistance. What I attempt to show below is how the concept of property and 
the links between slavery and property, as established by Locke, were exploited by Calhoun 
in his defense of slavery, as well as how he applied the Lockean rights of revolution and 
resistance in his defiance of the federal government. 
Calhoun's theory of property right is accessible through his usage of the concept and not 
through his premises, which, indeed, were rooted in the denial of Lockean natural rights. 
Nonetheless, his usage does fall in line with contemporary American understandings of the 
Lockean argument. This theory of property did involve the Lockean notion of its legitimate 
acquisition through one's labor and thus self. 
64 Jaffa, New Birth of Freedom, 420. George M. Fredrickson argues that the claim about black inferiority as a 
constant trait emerged as part of the "positive good" argument, in response to abolitionism in the 1830s. Proslavery 
writers held that slavery could not totally eradicate "natural" inferiority, only ameliorate it. Fredrickson, The Black 
Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914 (New York: Harper and Row, 
1971; repr. Hanover, N.H.: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), 43, 47, 53. The "unchangeability of the black cha-
racter" was a consensus view among white planters of the antebellum South, and "even those apologists who accepted 
the possibility that blacks might someday be ready for freedom maintained that additional centuries of servitude 
would be required to transform the essential Negro character" (ibid., 50-51; 55). Calhoun's positing of slavery as 
permanent childhood fitted in with the American tradition. For instance, in the minds of revolutionary Americans, 
slavery differed from the state of childhood only in that the latter meant temporary authority of the parent over the 
child. Otherwise the control was necessary for the same reason in either case: the lack of developed rationality. 
Kenneth S. Greenberg, "Revolutionary Ideology and the Proslavery Argument: The Abolition of Slavery in Ante-
bellum South Carolina," The Journal of Southern History 42 (1976), 369. By the nineteenth century black slaves in the 
South were seen as inferior but human creatures, yet, at the same time, basically incapable of existing outside 
bondage. As Willie Lee Rose argues, "they were to be treated as children expected never to grow up." Willie Lee 
Rose, "The Domestication of Domestic Slavery," in Willie Lee Rose, Slavery and Freedom, ed. William W. Freehling 
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 25. See also Jeffrey Robert Young, Domesticating Slavery: 
The Master Class in Georgia and South Carolina, 1670-1837 (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1999), 181,213 Jefferson, for instance, drew a parallel between the condition of black slaves and that of children, 
being degraded, unable to provide for themselves (Jefferson to Edward Coles, August 25, 1814, in PT], 546). 
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Property is probably the most crucial concept in Locke's political philosophy. Its restricted 
usage denotes possessions, while in an extensive sense it includes man's "Life, Liberty and 
Estate." Fundamentally, property provides the reason that men enter civil society: they intend 
to preserve it by erecting a civil government. 65 One of the basic attributes of Locke's indi-
vidual is his being a property. This notion is derived from his premise rendering the individual 
the creation and thus the possession of God. "For Men being all the Workmanship of one 
Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into 
the World by his order and about his business," Locke contends. "[T]hey are his Property, 
whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his not one another[`]s Pleasure." How-
ever, not only the divine proprietorship of the individual self but also the individual himself 
are annulled by Locke's later claim that the individual self is his own proprietor. As Locke 
asserts, "Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man 
has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.»66 Zuckert explains 
this contradiction by pointing out Locke's move from the primacy of the law of nature 
argument, with God at its center, to the natural rights argument, which revolves around the 
individual, through self-ownership. At the same time, he points out that the former still keeps 
its importance in Locke's discussion of property since he "keeps reverting to" it. 67 
Furthermore, with Locke, it is through the possessing of one's own body that one can 
acquire private property. All this is expressed through the labor theory of value, which 
suggests that by means of his labor belonging to the self, in the course of work, the individual 
turns a given part of nature into his private property, making it exempt from claims by others. 
"For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer," says Locke, "no Man but 
he can have a right to what that is once joyned to." Man acquires property through his labor, 
therefore he has a right to the fruits of his labor. 68 
65 	Second Treatise, sec. 87; Laslett, introduction to Two Treatise, 101. 
66 	Second Treatise, secs. 6, 27. 
67 . Zuckert, New Republicanism chapters 8 and 9, esp. 278, 285; 257-58. Pangle also points out the importance 
of self-ownership in Locke (Pangle, Modem Republicanism, 160). Laslett, at the same time, argues that here Locke's 
major aim is to explain the making of private property, its demarcation of common possessions granted to whole 
mankind by God. Hence, in taking issue with Sir Robert Filmer, he is compelled to refute the claim that property 
was not so much the result of communal consent, as individual appropriation based on the natural right to property. 
Laslett, introduction to Two Treatises, 101. For Filmer's argument in brief see Schlatter, Private Propeny, 152-53. 
68 , Second Treatise, sec. 27. On Locke and labor see also Pangle, Modem Republicanism, 166-70. See also James 
L. Huston, Calculating the Value of the Union: Slavery, Propeny Rights, and the Economic Origins of the Civil War (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 10. Scholars have claimed that Locke's concept of property as a 
natural right, based on self-ownership, implies the notion of unlimited acquisition of property by the self in the sense 
that he does not have to take into consideration others' needs for or claims to property (Pangle, Modem Repub-
licanism, 162; Zuckert, New Republicanism, 268-69). Furthermore, with the help of money even "spoilage limitation," 
that is, the principle that one cannot take more than one can use, became annulled (Zuckert, New Republicanism, 256; 
see also 256 and 269). All this notwithstanding, it seems that there is still a limit to the acquisition of private 
property left by Locke, which is labor: the individual's capacity to acquire private property, his own share of the 
common stock: "No Mans Labour could subdue, or appropriate all," Locke says (Second Treatise, sec. 36). So limitless 
acquisition is only a theoretical possibility; the self's ability to acquire is limited by his ability to mix his labor with 
nature. This, in turn, implies that the amount of private property that one can possess, to a very large extent, 
depends on one's personal qualities, which are necessary for acquisition. From this comes the critical role of industry 
in the accumulation of wealth for Locke. Mainly due to its egalitarian tones amplified by Thomas Paine and used by 
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Richard J. Ellis argues that, with Locke, both "egalitarian" and "individualist" conceptions 
of property can be identified. The egalitarian reading suggests that man in the state of nature 
can rightfully acquire only as much as necessary to meet his needs, whereas the individualist 
reading emphasizes the sanctity of private property in the social state. 69 The egalitarian 
conception emphasized "spoilage limitation," the limits on the acquisition of property or goods 
set by one's capacity to consume without leaving it spoiled. 
Locke's "labor theory of value," his derivation of property from the self through human 
labor has further significance. As Peter Laslett argues, in Locke's reasoning, property can 
become alienable only through individual consent exactly because it is "part" of the individual's 
personality, yet "distinguishable" from it. Taking away property without consent thus was 
inadmissible by Locke's theory as opposed to Filmer's claim, which had argued that no con-
sent was needed for the "king" or "the law" to "change property relations.' 
Locke's theory of property was one for the rising middle classes, a new social group, who 
produced goods for the market relying on their own labor, unlike medieval lords exploiting 
serfs. Also, by making the right to property ubiquitous, such independent producers could 
claim security for their own private property, no longer based on the medieval principle of 
privilege distributed by the king, who thus also had the power to take it back. Property as 
natural right knew no distinction between privileged and underprivileged groups. Laws based 
on it, as Schlatter claims, "secured to each man the fruits of his labour [sic].»71 
In Locke's political theory, property is intimately linked with slavery, which he identifies with 
the lack of liberty to dispose of one's own person and the lack of the right and duty of self-
preservation. With him, in the state of nature, the chief rule for the individual to follow is the 
law of nature, which prescribes for him self-preservation as well as the preservation of others' 
life, liberty and possessions. At the same time, self-preservation takes precedence over 
respecting others' rights. As he argues, "Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not 
to quit his station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in Com-
petition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it 
be to do Justice on an Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the Preser-
vation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of another.n 72 In other words, self-
preservation takes precedence over preserving others. 
Connected to Locke's concept of self-preservation is the suicide taboo, rooted in the law 
of nature, and in the notion that man should be regarded as God's property. This reading of 
French radicals, paradoxically, to destroy private property, even Edmund Burke, though refuting a theory of natural 
rights, clearly adopts Lockean language describing the acquisition of property through labor: "[The people] must 
respect that property of which they cannot partake. They must labour to obtain what by labour can be obtained" 
(Reflections on the-Revolution-in-France [ -1790], quoted in Schlatter, Private Property, 180-81. 
69 	Richard J. Ellis, American Political Cultures (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 30. 
70 	Laslett, introduction to Two Treatises, 103, 112; and Zuckert, Natural Rights Republic, 1 11. 
71 	Schlatter, Private Property, 15S-56. 
72 	Second Treatise, sec. 6; emphasis added.. The ambiguous nature of Locke's self-reservation as right as well 
as duty has been pointed out by Gerber (To Secure These Rights, 43). See also Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 188, 
Huyler, Locke in America, 244; and H. Jaffa, New Birth of Freedom, 417. 
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self-preservation emphasizes it as a duty, ultimately derived from God, who, through his 
ownership of man prescribes his adherence to life. Such an interpretation prohibits suicide and 
forms the basis of resistance to tyrannical power taking one's life. 73 It is only in an extreme 
case, in the exceptional state of slavery, that Locke treats self-preservation as a right, based 
on self-ownership, and not a duty, making it possible for the self to commit suicide when in 
the state of slavery. 74 This, however, is an abnormal case, when the individual lives with no 
freedom, but in bondage, in the state of war. In the state of slavery, therefore, God suspends 
his ownership of unfree man, who is possessed by someone else, but the unfree man can also 
commit suicide. Slavery is thus a state in which someone else possesses the self through 
coercion and thus liberty is suspended. 
The slave's "drawing on himself the Death he desires" is, at the same time, not necessarily 
motivated by the suicide drive but rather can be seen a consequence of being in a state of war 
with his owner and resisting him—in Locke's words "resisting the Will of his Master.» 75 
Nonetheless, according to Locke, no one can have the right to submit oneself to slavery by 
one's own will. 
Since for Locke, property "seems to give the political quality to personality," slaves are 
denied political rights due to their lack of property. 76 Slaves do not have the freedom to dis-
pose of their own persons and lives; they have no right to property. They do not own 
themselves as property, either; they are owned by somebody else, that is, by their masters. 
Hence they do not, in fact, exist in civil society but in the state of slavery. They "are by the 
Right of Nature subjected to the Absolute dominion and Arbitrary Power of their Masters. 
These Men having ... forfeited their Lives, and with it their Liberties, and lost their Estates; 
and being in the State of Slavery, not capable of any Property, cannot in that state be considered 
as any part of Civil Society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of Property," as Locke 
contends. 77 As opposed to the head of the family, who has only a temporary authority over his 
children but not over their "Life" or "Property," the master has an absolute power over his 
slave. - Hence, for Locke, slavery is also the state of war "between a lawful Conquerour, and a 
Captive, "' 8 because the state of slavery and the state of war equally lack both a contractual basis 
and a civil authority, unlike in civil society. 
At the same time, for Locke, the free individual cannot deprive himself of his liberty and 
enslave himself, because "a Man, not having the Power of his own Life, cannot, by Compact, 
73 	Sinopoli, Foundations of American Citizenship, 41-42; Dworetz, Unvarnished Doctrine, 30, 131; McDonald, 
Novus Ordo Seclorum, 61; Zuckert, New Republicanism, 239. Locke himself claims that "Men . . . have a right to their 
preservation." Second Treatise, sec. 25. The fact that the right of self-preservation is inalienable implies that "we can-
not surrender to another our right to life ... , and a person may give up life but not the right to life," says Zuckert 
(New Republicanism, 245-46). 
74 	
Zuckert, New Republicanism, 240-44. 
75 	Second Treatise, sec. 23. 
76 	Laslett, introduction to Two Treatises, 102. 
77 	Second Treatise, sec. 85. That Locke himself was prepared to see his principles put into practice can be shown 
by the fact that he was involved in drafting the constitutions for Carolina (1669) which sanctioned slavery by granting 
the master "absolute power and authority over his negro slaves" (Quoted in Huyler, Locke in America, 343n63; see 
also Second Treatise, note to sec. 24). 
78 	Second Treatise, sec. 65; see also sec. 86; and sec. 24. 
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or his own Consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary 
Power of another, to take away his Life, when he pleases." In addition, as Locke says, "No-
body can give more Power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own Life, 
cannot give another power over it.' However, through the notion of suicide that a slave is 
allowed to commit according to Locke, he confirms the self-ownership principle. 80 Slaves own 
themselves only to the extent that they can dispose of their lives. The way in which a free in-
dividual becomes a slave is through force, by being captured in a just war. 81 
In Locke's theory, property is also a major rationale for people to enter civil society. 
According to Locke, individuals "joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, 
safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and 
a greater Security against any that are not of it." 82  Civil government is established to protect 
the property of individuals, now members of civil society. "The great and chief end therefore, 
of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government," Locke 
argues, "is the Preservation of their Property."83  Furthermore, although civil society and 
government are established by property holders, in Locke's model, as Thomas L. Pangle 
points out, people outside it can become members through the acquisition of property, 
through their labor. 84 
Locke further develops the contrast between the states of slavery and freedom by claiming 
that the legislative power of the government "can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or 
designedly to impoverish the Subjects." Property is endangered in an absolute monarchy, 
where the monarch unites all the powers, and hence if the individual's "Property is invaded 
by the Will and Order of his Monarch, he has not only no Appeal, as those in Society ought 
to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of Rational Creatures, is denied 
a liberty to judge of, or to defend his Right." Therefore, the individual becomes the slave of 
the absolute monarch. 85 
Absolute or "despotical" power for Locke is outside both the natural and the social state: 
it is, rather, the equivalent of the state of war, since "it is the effect only of Forfeiture, which the 
Aggressor makes of his own Life, when he puts himself into the state of war with another." 
It is in civil society, based on compact, where the individual can dispose of his property (life, 
liberty and estates) freely within the limits set by civil government, which can dispose of their 
properties only with their consent. 86 Consequently, for Locke, the state of slavery, absolute 
79 	Ibid., sec. 23. 
Second Treatise, sec. 17 and note to sec. 24. 
82 	Second Treatise, sec. 95. 
83 	Ibid., sec. 124; see also ibid., secs. 138, 139; and Zuckert, New Republicanism, 216, 258. 
84 	Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 168. 
85 	Ibid., secs. 155, 91; see also sec. 138. 
86 	Ibid., secs. 172 and 138; see also Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 255. Rahe also emphasizes Locke's point 
that "all legitimate governments actually rested on the consent of the governed." Rahe, Republics, 32. 
80 	Zuckert, New Republicanism, 242. See also Second Treatise, note to sec. 23. Zuckert has pointed out that since 
slavery means ownership by the other, it violates both the divine ownership and the self-ownership theses. Zuckert, 
New Republicanism, 241. 
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rule and the state of war are intimately bound up with one another in that there is no security 
of property as self or possession. 
At the same time, Locke also emphasizes that civil government can turn despotic and work 
against its original task of preserving property and securing the individual's right of self-
preservation. When this takes place, the people are obliged to resist such an abuse of power 
and change government. In such a case, the people are entitled to establish a new legislative 
body to serve their needs, and the governed have the right to withdraw the power that they 
originally invested in their rulers and "by the Establishment of a new Legislature (such as they 
shall think fit) provide for their won Safety and Security, which is the end for which they are 
in Society." In other words, they appeal to God, taking into their hands the power to execute 
the law of nature and start a revolution. 87 
The basis for Locke's people having the power to change civil government lies in the act 
of its founding. As Peter Laslett has pointed out, for Locke, the making of civil government 
consists of two stages: the first creates civil society through the social compact, the second 
civil government. The latter, however, is not so much a contractual act as a "process by which 
the community entrusts political power to a government." Thus "the relation between go-
vernment and governed" is based on trust, and hence "the people are not contractually obliged 
to government." Furthermore, the concept of trust involves the notion that it is the people, 
the governed, that are "to act as umpire in any dispute between the governors and a part of 
their body." Thus, for Locke, it is the people—parties to the social compact—that have the 
power to arbitrate in cases of debate between themselves and civil government, and in an 
extreme case of the breach of trust they can withdraw their trust or consent. 88 Due to the 
two-stage-process, Locke's individuals, when applying their right of revolution do not fall 
back into the state of nature: although civil government is dissolved, the people as community 
remain in the social state. 89 The contract among themselves survives the trust that they have 
withdrawn from the government. 
In treating the dissolution of government, Locke makes a clear distinction among the right 
of revölution, resulting in the change of government, the right of resistance, and rebellion 
involving the use of force. The right of resistance is aimed at curbing an unlawful act of the 
government by means of force whereas rebellion is using force in a way that violates the law 
resulting in restoring the state of war. Rebellion is a violent act involving the use of force with 
the purpose of defying the law or changing the government: "[T]hose who set up force again 
in opposition to the Laws, do Rebellare, that is, bring back again the state of War, and are 
properly Rebels." Locke, at the same time, makes it clear that legislators may also become 
"Rebellantes Rebels" [i.e. the most rebellious rebels], that is using unlawful force, when acting 
against the trust that they were invested with by the people. 90 Locke deems the right of 
revolution vital and in accordance with the aims of civil society in the sense that by changing 
Second Treatise, sec. 222; Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 204. 
See Laslett, introduction to Two Treatises, 114, 109, 115; and Second Treatise, secs. 222, 240, 242. 
Laslett, introduction to Two Treatises, 115. 






a government that is turning tyrannical unlawful action can be prevented, and thus force can 
be avoided, saving society from the state of war. 91 
Therefore, it is, in turn, not rebellion but justified self-defense if the people use force to 
resist the attempt of the magistrates to deprive them of their rights, argues Locke. En-
croaching upon the people's rights equals the violation of the social compact and the beginning 
of the state of war: "Whosoever uses force without Right, as every one does in Society, who 
does it without Law, puts himself into a state of War with those, against whom he so uses it, 
and in that state all former Ties are cancelled, all other Rights cease, and every one has a Right 
to defend himself, and to resist the Aggressor."92 In other words, the people have the right to 
resist force when exerted in a way that violates the law, because such an act re-establishes the 
state of war, when law becomes defunct. Locke also deals with the problem of the controversy 
between the ruler and the ruled and assumes that it is the people who, having created the 
government, have the right to act as arbiters in controversies. It is in the people's power to 
deem whether the government has violated the compact. However, if the ruler fails to 
acknowledge this role of the people, force can be applied and, again, the state of war sets in. 93 
Nonetheless, Locke's people have no disposition to change their government hastily: they 
are prone to bear its abuses with patience. To refute the claim that the power of the governed 
and their right to revolution would lead to frequent changing of the government, Locke argues 
that the people do not tend to start such a revolution without due responsibility. "Revolutions 
happen not upon every little mismanagement in publick [sic] affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling 
part, many wrong and inconvenient Laws, and all the slips of humane frailty will be' born by the 
People, without mutiny or murmur," he asserts, then adds, "But if a long train of Abuses, 
Prevarications, and Artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the People, 
and they cannot but feel, what they lie under, and see, whither they are going; `tis not to be 
wonder' d, that they should then rouse themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such 
hands, which may secure to them the ends for which Government was first erected." It is only 
the accumulation of abuses that will make the people rise against those governing them. As 
he adds later, "For till the mischief be grown general, and the ill designs of the Rulers become 
visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater part, the People, who are more disposed to 
suffer, than right themselves by Resistance, are not apt to stir.» 94 
Locke's tenets of property as a natural right, the role of government in protecting it, self-
preservation and the right of revolution to resist arbitrary political power took root in 
America with some modifications. Either in revolutionary times or later, they became in-
tertwined in the service of defending property. 
As far as property is concerned, as James L. Huston claims, "Most commonly, Americans 
upheld the idea of private property by referring to it as a natural right, and justified it by using 
the natural right argument of the late seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke." 
Ibid., secs. 204, 209; 226 (quotation). 
Ibid., sec. 232. 
Ibid., sec. 242. 






Furthermore, both in revolutionary times and in the nineteenth-century, Americans adopted 
Locke's labor theory of value to justify the acquisition of private property as well as its defense 
from outside forces. 95 The revolutionaries understood property not simply as an object but 
as a relationship between possessor and possession: the individual owned an object because 
he had exclusive control over its disposal. The notion of liberty was thus intimately linked 
with that of property in that the owner was to have the freedom to dispose of his possession. 
In addition, Locke's move to make the possessor's consent the basis of property transfer was 
also adopted by the American colonists. (The individual does not truly possess an object as 
long as it can be taken away from him without his consent.) 96For the colonists, as for Locke, 
property was to be protected by civil government, since it was a manifest expression, a 
product of their industrious activities as well as the basis of their subsistence. Also, as a natural 
right, property required "equal protection under law." These principles also informed the 
argumentation of the Declaration of Independence, where the problem of consent in 
connection with representation evokes the right to property, to which all property holders 
should have free access, at the same time implying that people cannot be deprived of property 
without their consent. 97 
The protection of property rights was also seen as a main priority by the Founders, and 
similar principles were adopted by those supporting the federal Constitution of 1787 for its 
measures aimed at the compensation of creditors whose loans were to be repaid by debtors, 
thereby insuring the protection of their (monied) property. 98 For the Federalists, property was 
not a natural right, in the sense of being equally available for every individual but rather an 
interest to be protected by government. Its amount depended on the individual's capacity of 
acquisition in the social state. 99 In other words, they advocated the individual version of the 
Lockean concept of property as a natural right. Adopting the Lockean argument, the Anti-
Federalists also emphasized "the fundamental desire to protect human industry and the 
enjoyment of its product from the excesses of public power." This was the principle from 
95 	Huston, Value of the Union, 9, 10-11. 
96 	Dworetz, Unvarnished Doctrine, 74-77. 
97 	Huyler, Locke in America, 244, 246; quotation 304. Zuckert, Natural Rights Republic, 110; and Erler, "Great 
Fence to Liberty," 58. The significance of property rights for the Revolutionaries is indicated by the identification 
of property with "the pursuit of happiness." Erler has shown how Locke's concept of property and the pursuit of hap-
piness were intertwined in Jeffersonian rhetoric, meaning "that civil society must, above all, provide the security 
for the external goods in Lockean terms `properties'—necessary for the `pursuit of happiness' ." Erler, "Great Fence 
of Liberty," 51. For Locke's equivalent treatment of "property" and "the pursuit of happiness" see Gerber, To Secure 
These Rights, 28. 
98 	Huyler, Locke in America, 256-58. As Rahe claims, they "recognized that, where human beings are denied 
a right to the fruits of their labor, their lives and liberties ... are similarly at risk." Rahe, Republics, 17, see also 19. 
Seven states declared the protection of property rights Lockean-style in the constitutions or Bills of Rights to fulfill 
the requirement for states to protect property. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 152, 270. When drafting the 
Massachusetts bill of rights, besides life and liberty as "natural rights," John Adams included "acquiring, possessing, 
and protecting property." Quoted in Rahe, Republics, 17; see also Erler, "Great Fence of Liberty," 51. At the same 
time, the Constitution also sanctioned slavery as property. According to Edward J. Erler, the Constitution did it 
in three ways: Article 1, Section 3 (3/5 clause); Article I, Section 9, clause 1 (on slave trade); Article IV, Section 
2, Clause 3 (on fugitive slaves). Erler, "Great Fence to Liberty," 48, footnote. 
99 	Diggins, Lost Soul, 60-61, 80. 
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which they argued for lower tariff duties in 1789 in the first Congress, claiming that they had 
resulted in the reduction of property for the benefit of certain interests at the expense of 
others . 100 
Thomas Jefferson also seems to have understood property rights from a Lockean point of 
view. In his First Inaugural Address, Jefferson made a memorable plea to the Lockean 
conception of government as one respecting the right of property, based on human labor: "a 
wise and frugal government, which, ... shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it 
has earned." 1o1  Furthermore, he also applied the principle of spoilage limitation: adopting the 
egalitarian conception of property, he criticized on Lockean principles the unequal distribution 
of land in France when, in 1785, he wrote to Madison: "Whenever there is in any country, 
uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far 
extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a common stock for man to labour 
and live on ." 1oz Jefferson's understanding was that uncultivated land was there to be 
appropriated, turned into private property by those having none. Leaving land appropriated 
as private property unused violated the Lockean requirement of spoilage limitation. As long 
as there was uncultivated land available, it was to be made use of. 
In the early-nineteenth-century United States, the radical Jacksonians were the chief 
advocates of the egalitarian conception of property, claiming that every white male in America 
had a natural right to property. They advocated its redistribution, that is, making the fruits 
of "improductive" labor, speculative wealth, illegitimate. As one of them asserted, "The great 
Locke laid it down that we could rightfully appropriate so much as we can mix our labor 
with " 103 To acquire more would be illegitimate. 
In the minds of Americans following Locke, closely bound up with property and other 
natural rights was the right of self-preservation. They appealed to it whenever they felt that 
government was jeopardizing their rights by moving beyond its assigned limits. In Steven M. 
Dworetz's words, "[Ijt is precisely this duty to preserve one's life that delegitimizes absolute, 
arbitrary power and makes political freedom, which implies limited government, a moral 
imperative." The American revolutionaries employed Locke's right to resistance in the name 
of self-preservation when rebelling against the British Crown. 104 The Declaration of Inde- 
100 	Huyler, Locke in America, 273, 280-81. 
101 	In PT], 293. James Madison joined Jefferson in emphasizing that work was the basis of property to be 
protected by government. See Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (Cam-
bridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 193-94. Jefferson also appealed to property as a natural right 
when questioning the inventors' right to their inventions. According to him, the private property of land is justified 
by usage. "By an universal law," Jefferson argues, "whatever, whether fixed or movable, belongs to all men equally 
and in common, in the property for the moment of him who occupies it, but when he relinquishes the occupation, 
the property goes with it" (To Isaac McPherson, August 13, 1813, in PTJ, 529). 
102 	To James Madison, October 28, 1785, in PTJ, 396-97. 
103 	Ellis, American Political Cultures, 33. His words can be supplemented by those of George Henry Evans, an- 
other radical Jacksonian: "If every man had a natural right to property ... the current distribution of property, 
which left many laborers landless, must be unnatural and unjust." ibid.; see also Diggins, Lost Soul, 144-47; and 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. TheAgeofJackson (1945; repr. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), 151-55; 170. 
104 	Dworetz, Unvarnished Doctrine, 112; and Huyler, Locke in America, 248. 
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pendence, similarly to Locke, regards self-reservation both as a right and a duty and, as such,  
is a motivating force in resisting tyrannical government. Self-preservation, at the same time,  
was closely connected with slavery, and the two concepts were, for instance, discussed as  
intimately related issues by the Continental Congress, the former serving as an impediment  
to emancipation. i°s  
Slavery, a peculiar state of the individual, antithetical to the concept of natural rights,  
enjoyed a preeminent role in the Lockean language that Americans appropriated from the time  
of the Revolution. Slavery was ultimately linked with the problems of property and inequality.  
Adopting Locke's tenet of property, the colonists held that its lack equaled slavery; hence  
their argument that taxation without representation was nothing else but appropriating their  
property without consent, equaling an attempt to enslave them. In their eyes, slavery was  
distinguished from liberty through the possession of property. 106 
The property status of slaves resulted in their exclusion from civil society by means of slave  
codes and statutes. They were made outsiders by being denied the Lockean rights necessary  
for freedom, which, in turn, white men could enjoy. As a result, the revolutionary gener-
ation, relying on Locke's natural rights argument in their struggle for independence, had to  
face the serious dilemma of denying them the natural rights of life, liberty and property  
equally belonging to every individual. 107 Those accepting Locke's doctrine of private property  
regarded chattel slavery as a form of property, under the protection of the law of nature, and  
hence they understood its proposed abolition as amounting to the transgression of natural law.  
They also believed it to be under the protection of the Constitution, which guaranteed slavery  
due to the chattel status of slaves.' 08 
105 	In Jefferson, The Papers of ThomasJ~erson, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University  
Press, 1950), 1:430; See also Jayne, Jefferson's Declaration, 47, 51; and Rahe, Republics, 95. 
106 	Dworetz, Unvarnished Doctrine, 78-79. 
107 , James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom: An Interpretation of the Old South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 68-
69, 70. This can be best exemplified by Jefferson's case, who, throughout his life, strove to reconcile his own con-
tradictory views about black slavery. For him, with slavery, two rights of self-preservation came into collision: that  
of the masters and that of the slaves, and he supported the former. See John Zvesper, "Jefferson on Liberal Natural  
Rights," in Reason and Republicanism: Thomas J fferson's Legacy of Liberty, ed. Gary L. McDowell and Sharon L. Noble  
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 24. Nonetheless, considering the institution of black  
slavery as a "necessary evil," he hoped to see its gradual extermination to be followed by the removal of freed blacks  
from America. See Winthrop Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill  
and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968; New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 1977),  
432. Citations are from the University of North Carolina Press Edition; Sheldon, Political Philosophy ofBerson, 
133-34; John Chester Miller, The Wo f by the Ears: Thomas] Person and Slavery (New York: The Free Press. A Division  
of Macmillan Publishing Co., 1977), 17.  
108 	Jordan, White Over Black, 350-51; see also Diggins, Lost Soul, 141. Huston, Value of the Union, 22-23. 
Moreover, southern chattel slavery formed the basis of white male social mobility: through acquiring slaves as  
property one could rise on the social scale, becoming an independent producer. See Huston, Value of the Union, 
40-41. It could be argued that since the slave was deprived of his or her own produce, violating the Lockean prin-
ciple, the master's "fruits of labor" were ultimately not his but those of his slaves. See Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness, 
94. Huston shows, for instance, how the labor theory of value proved appealing to antislavery forces that denounced  
slave economy as being based on aristocratic planters' depriving black slaves of their fruits of labor. See Huston,  
Value of the Union, 14-15. However, given that masters possessed their slave's self as property, whatever that self  
produced, they argued, legally belonged to the former. (Oakes Slavery and Freedom, 5) Moreover, Locke also admits  
the right of the master to acquire the slave's fruits of labor (Laslett, introduction to Two Treatises, 105). In addition,  
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In defending slavery, the crux of the matter for Southern slaveowners was to preserve 
their power to define slavery legally as an institution based on property. What made this 
difficult was that, as they admitted, slaves were also human beings—although of a presumably 
inferior sort, hence their task being to define humans as objects to possess in a democratic 
society. Consequently, their concern was to exclude federal legislation from the legal de-
finition of human slaves as property, whom whites outside the South had no interest in def-
ining as such. 109 
Jacksonian America also tended to rank the right to slave property over the right to life and 
liberty. With Jackson, a slaveowner himself, equality belonged to the white males of the 
republic; blacks were not to partake of its benefits. For him and for the Jacksonians in general, 
the government had no right to address the problem of slavery in America, for in doing so it 
was bound to endanger their right to property. They also regarded abolitionist attacks upon 
slavery as threats to the American democratic order. Furthermore, Jacksonian Democrats held 
that slavery was protected by the Constitution, and hence abolitionists were simply troub-
lemakers, acting against constitutional order. 1' 
In tandem with the issue of slavery and government, it was Lockean political philosophy 
that underlay the colonials' late-eighteenth-century "theory of rebellion."' The American 
revolutionaries, drawing on Locke, employed their right of revolution to change a government 
that had, in their eyes, lost its legitimacy failing to fulfill its function of protecting their natural 
rights. " Z In this sense, their deed was indeed revolutionary, innovative and was not concerned 
with restoration—they were about to create a new order, breaking with the old one. They 
strove to justify doing so by claiming the revolution to be just against a government turning 
despotic. This is why the Declaration of Independence adopted the Lockean attitude to 
tyrannical government: when it becomes despotic, the people have the right to change it. 13 
Furthermore, the decision about the proper moment to apply the right of revolution in the 
Lockean fashion was held to belong to the governed, i.e. the people. They were seen as the 
ones having the power to judge in cases of conflict. 14 Both Locke and the Declaration invested 
the people with the power to arbitrate whether governmental power was getting out of 
slaveowners tended to claim that what they wielded power over was not the person of the slave but his labor, thus 
denying the total enslavement of human beings. It was not a one-sided appropriation of labor without consent but 
rather its exchange for masterly provision and care. See Kenneth S. Greenberg, Masters and Statesmen: The Political 
Culture of American Slavery (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 92-94. This ar-
gument, in turn, conformed to Locke's labor theory of value. 
109 	Huston, Value of the Union, 46-47, 49. 	 . 
110 Remini, Legacy of Jackson, 39, 89, 107; and Ashworth, Slave ry, Capitalism, Politics, 333-34. 
t t t 	Hamowy, "Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment," 506. Donald Lutz has demonstrated the relatively 
low citation rate of Locke among the late colonials. Yet, even he admits the revolutionaries' turning to Locke, who 
was thus the most frequently cited writer in the turmoil of the revolution. See his "The Relative Influence of 
European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought," American Political Science Review 78 
(1984), 192. This, in turn, is understandable given Locke's status as a major theoretician of revolution at the time. 
12 	Zuckert, Natural Rights Republic, 6, 27-28. On the right of revolution in the Declaration see also Fletcher 
Wright, Natural Law, 10. 
113 	Zuckert, Natural Rights Republic, 13; and Jayne, Jefferson's Declaration, 44-46. 
114 	Dworetz quotes Charles Turner from 1773: "[Tlhe people have a right to judge of the conduct of government, 
and its tendencies." They are "capable of judging in things of such a nature" (Dworetz, Unvarnished Doctrine, 182). 
96 
control. It was their reason that made them capable of making such decisions. At the same 
time, the Declaration also adopted the Lockean notion of the enduring people under abusive  
power. As the document reads, "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long  
established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience  
hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right  
themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.'HS 
These idioms of the Lockean language adopted by Americans became integral to Calhoun's  
political rhetoric and came to inform his argumentation on various issues. Calhoun made  
extensive use of Locke's ideas about slavery, property and resistance to government,  
especially during the Nullification Controversy and in his speeches in defense of slavery. His  
argument about the right of property and the preservation of slavery was intimately linked to 
the planters' discourse about self-preservation, about avoiding being enslaved by the North.  
According to Guy Story Brown, a logical corollary of Calhoun's rejection of the state of  
nature philosophy in the Disquisition is that the issue of property and its protection play no  
role, his major concern being moral and intellectual development under the protection of  
government and not material progress. Therefore, Calhoun's position is in sharp contrast with  
Locke's, which held that government merely serves "as a protector of property." Under-
standably, Brown claims, "the term `property,' so far from providing the basis of government  
or providing the essential ends whence the necessity of government is itself derived, does not  
even occur in A Disquisition on Government. n116 In other words, with Calhoun property enjoys  
no primary importance as far as the rationale for civil government is concerned.  
Brown's argument notwithstanding, it seems feasible to argue for the indirect yet strong  
presence of property in the Disquisition and its explicit role in Calhoun's system in general. In  
the first place, similarly to Locke, Calhoun also defined government as a body protecting  
property, and thus he assumed a society of property holders. The South Carolinian held that  
it was the government's duty to protect property; "with most of its institutions [it was]  
intended to protect life and property.» 117 Even those outside civil society had the opportunity  
to become part of it by acquiring property through hard work. In the second place, the word  
"property" may not occur in the Disquisition, but its surrogate does and quite in the Lockean  
sense. It is in the context of his discussing liberty and equality that Calhoun addresses the  
problem of property.  
As pointed out before, with Calhoun, the inequality of human condition based on the  
different levels of moral and intellectual development is the basis of the unequal degrees of 
liberty. This, at the same time, is a motive for the individual's development: to acquire more  
liberty, people are compelled to achieve moral and intellectual improvement. In the  
Disquisition, the issue of property is expressed through the Lockean value of labor theory, in  
relation to the problem of government and progress. For Calhoun, it is the social or political  
115 	a ne Jeferson's Declaration, 47-48, 60; and Thomas Jefferson, The  Papers of Thomas 	erson ed. Julian P. J y , 	  f 	l~ 
Boyd (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), 1:429-30. 
116 	Brown, Calhoun's Philosophy of Politics, 217, 76, 134; see also 40. 
117 	February 4, 1836, in Papers of Calhoun, 13:62; see also ibid., 16:358; and Garson, "Proslavery as Political 
Theory," 210.  
97 
state in which individuals exist, and where they can best develop their faculties, improve their 
condition and rise "in the scale of liberty." This is why he assigns a twofold role to government 
similar to the one assigned by Locke: government is designed "to preserve and perfect so-
ciety." For Calhoun, as for Locke, one of the major aims of government is to protect the fruits 
of one's labor, with property among them; in his words: "to secure to all the fruits of their 
exertions.n 18 These "fruits of exertion" which come into being through the creative power of 
liberty and progress, also need to be protected—otherwise liberty and its resulting benefits 
would be pointless. Calhoun makes clear that progress does involve the notion of material 
aggrandizement, the protection of which should be an important element of politics: 
Therefore, "to deprive [individuals] of the fruits of their exertions, would be to destroy the desire 
of bettering their condition." 19 Hence, the original twofold function of government works in 
this case as well: progress or perfection simply cannot form the basis of social existence with-
out the principle of protection, the protection of the fruits of labor, liberty and development. 
The lack of security for property would undermine the drive for progress. Improving one's 
condition by means of moral and intellectual development involves the acquisition and 
protection of the "fruits" of one's "exertions."' 
Calhoun also addressed the problem of property in the Lockean spirit elsewhere, in other 
contexts. He similarly employed the Lockean idiom about property rights during the 
Nullification Controversy, when anti-tariff South Carolinians denounced the tariff of 1828 as 
inimical to their properties. In 1828, the South Carolina state legislature appointed a special 
committee to prepare a document of protest against the federal protective tariff, justifying the 
state's position on the issue. The committee was also commissioned to explore the problems 
the protective act caused and to suggest a possible remedy for South Carolina's grievances. 
The committee submitted its report entitled "Exposition" to the House of Representatives on 
December 19, 1928. It was based on a draft prepared by Calhoun, which I will use for my 
analysis below. 12 ' 
The tariff of 1828 raised the duties on imported manufactured goods from an average of 
33.33 percent to 50 percent on average, thereby forcing domestic consumers to purchase 
them at higher prices. At the same time, since the tariff was introduced as part of an attempt 
to protect and foster home manufacturing, it had the discriminatory effect of benefiting 
Northern producers, who had to face foreign competition, and disfavoring Southern con-
sumers, who had no significant capacity for industrial production. 122 
118 	Disquisition, 9, 38 (first and last quotation); see also 36; my emphasis. 
119 	Ibid., 39; my emphasis. 
120 	Although, then, the Disquisition takes issue with the basics of Locke's theory, the latter's concern with the 
accumulation and protection of property" (Brown, Calhoun's Philosophy of Politics, 4-0) also is a primary element of 
Calhoun's understanding of progress and hence government: conditions necessary for the creation of property match 
in importance with conditions necessary to protect it, and moral and intellectual development is only a means to 
improve one's condition. 
i21 	Editor's introduction to the South Carolina "Exposition" and "Protest," in Papers of Calhoun, 10:442-43; 
and ibid., 10.444-534. 
122 	William W.Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nulljication Controvers,v in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (Harper 
& Row, 1965; New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 138. Citations are taken from the Oxford 
University Press edition. 
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In his draft Calhoun denounces the tariff on the grounds that by making imported goods 
more expensive for southerners to buy, it drains their financial resources and moves their 
"property annually to other sections of the country." 123 Employing argument grounded in the 
individualist conception of property he claims, "Our complaint is that we are not permitted 
to consume the fruits of our labour, but that, through an artful and complex system, in violation 
of every principle of justice, they are transferred from us to others.» 124  Here, Locke's ideas 
about the violation of property rights by a tyrannical government appear in a modified form: 
for Calhoun, it is the federal government that abuses power by taxing southerners without 
their consent, making them pay higher prices for imported goods because of the tariff 
duties. t25  Calhoun, at the same time, did not apply Locke's egalitarian concept of property: 
his main concern was to have governmental protection of private property, in the form of 
income for Southern exporters. Instead, he drew upon the individualist version of Lockean 
language, which was designed "to justify the right of each man to keep what he has ac-
quired." 126 
The other way in which Calhoun appropriated the Lockean defense of property right pertains 
to the problem of slavery. Like in the slaveholders' minds, slaves and property were linked 
in Calhoun's, and part of his proslavery argument defended the southerners' right to hold 
slaves as a right to hold property. As Calhoun made explicit to Northerners, their ancestors, 
trading in slaves, had exchanged them to Southern masters for money. 127 Sold by Northern 
slave merchants, black slaves came to assume the status of property, whose value was ex-
pressed through money, in turn the result of the exchange of goods based on human labor. 
Since slaves had the status of property for Calhoun, he posited the reception of abolitionist 
petitions by Congress in 1836 as the beginning of a process bound to culminate in the abolition 
of slavery in the South, equaling the violation of the right of property: "Here the subject of 
abolition would be agitated session after session, and from hence the assaults on the property 
and institutions of the people of the slaveholding States would be disseminated, in the guise 
of speeches, over the whole Union." That, in turn, would be a violation of southerners' 
property rights in their slaves. In response to this danger, Calhoun, in Lockean fashion, denies 
125 	In his "Fort Hill Address" of July 26, 1831 (in Papers of Calhoun, 11:413-39), exploring his views on the 
relation between the federal government and the states, he made a similar claim and identified the crisis as a conflict 
between majority and minority interests, involving an unjust appropriation of property: "... if taxes, by increasing 
the amount and changing the intent only, may be perverted, in fact, into a system of penalties and rewards, it would 
give all the power that could be desired, to subject the labour and property of the minority to the will of the majority, 
to be regulated without regarding the interest of the former, in subserviency to the will of the latter" (ibid. , 436; 
emphases added; see also ibid., 14: 11, 437). Here, the majority interest appears as Locke's tyrannical government, 
violating the property rights of the minority. 
126 	Ellis, American Political Cultures, 30. 
127 	Papers of Calhoun, 14:207, 208. Calhoun's argument was in harmony with the more general proslavery claim 
about the rightful appropriation of the slave's labor in return for the master's care. See David F. Ericson, The Debate 
over Slavery: Antislavery and Proslavery Liberalism in Antebellum America (New York and London: New York University 
Press, 2000), 21-22. 
123 	Papers of Calhoun, 10:464. As he explained later, referring to the tariff of 1828: "A tax [i.e. the tariff] is but 
a mode of taking away property" (October 11, 1838, in ibid., 17:437). 
124 	Ibid., 10:464-66; emphasis added; see also ibid., 12:65. 
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government the power to infringe upon the right of private property, that is, slaves. As he 
claims, "... our right to reject this petition is a truth as clear and unquestionable as that 
Congress has no right to abolish slavery in the States." 128 Should slaveholders be deprived of 
their slaves as a result of abolition, the South, Calhoun argues, would be prepared to resist and 
defend its chattels with all its might: "Come what will, should it cost every drop of blood, and 
every cent of property, we must defend ourselves; and if compelled, we would stand justified 
by all laws, human and divine."' 29 
As Calhoun understood, the preservation of slavery was firmly connected with the pre-
servation of southern culture and identity, so the two senses of Lockean property (possession 
and self) can be traced here clearly. In the face of abolitionist attacks, the South should make 
a firm stand: "There would be to us but one alternative," he argues, "—to triumph or perish 
as a people. We would stand alone, compelled to defend life, character, and institutions."' 
With emancipation, the role of black slaves and free whites would be reversed, and, according 
to him, the inanumission of the former would result in the enslavement of the latter. "They 
and their northern allies would be the masters, and we the slaves," asserts Calhoun. 131 
Accordingly, as a consequence, having become slaves, that is, the property of others, white 
masters would lose their right to dispose of their life, liberty and property—the worst a free 
individual can think of.' 32 
Jan Lewis argues that Southern slaveholders shifted from the Lockean defense of slavery 
as property protected by the Constitution in the early national period to a republican one by 
the 1830s, and Calhoun had a leading role in that shift. Furthermore, James Oakes also ex-
cludes Calhoun from the community of liberal proslavery thinkers by the 1840s, arguing that 
while the latter increasingly reverted to rights, such as the right of property, the South 
Carolinian had rejected "the primacy of rights." However, evidence shows that, much in line 
with Oakes's major examples, Calhoun remained committed to inequality on the one hand, 
and the protection of property rights and slavery on the other. Similarly to William Harper, 
for instance, he rejected the doctrine of natural rights, but, also like him, "could not break 
completely from prevailing liberal assumptions."' 33 The Lockean-based property right defense 
of slavery continued to appear in Calhoun's rhetoric well into the 1840s. 
In 1848, for example, in the debate over the Oregon Bill, he made a clear connection 
between slavery and the founding document of the Republic. For Calhoun, slaves represented 
private property falling under its protection. "Slavery existed in the South when the Con- 
128 	Ibid., 13:104, 105. 
129 	Ibid., 13:108. David F. Ericson points out that proslavery Southerners also referred to the liberal idiom 
of the consent of the governed when arguing that abolition was against the will of slaveholders. See Debate over 
Slavery, 22. 
130 	Papers of Calhoun, 13:109; see also ibid., 13:395. 
131 	Ibid., 13:397; see also ibid., 25:667. As he thundered in a similar speech: Northerners "are striving to 
divest us of our property, to reduce us to the level of those whom they sold to us as slaves" (ibid. 14:208). 
132 	On this, see also Huston, Value of the Union, 24, 53. 
133 	Jan Lewis, "The Problem of Slavery in Southern Political Discourse," in Devising Liberty: Preserving and 
Creating Freedom in the New American Republic, ed. David Thomas Konig (Standford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1995), 271, 292-93; Oakes, Slavery and Freedom, 168-74, see also 179; and ibid., 176. 
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stitution was framed.... It is the only property recognized by it.... It is well known to all 
conversant with the history of the formation and adoption of the Constitution, that the South 
was very jealous in reference to this property; that it constituted one of the difficulties both 
to its formation and adoption, and that it would not have assented to either, had the 
Convention refused to allow to it its due weight in the Government, or to place it under the 
guarantee of the Constitution.» 134 
Furthermore, in another speech on the Oregon Bill that he delivered on August 12, 1849, 
mainly designed to kill the Polk administration's amendment to extend the Missouri 
Compromise line to the Pacific, 135 Calhoun confirmed both his commitment to slavery as a 
legitimate form of holding property and the dictum about the protection of property: "No one 
doubts but we have the right to hold slaves, and all admit that neither this Government, nor 
any state government, has the right to abolish slavery in the States where it exists. But, if we 
have the right to hold them as property, we have also the right to hold them in peace and 
quiet; and all attempts to disturb or question our right, with the view to its subversion, are 
direct and dangerous outr ages ."' 36 
In claiming protection for property on the basis of the Constitution, Calhoun thus followed 
a tradition that was essentially tied up with Lockean liberalism. In this sense, too, he adopted 
the language of the Founders used for both pro- and anti-slavery purposes. He employed a 
discourse widely accepted throughout the nation. 137 By employing Locke's labor theory of 
value, Calhoun clearly aligned himself with the former's theory of property and consequently, 
government as its protector. 138 
Calhoun also adopted the idea that government is to be dissolved if it fails to protect the rights 
of the governed: "But strong as is my attachment to the Union, my attachment to liberty and 
the safety of the section where Providence has cast my lot, is still stronger ...," he once 
claimed, then added, "Our Union and political institutions can only be preserved by 
134 	Papers of Calhoun, 25:515-16. For further instances of Calhoun's understanding of slavery as property right 
see ibid., 14:66, 208, 512; ibid., 16:301; 18:220; and ibid., 25:667. On Calhoun's defense of slavery as property 
in the 1840s, see also Calhoun to Percy Walker, October 23, 1847, in ibid., 24:617. 
135 	John C. Calhoun, The Works ofJohn C. Calhoun, ed. Richard K. Crallé, 6 vols. (New York: D. Appleton & 
Co., 1851-1857; repr., New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), 4:513-35; and Niven, Price of the Union, 317. 
136 Works, 4:529. Ericson argues that some slaveholders were disturbed by the fact that they held human beings 
as property, an act against liberal principles. (Ericson, Debate over Slavery, 21) Calhoun seems to have been one of 
the exceptions. 
137 	As Forrest McDonald points out, the Lockean tenet that government cannot deprive the individual of 
property without his consent became the basis of "specific property rights," which were, in turn, expressed through 
the laws of the land. These, then, were directly rooted in political society and not in the state of nature but were 
to accord with it. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum, 65. It can be argued, then, that Calhoun was able to refer to such 
positive laws, without overtly accepting Lockean natural rights, which they were nevertheless derived from—
indirectly, through the Constitution of 1787. 
138 	Historian Richard N. Current has connected Calhoun's use of the labor theory of value to the Marxian 
notion of the exploitation of labor, unaware of the contradiction between the two. Current, John C. Calhoun (New 
York: Washington Square Press, 1963), 44, 87-88. Current's argument is concerned with Calhoun's justification 
of depriving the slave of his property as in the case of the laboring classes. Calhoun's problem, however, pertains 
to the exchange of property as the fruits of one's labor with or without consent. He employed the labor theory of 
value in order to defend owners' right in movable and immovable property, as well as in slavery. 
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preserving the rights and equality established among its members by the Constitution." 139 The 
alternative would be secession, the dissolution of the existing government and the estab-
lishment of a new one. 
Calhoun drew upon the Lockean concepts of revolution and resistance as well as self-
preservation in an effort to defend South Carolina's position during the Nullification Crisis. 14° 
Historian Pauline Maier has argued that Calhoun's attempts to legitimise state veto derive 
from the eighteenth-century notion that the right of resistance, when practised by the people, 
was to be understood as a sign for the government to change its course of policy, and thus it 
was seen as a legitimate means of preventing revolution, the complete overthrow of go-
vernment. She maintains that the nullification doctrine "was not ... a plea for revolution on 
the model of 1776; it was instead a revival of the old right of resistance, with all of its con-
servative connotations." Thus, making nullification serve the purpose of the right of resistance, 
Calhoun intended it as a conservative tool for saving the Union. He made every effort to avoid 
making nullification appear a natural right and giving a chance of identifying it with the idea 
of secession—as anti-nullifiers did not fail to make that connection. 141 
Calhoun's use of political languages, nevertheless, I argue, had ambiguous effects, his 
rhetoric pointing toward the right of revolution as featured in the Second Treatise and the 
Declaration. Furthermore, as will be seen, Calhoun's understanding of the right of resistance, 
paradoxically, like in the case of Locke, linked to the concept of force and the state of war, 
did not serve as a deterrent, to prevent revolution, but to resist force in a state of war. 
For Calhoun, the whole American system of government was based on revolution in the 
Lockean sense. In 1837, in his speech on a bill to admit Michigan as a state, responding to a 
challenge he claimed the Revolution of 1776 as a legitimate basis of the US and endorsed the 
Lockean principle of government resting on the consent of the people, who have the power 
to dissolve it by means of revolution: "I never denied the right of revolution: I contended for 
it. All our institutions rest on that right; they are the fruits of revolution. That was the pro-
position which led to the revolutionary war. I said that a convention of the people had power 
to put up and throw down any and every form of government; but that is, per ex, a re-
volution." 142 In other words, Calhoun understood the War of Independence as a revolutionary 
act, connected with innovation, a radical change of government. He employed such an act of 
innovation to legitimize nullification, a purportedly restorative, conservative measure. 
The Nullification Convention of South Carolina, to justify its decision to nullify the duties 
of 1828 and 1832, among others, issued a document drafted by Calhoun, entitled "Address 
Works, 4-:531. 
140 	Kenneth Greenberg has argued that Calhoun, through his "own conceptions of man's nature" implicitly 
endorsed the "right to revolution." ("Revolutionary Ideology," 371) However, he fails to examine the problem in 
view of its Lockean connection and outside the Disquisition. Hence, he identifies the cause of revolution only with 
the failure of government to fulfill its end of restraining selfish humans. Calhoun, however, as will be seen, went 
beyond that and was not implicit but quite explicit about the Lockean right of revolution. H. Lee Cheek finds 
Calhoun's references to the right of revolution irrelevant, along with other Lockean idioms in Calhoun's political 
theory. See Cheek, Calhoun and Popular Rule, 97. 
tot 	Pauline Maier, "The Road not Taken: Nullification, John C. Calhoun, and the Revolutionary Tradition in 
South Carolina," South Carolina Historical Magazine 82 (1981), 3, 7, and 18. 
142 	Papers of Calhoun, 13:353; original emphasis. 
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to the People of the United States" in November 1832, in which he applied Locke's concept 
of the right of revolution and the protection of rights by government to the debate between 
the federal government and South Carolina. 143 In the document Calhoun introduces a new 
Lockean idiom which he means to defend state interposition as a non-revolutionary act, 
functionally identical with the right of resistance and legitimately applied for the purpose of 
preventing the national government from wielding unconstitutional powers. It is the duty of 
a state "to resist the Government," Calhoun says, "should it, under color of exercising the 
delegated, encroach on the reserved powers.' He claims that, by means of nullification, 
South Carolina is trying to defend itself "without the slightest feeling of hostility towards the 
interests of any section of the country, or the remotest view to revolution." 14s 
However, the rhetoric that Calhoun employs to demonstrate the patience of South 
Carolinians in hope of the repeal of the tariff laws with the payment of the public debt, in fact, 
also alludes to Locke's right of revolution. For him, nullification, or state veto is the ultimate 
means of settling the controversy. As he maintains, "The occasion to justify a State in 
interposing its authority, ought to be one of necessity; where all other peaceful remedies have 
been unsuccessfully tried.» 146 The people of South Carolina, in Calhoun's argument, have been 
tolerating the unjust measures of the federal government patiently—like Locke's people 
before they would resort to the right of revolution. 
Furthermore, similarly to Jefferson, who extended the individual's right of revolution to 
the individual colonies, Calhoun applies the same right to the case of South Carolina vs. the 
federal government. "During this long period," Calhoun says, "all the ordinary means of op-
position—discussion, resolution, petition, remonstrance, and protest have been tried and 
exhausted, without effect. We have, during the whole time, waited with patience under the 
unequal and oppressive action of the system, hoping that the final payment of the public debt 
... would bring it to a termination.n 147 
This way of argumentation did, in fact, invoke the spirit of 1776, inasmuch as the De-
claration of Independence also applies a similar line of argument to introduce and justify the 
colonists' demand for independence, the application of the right of revolution. Employing 
Lockean language to justify the act of revolution, the complete overthrow of existing 
government, the Declaration of Independence reads: "In every stage of these Oppressions We 
have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been 
answered only by repeated injury.... We have warned them [i.e. the British] from time to 
time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us... . 
[W]e have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity and we have conjured them by the 
143 	Ibid., 11:660-81. 
144 	Ibid., 11:670. On lawful resistance, Locke says the following: "Supposing a Government wherein the 
Person of the Chief Magistrate is not thus Sacred; yet this Doctrine of the lawfulness of resisting all unlawful exercises 
of his Power, will not upon every slight occasion indanger him, or imbroil the Government. For where the injured Party 
may be relieved, and his damages repaired by Appeal to the Law, there can be no pretence for Force, which is only 
to be used, where a Man is intercepted from appealing to the Law" (Second Treatise, sec. 207). 
145 	Papers of Calhoun, 11:677. 
146 	Ibid., 672. 
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ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt 
our connections and correspondence.n 148 
So, through his allusion to the sacred document, Calhoun's use of the Lockean idiom took 
on a radical tone. In doing so, he evoked the right of revolution formulated by Locke, through 
appropriating the language of the Declaration. Such a move, however, subverted his strategy 
to depict nullification as a conservative, restorative measure. His appeal to a text concerning 
the dissolution of government contested his explicit aim of preserving the Union. In this way, 
Calhoun employed Lockean language originally meant to justify revolution, also appropriated 
by the Revolutionaries in 1776 to ground their cause on. What they and he appealed to was 
no right of resistance to stop the "long train of abuses," but a preliminary measure taken 
before applying the right to revolution. 149 
During the Nullification Controversy, Calhoun also employed the notion of revolution 
intertwined with the concept of self-preservation. As has been seen, Locke claims that if there 
is evidence that the rulers plan to deprive the people of their liberties, the latter are justified 
in using force, or starting a fight in self-defense, and then the state of war sets in. Andrew 
Jackson's Nullification Proclamation (December 10, 1832) and "Force Bill Message" (January 
16, 1833), asking Congress for authorization to use force in an attempt to subdue anti-tariff 
defiance in executing the law of 1832 in South Carolina evoked a similar argument from 
Calhoun in his speech on the Force Bill.' so 
Calhoun's basic point is that the culmination of the "train of abuses" is near; the country 
is fast approaching despotism due to the executive's policy. By means of the "Force Bill," he 
argues, the executive is attempting to take up arms against South Carolina. "And for what 
purpose is the unlimited control of the purse and of the sword thus placed at the disposition 
of the executive?" asks Calhoun. "To make war against one of the free and sovereign members 
of this confederation.... Thus exhibiting the impious spectacle of this government, the 
creature of the States, making war against the power to which it owes its existence." In an 
effort at self-preservation, Calhoun suggests, South Carolina should be prepared to meet force 
with force, to defend its liberty and avoid being enslaved: "It is to South Carolina a question 
of self-preservation; and I proclaim it, that, should this bill pass, and an attempt be made to 
enforce it, it will be resisted, at every hazard—even that of death itself. Death is not the 
148 	Declaration of Independence, in Thomas Jefferson, The Papers of Thomas Je, fferson, vol. 1, 1760-1776, ed. 
Jüliin P. Boyd (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1950), 431-32. 
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greatest calamity; there are others still more terrible to the free and brave, and among them 
may be placed the loss of liberty and honour." 151 
Here Calhoun also seems to rely on the assumption that liberty is worth dying for, and 
slavery being worse than death, a notion familiar to Americans of his time from the revo-
lutionary war, but which, again, is Lockean language. Locke claims that the individual, "when-
ever he finds the hardship of his Slavery out-weigh the value of his Life, `tis in his Power, by 
resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on himself the Death he desires." 152  Calhoun's duty 
of self-preservation corresponds to Locke's, rooted in God's ownership of mankind. How-
ever, when he sets up a choice between surrendering to federal tyranny, i. e. slavery and 
death, during the Nullification Crisis, and opts for the latter, he dispenses with the duty part 
of self-preservation. Calhoun also argues in the speech that the Union cannot be held together 
by force, since that would equal slavery, that is, in Lockean terms, the state of war. As he 
maintains, "You cannot keep the States united in their constitutional and federal bonds by 
force. Force may, indeed,-hold the parts together, but such union would be the bond between 
master and slave: a union of exaction on one side, and of unqualified obedience on the other."' S3 
Thus, Calhoun also appropriated Locke when arguing that resistance was justified when 
aimed against sheer force. Furthermore, as we have seen, Locke also identified the state of 
war with slavery, a state also ruled by sheer force. In such cases, in turn, the right of resistance 
to force and the duty of self-preservation, as Locke argues and Calhoun agrees—when de-
nouncing the Force Bill—came into effect. 
Especially during the Nullification Controversy, then, Calhoun drew extensively upon 
Locke's arguments about property, slavery, self-preservation and the right of resistance and 
revolution. Following that period, with the rise of the abolitionist movement, slavery and 
property remained important issues in his rhetoric. He applied them, first and foremost, to 
defend southern interests vis-i'-vis the federal government, whether it came to the defense of 
their income or the institution of chattel slavery. Quite remarkably, while being explicit about 
the denial of the state of nature, Calhoun found the implications of other components of 
Lockean liberalism usable. 
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THE PROBLEM OF MAJORITY RULE 
According to the prevailing scholarly view, Calhoun's nullification theory was invented first 
and foremost to defend minority interests. In his efforts, he is claimed to have discarded 
numerical majority as a possible basis of republican politics, denounced democracy based on 
numerical majority and preferred rule by the concurrent majority. A zealous critic of 
centralizing tendencies of Jackson's government and his conception of democracy, Calhoun 
offered his concept of the concurrent majority, and nullification resulting in consensual 
political decisions as a means to protect minority rights from majoritarian democratic rule.' 
Calhoun's critique of Jacksonian democracy was, therefore, also targeted at Locke's numerical 
majority rule. As Guy Story Brown argues, Calhoun's aim was to protect the governed from 
oppression by the government by making the latter responsible to the former. His rationale 
was that Locke's majority principle results in absolute majority rule in a democracy: "a 
majority rules, `for the time,' over the minority." The basic situation does not change, though 
the roles may get reversed as a result of democratic elections. 
All this notwithstanding, I contend, Calhoun's political theory also involved the Lockean 
concept of majority rule; in several ways, the principle of numerical majority did play a 
decisive role in his political theory. Despite his predominant interest in minority rights, he 
utilized the idea of majority rule as formulated by Locke in the Second Treatise. 
Interestingly, scholars asserting the primacy of minority veto in Calhoun's political thought 
represent only one point of the spectrum concerning his views on majority rule. At the other 
end are those who argue for the ubiquitous presence of the majority principle in his theory of 
the concurrent majority. As John Niven argues, "Even his notion of concurrent majorities 
simply split popular majorities into many parts, each of which would be subject to the same 
majority-rule, minority-right problem he had faced in the first place," and in Daryl H. Rice's 
words, with Calhoun, "the majority is finally absolute." They, however, fail to see the limits 
of the effect of majority rule in Calhoun and ignore the specific, diverse ways in which 
Calhoun puts this Lockean idiom to use. A thorough look at his doctrine of the concurrent 
majority and the mechanism of nullification can help understand the nature of Calhoun's 
appropriation of the Lockean concept of numerical majority. As will be seen, it informs 
154 	Brown, Calhoun's Philosophy of Politics, 182. On Calhoun's preoccupation of minorities as opposed to 
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Calhoun's thought in a qualified manner in more ways than identified before: numerical 
majority rules the top level of decision making, within federal government as well as on the 
level of states in the form of convention, finally in the community of the qualified majority of 
the states, blocking nullifying minority (state) veto. 155 
Majority rule is an important principle for Locke, enabling civil government to function 
properly: in civil society political decisions are made based on the will of the majority of the 
citizens, to which the rest of the citizen body is supposed to consent. As he contends, "When 
any number of Men have so consented to make one Community or Government, they are thereby 
presently incorporated, and make one Body politick, wherein the Majority have a Right to act 
and conclude the rest." If it fails to happen so, if the rest of society does not accept majority 
rule, the outcome is the deterioration of governmental power since, "it is impossible it should 
act or continue one Body, one Community, which the consent of every individual that united 
into it, agreed it should." 156  The alternative of having the consent of each individual in society 
for political decisions would be impossible to realize. Furthermore, according to Locke, the 
decisions of the majority "are binding upon the minority," and the individual members of the 
community. The minority's disobedience to the will of the majority results in the dissolution 
of civil government. 157 
The Lockean principle of majoritarian government struck root in American soil: as it was 
understood under the Articles of Confederation, majority rule was expressed and practiced 
through the majorities of individual states, which acted to execute Congressional laws. Later 
it became the foundational basis of the American political system created in 1787. The Con-
stitution made Congress a legislative body representing the majority embodied by the people 
of the whole Union, and the decisions of the new government formulated by the Constitution 
were to express majority will. Madison, for instance, explicitly identified the republican form 
of government with majority rule. 158 Thomas Jefferson even saw majority rule as an antidote 
to secessionist tendencies, arguing that when local discontents on a particular issue became 
shard by the majority in the Union, they could be remedied through the legislating power of 
the majority. 159 
For all the reverence attached to it, in the early Republic the majority principle was 
limited to a minority of the US adult population. Until the 1820s, with property and taxpaying 
qualifications, both on the state and the federal levels, the right to vote as well as the right to 
hold office was restricted to a minority of the adult white male population. Furthermore, in 
most Atlantic states, older districts in the East with population level well below those of 
western districts still sent the same number of representatives into the state assemblies. Even 
where broader franchise existed, local politics was controlled through the appointment of 
155 	Niven, Price of the Union, 329; and Daryl H. Rice, "John C. Calhoun," History of Political Thought 12 (1991): 327. 
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office holders by state magistrates instead of having the election of magistrates by the  
electorate. 16° It was from the mid-1820s on that an overall change began to take place in the  
assessment of majority rule. By the time of the rise of the Jacksonian Democrats, victorious  
in the presidential elections of 1828 and 1832, democracy based on universal adult white  
manhood suffrage began to replace the old system in which political elites had the opportunity  
to evade majority will. As a result, the will of the electorate came to play a greater role in  
political decision-making. (See, for instance, the abolition of the caucus system.) 16 ' 
Andrew Jackson repeatedly reaffirmed his position on majority rule as the basis of de-
mocracy, as well as his image as the representative of the majority interest of the nation.  
Taking Locke's majority principle to the extreme, Jackson held that having elected their  
magistrates, the people remained active in the law-making and governing process and their  
consent to laws made by the government was understood. In addition, he believed sovereignty  
to remain with the people, and advocated- the popular election of the president and the  
senators so that the people's will would rule in every sphere of US politics. 162 
At the same time that the US political system privileged majority rule, minority rights  
were often seen as needing protection from the majority, because they were regarded as  
identical with Lockean natural rights. Debate could arise only with regard to the means of  
achieving this. The Founding Fathers, for example, were suspicious of absolute majorities and  
thought to have created a republican form of government in order to avoid the excesses of  
democracy. 163 Although Calhoun was mainly concerned with this problem himself, his theory  
of the concurrent majority and nullification also contained elements adopted from the Lockean  
majority rule, but only with significant limitations and, at the same time, in more ways than  
thought before. 
The presence of the majority principle in Calhoun's political theory was, in part, due to his  
general understanding of the American political system, which he found his own theory of  
state sovereignty compatible with. According to him, the American government is based on  
the combination of the concurrent principle and numerical majority rule. As he maintained,  
the principle of concurrency was at work at the making of the Constitution of 1787, when its  
ratification was made conditional on the concurrent opinions of the states. 164 The confederacy 
under the Articles was solely based on the concurring principle; however, the new Con-
stitution created a system that endowed the federal government with powers of the absolute  
162 	Ibid. 22, 25, 26, 34. 
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majority in the making of laws, whereas states retained the constitution-making power, based 
on concurrency. 165 
The law-making body consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives, Calhoun 
admits, is based on majority vote: "a majority of the States considered as bodies politic, which 
prevails in this body; and a majority of the people of the States, estimated in federal numbers, 
in the other house of Congress." 166  In other words, within federal government majority rule 
prevails in the Senate representing states as well as in the House of Representatives, which 
represents the overall population of the states. Yet, besides his understanding of the US system 
of government, the Lockean majority principle, in part, also lay beneath Calhoun's own 
theories of the concurrent majority and nullification. 
In addition to his understanding of federal government, numerical majority rule informs 
Calhoun's political theory in three more ways: by virtue of his concurrent majority, the 
nullifying state convention, and finally, the three-fourth majority of the states overwhelming 
the state interposition. 
In the Disquisition, Calhoun expresses his preference for the concurrent majority, con-
tending that it has more advantages over the numerical one, which is based on the majority 
principle and "collects the sense of the greater number of the whole as that of the com-
munity." i67 However, hé, in fact, draws upon Locke's majority rule when he defines concur-
rent majority. In the Disquisition, Calhoun understands concurrent majority as the one that 
"takes the sense of each [interest] through its majority or appropriate organ.n 168 This way of 
seeing interests, however, is based on the presupposition that they are not unanimous con-
structs. Paradoxically, then, Calhoun admits that interests may be heterogeneous. In other 
words, his definition of interest makes it an impossible entity to identify. Yet, he immediately 
adds that "whatever diversity each interest might have within itself . . . the individuals 
composing each would be fully and truly represented by its own majority or appropriate 
organ, regarded in reference to the other interests." 169  What Calhoun seems to be assuming 
here is that one interest may consist of various individuals differing from one another, yet still 
the majority within that given interest can legitimately represent all the rest, that is, indi-
viduals that make up the minority interest. 
Louis Hartz claims to find the origins of Calhoun's concurrency principle, aimed at 
restricting majority rule in Locke's concept of the natural state. He claims, "It is here, in his 
passionate defense of the minority interest, that Calhoun goes back to Locke's state of nature 
after having destroyed it in a blaze of organic glory. For there are of course minorities within 
minorities ..., and since Calhoun offers no reason why there should not be given a policy 
veto too, the idea of the `concurrent majority' quickly unravels itself into separate individuals 
executing the law of nature for themselves." 170 In other words, Hartz argues that for Calhoun, 
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each and every interest within society is entitled to the veto power, since they are sovereign 
entities, existing in the state of nature. Accordingly, to Hartz's mind minority veto works on 
every level of society, and consequently, Locke's majority principle emphasizing the over-
whelming power of majority interest has no place whatsoever in Calhoun's system. This 
however, is not the case in which Calhoun's system works. 
For him, as seen above, concurrent majority is composed of interests, which, in turn, are 
constituted by individuals. Furthermore, interests are represented in the government of the 
concurrent majority through their majorities. Consequently, there is no further level between 
the interest and the individual. Hence, the numerical majority principle cannot work further 
down than the level of interest. In other words, the "seeping down" effect of minority veto 
depends on the presence of majority rule, which it presupposes. Concurrent majority, then, 
cannot function without the numerical majority principle in Calhoun's system. However, 
where one ends, the other finishes, too. The concurrent principle or minority veto works only 
on the top level of Calhoun's system—below that, numerical majority rules. The two "super-
majorities" on the top are empowered to veto each other's political decisions; however, their 
identities are strictly based on the numerical majority principle: interests are not defined 
through a minority veto but through majority decision. Below them, however, are the indi-
viduals in Calhoun's system and following his logic, the way their interaction generates an 
interest remains a mystery. Hence, in Calhoun's system there are clear-cut limits both to 
minority veto and majority rule: although numerical majority rule is a prerequisite for 
minority veto, neither of them is unlimited. Therefore, it is not helpful to "ask about the in-
terests of the minority within the minority, and the minority within that, and so on," as Rice 
would do, following Hartz. 11 Instead, it seems more fruitful to examine the concrete forms 
that majority rule takes in Calhoun's political philosophy. 
Another of Calhoun's applications of the majority principle concerns the process of 
nullification by a state, through its convention. Taking issue with the view that Calhoun's prin-
ciple of the concurrent majority is confined to the federal government, Guy Story Brown 
argues for its ubiquitous nature in Calhoun's political philosophy. In his opinion, "the con-
stitutional principle" applies to any kind of government including "the governments of the 
individual states composing the American Union, as well as the federal government, because 
they are all governments." For Calhoun, such a kind of government, Brown argues, prevents 
the tyranny of the majority on the state level, too. 172 
Furthermore, Lacy K. Ford has persuasively argued that Calhoun was aware of the political 
division in his own state between the Lowcountry and the Upcountry, and attempted to forge 
unity even at the price of curbing further democratization, such as the popular election of the 
state governor and presidential electors. He was anxious to keep the political balance between 
the two regions and hence also disapproved of giving proportional representation to upcountry 
parishes. Democratization would have granted overwhelming power to the Upcountry, break- 
171 	Cf. Rice, "John C. Calhoun," 326; see also Current, John C. Calhoun, 116. 
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ing the presumed political unity of the state. He was, in short, against giving numerical ma-
jority power to the Upcountry. t'3 
Yet, at the same time, the numerical principle was at work during the Nullification Crisis 
in South Carolina, and the triumphant nullifiers did rely on the Lockean majority rule. 
With their views, Brown and Ford get close to the universalist argument about Calhoun's 
concurrent majority held by Hartz or Rice. This position, however, is untenable in light of the 
analysis of Calhoun's nullification texts. As David F. Ericson points out, during the Nulli-
fication Crisis, Calhoun found his concept of the concurrent majority indispensable to political 
stability only on the federal level because he found there a plurality of interests, which he 
thought to be manageable only by means of this mechanical device. At the same time, ac-
cording to Calhoun, no such device was needed within the individual states. 174 For Calhoun, 
as far as economic interests are concerned, the federal union is heterogeneous and hence 
requires the rule of the concurrent majority, while states are homogeneous, and therefore he 
found numerical majority rule sufficient to ensure political stability there. is 
As for Calhoun's doctrine of nullification, majority rule on the state level was realized 
through the concept of nullification convention, with the two-thirds majority of votes required 
for calling the state convention of South Carolina in order to nullify the tariffs of 1828 and 
1832. The state convention nullifying a federal law deemed unconstitutional was to be 
summoned by a state legislature with a minimum requirement of two-thirds majority support. 
(Popular votes for nullifier representatives did not reach that limit in October 1832.) The will 
of the state convention thus stood for qualified majority will. 176 Had the requirement not been 
fulfilled, it would have meant the defeat of minority rule, and, in fact, the victory of the prin-
ciple of (qualified) majority. However, the nullification convention expressed the will of a 
numerical majority of the state, not a concurrent one: Unionists were against nullification and 
remained a numerical minority whose voice was not considered in an act of consensual 
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decision making as posited by the Disquisition . '77  Paradoxically, then, a numerical majoritarian 
political mechanism was cleverly used by a hegemonic minority in South Carolina society. i78 
Thus, Calhoun intended his theory of the concurrent majority to regulate the interaction 
among diverse interests on the federal level; whereas on the state level, he found numerical 
majority rule expedient as embodied by the state convention. Drawing upon Locke's majority 
rule designed for the representation of individual interests, he extended it to states acting 
while applying their state veto. 
The third way in which Calhoun appropriated the Lockean idiom of majority rule concerns 
the process in which nullification by one state can be overruled by a qualified majority of 
states. His assertion of majority rule even supersedes his doctrine of absolute state sov-
ereignty. According to his nullification doctrine, when a state deems a federal law uncon-
stitutional and hence null and void and ineffective in its territory, the three-fourths majority 
of the states has the power to "nullify" the decision by amending the Constitution. The 
amending process making the unconstitutional measure constitutional requires the qualified 
amending majority of three-fourths of the states. As Calhoun argues in the "Exposition:" 
"Admit then the power in question to belong to the States, and admit its liability to abuse and 
what is the utmost consequence, but to create a presumption against the constitutionality of 
the power exercised by the General Government, which, if it be well founded, must compel 
them to abandon it, but if it be not the General Gvt. [sic] may remove the difficulty by ob-
taining the power contested by amendment to the Constitution.n 179 By granting three-fourths 
of states, a qualified majority power, to overwhelm state veto, rooted in state sovereignty, 
Calhoun was, indeed, a follower of Lockean majority rule, which, then, left an imprint on 
Calhoun's political theory, and it did play a crucial role in his theory of the union. 
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Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 64. William Freehling also draws attention to the fact that Calhoun's 
nullification theory results in absolute majority rule within the states when it comes to the overwhelming power of 
the nullification convention, because in it he fuses sovereignty with governmental power, allowing sovereign con-
ventions to judge or make laws. In this way, the governing power assumes the absolute power of the sovereign 
thereby overwhelming minority interest in the state (Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, 170-71). 
178 	Furthermore, as Harry V. Jaffa argues, Calhoun's and later the secessionists' stance on citizens' loyalty was 
that it belonged to the states, and not to the Union, and that therefore they "were morally bound by majority rule 
within their states" (Jaffa, New Birth of Freedom, 366). 
179 	Papers of Calhoun, 10:520; see also ibid., 522,528; and ibid., 11:636,421. See also Freehling, Prelude to Civil 
War, 167. Manisha Sinha's contention that Calhoun's nullification theory promoted minority rule in that one-fourth 
of the states plus one could prevent the three-fourths' majority of states from overwriting a nullification ordinance 
does not seem to hold (Sinha, Counterrevolution of Slavery, 23). In fact, Calhoun's application of the principle of ma-
jority rule in his nullification doctrine is based on the idea of qualified majority. Making a constitutional amendment 
requires a qualified majority decision—its failure is not the consequence of minority rule, but rather the lack of a 
sufficient degree of majority support for the decision. A single state's nullifying act based on its sovereign power 
was confronted by the rest of the states as parties to the contract and measured in that way based on the (qualified) 
majority principle. 
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As we have seen, Calhoun made extensive use of Lockean liberalism despite the fact that he 
overtly denounced its theoretical basis, the state of nature. He adopted the intimate link that 
Locke established between liberty and human rationality as a prerequisite for participation in 
civil society. In this way, Calhoun was able to argue for the just nature of human bondage for 
those who lacked the intellectual capacity to live free under government. To the same 
purpose, he was also able to utilize Locke's right to property in defending slaves as chattel. 
In addition, Calhoun's individualist defense of property was ultimately based on the same 
labor theory of value in which Locke grounded his own concept of property rights. In his 
defense of slavery as property on account of the Lockean labor theory of value for its ultimate 
baseline, Calhoun thus adopted a stance that was similar to that of the Founders. As seen 
above, they gave primacy to property rights, explicitly linking slaves as chattel to the Lockean 
protection of natural rights. The Founders, however, unlike Calhoun, did sense the conflict 
between these rights. 
During the Nullification Crisis, Calhoun had the opportunity to draw upon Lockean idioms 
intensively, given that it was a situation in which issues related to government arose in an 
especially dramatic way. He appropriated Locke's concept of the duty of self-preservation, 
combining it with the right of resistance, and similarly to the English thinker, he thought 
possible the suspension of the duty of self-preservation when he regarded enslavement as a 
viable threat. Moreover, although introducing nullification as a conservative measure, he, in 
fact, evoked Lockean language justifying revolution and the changing of government. 
Finally, Calhoun also drew upon the Lockean idiom of majority rule, but applying it with 
significant limitations: his theory of the concurrent majority posited only each interest in 
society as ones defined through majorities within. This way of seeing political society, at the 
same time, determined Calhoun's views of federal relations, too, in so far as he understood 
individual states as political entities based on the numerical majority rule: even though Up-
country and Lowcountry in South Carolina were supposed to balance each other through 
minority veto, the nullification convention, an important component of Calhoun's theory of 
state interposition, was truly based on majority rule. 
Alongside the republican tradition, then, Calhoun spoke the language of Lockean lib-
eralism, too. Aware of it or not, he utilized these in an attempt to appeal to a political com-
munity steeped in them. Moreover, besides these rather secular political languages he was 
ready to draw upon idioms more related to religious nationalism, namely the American 








In a recent discussion of Calhoun's political thought, H. Lee Cheek calls for more attention 
to its "spiritual" aspect, including his concept of Providence.' This notion, indeed, provides 
a useful perspective for exploring, in part, the link between religion and Calhoun's political 
thought; moreover, it offers a starting point for investigating the interface of Calhoun's 
religious and nationalist rhetoric, which, I contend, can be successfully grasped through the 
concept of the "American jeremiad." In addition to Lockean liberalism and republicanism, his 
rhetoric was also informed by the language of the American jeremiad, as identified by Sacvan 
Bercovitch. 2 The American jeremiad was a rhetorical construct which comprised a decisive 
part of the American political tradition. It provided a space for members of the political com-
munity to articulate their anxieties about their failure to meet their cultural ideals. Informed 
by the Old Testament genre of the jeremiad that explains current social or political troubles 
as punishment for the chosen nation living against God's will, jeremiads in the New World, 
from New England Puritans through the generation of Founders, also often explained crisis 
symptoms in their society by linking them to divine punishment. More importantly, however, 
this ancient rhetorical ritual gained a new aspect in their hands; at the same time that it 
criticized transgression of moral and other nature, the American jeremiad exhibited a high 
degree of optimism, prophesizing restoration of the ideal confirming Americans' special status 
as God's elect nation. As will be explained, the American jeremiad functioned as a political 
language in the Pocockean sense both in the larger national rhetorical context and also in 
Calhoun's discourse. 
Before exploring Calhoun's appropriation of the American jeremiad, I will offer an analysis 
of his understanding of Providence as it relates to his religious nationalism. Then, after a 
discussion of those assumptions in Bercovitch's model of the American jeremiad which are 
relevant to my argument, I will turn to Calhoun's speeches and writings in order to identify 
Cheek, Calhoun and Popular Rule: The Political Theory of the Disquisition and Discourse (Columbia and Lon-
don: University of Missouri Press, 2001), 81. 
2 	Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (Madison, Wisc.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). 
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the ways in which the jeremiad appears in them.' I will demonstrate the changes in his 
jeremiad rhetoric which can be explored by tracing the modification of its vocabulary, the 
various contexts in which it appeared, as well as the functions that he intended it to fulfill 
during his political career. 
I will categorize Calhoun's versions of the American jeremiad as belonging to three periods 
of his political career: his pre-Nullification or nationalist period, the time of the Nullification 
Crisis (the beginning of his sectionalist period) and, finally, his post-Nullification period. My 
rationale for such a division lies in the recognition of the shared features of Calhoun's jeremiad 
utterances in each epoch. This division of Calhoun's life into various periods is not intended 
to suggest inconsistency in his political rhetoric.' Instead, my aim is to point out his persistent 
use of the American jeremiad which, nonetheless, was not without some differences. Such an 
understanding of Calhoun's jeremiad rhetoric is not to question his consistency in this respect, 
nor is it to deny the detectable changes in the various components of his version of it as a 
political language. 
CALHOUN AND PROVIDENCE 
Robert M. Calhoon has shown that Providence plays a significant role in Calhoun's republican 
rhetoric. Drawing upon Pocock, Calhoon contends that the phrase "mysterious Providence," 
often applied by Calhoun, is "a perfect synonym for Machiavelli's concept offortuna," that is, 
fortune as understood in Renaissance Italy: the force of contingency and chance ruling political 
life, making it insecure for political participants.' At the same time, it should be added to 
Calhoon's definition of Providence and fortune, that, as Pocock points out, in the late medi-
eval period, Providence denoted God's mysterious, inscrutable will unknown to humans, 
who, positioned in their finite world, watched and experienced the sequence of particular 
events from within. It was beyond their power to occupy the nunc-stans of God, which would 
have enabled them to understand the meaning of worldly occurrences by identifying their 
position in the larger, divine pattern. Therefore, although Providence operated asfortuna with 
faith added, signifying the contingency of earthly events seen from the viewpoint of humans, 
it assumed significance and certainty from the viewpoint of God. Belief in a providential plan 
by God made the seemingly unrelated chain of earthly events meaningful through their being 
3 	It would be an exaggeration to claim that Calhoun's political utterances were permeated with the strategy 
of the American jeremiad throughout his political career. Several speeches and writings by him, however, did 
manifest the conventional pattern, which demonstrates that Calhoun was very much part of a mainstream American 
rhetorical tradition and utilized it in various contexts. 
4 	H. Lee Cheek, Jr. criticizes such a periodization as "questioning his consistency" based on the "South At- 
lantic republican vision." See his Calhoun and Popular Rule, 63, 64, and 18. 
Calhoon, Evangelicals and Conservatives in the Early South, 1740-1861 (Columbia, S.C.: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1988), 184, 184-85. 
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part of that plan. It was only once this faith was lost that having been rid of its religious con-
tent, Providence became irrational fortune, "the atheist's version of providence."6 
By the late seventeenth century the republican concept of fortune, signifying randomness 
and contingency, was beginning to lose its appeal and was gradually replaced by the concept 
of corruption as a force that was not external to human society, not independent of and 
beyond human will. The corruption of virtue came to be attributed to "secondary" causes, 
which had human agency: corruption was seen as rooted in human society, linked to human 
action.' Calhoun's "kind Providence" had more links with contemporary American political 
thought and served as a basis for the exceptional status that he constructed for America 
through his American jeremiad. 
The examples which Calhoon cites to illustrate how the South Carolinian's usage of the 
concept of Providence is linked with the notion that chance and contingency determine 
historical events do seem to support his identification of Providence withfortuna. However, 
with Calhoun, in fact, there is also another and opposing sense of "mysterious Providence," 
bringing either good or bad, resisting human attempts to anticipate its workings. This alter-
native usage can even be detected in one of the passages quoted by Calhoon, in which the 
South Carolinian refers to "an all-wise Providence" granting "liberty ... as the noblest and 
highest reward for the development of our faculties." 8 
Here, Providence can hardly be understood as completely unpredictable: since it functions 
as a rational force (rewarding people for their proper behavior in this case) it appears rather 
as the antithesis of irrationalfortuna, hostile to man, and assumes qualities of a benevolent and 
reliable force.' Furthermore, as will be seen below, this usage of Providence also implies that, 
as opposed to fortune, the workings of the former can indeed result in political stability. 
Providence may stand for contingency, but in connection with the American republic, past 
events turn out to be favorable in Calhoun's texts, narrated and interpreted from the nunc-
stance of retrospection. 
Calhoun's public utterances contain several references to "a kind Providence," which 
seems to have taken an active part in the shaping of American history. One such instance can 
be located in his speech demanding the repeal of the Force Act in 1834. 1° Here Calhoun 
emphasizes the role of "a kind Providence" in the making of the American system of 
government, peculiar in that although spanning over a vast territory, it is capable of preserving 
liberty and avoiding tyranny. Thus, in Calhoun's reading, the making of the Constitution was 
6 	Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton 
and London: Princeton University Press, 1975), 25-30,48; and Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Polit-
ical Thought and History (New York: Atheneum, 1971; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 
84-85. Citations are from the University of Chicago Press edition. 
' 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 333. 
8 	Quotation from Calhoun's Disquisition, in Calhoon, Evangelicals and Conservatives, 184. 
9 	See also the rewarding function of Providence linked with faith in another passage by Calhoun: "Let us stand 
fast in the faith and persevere to the end in the confident belief, that, if we but do our duty honestly and fearlessly, 
a righteous Providence will reward us in the end by the redemption and restoration of the Government to its 
primitive purity and the establishment of our liberty on a more solid foundation than ever" (Papers of Calhoun, 
13:284). 
10 	Ibid., 12:277-98. 
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something of a miracle: the Framers solved a problem almost impossible to cope with. 
Although they were wise enough to devise such a system, their wisdom, by itself, would not 
have been sufficient to work the miracle. "Yet this difficult problem" [i.e. to protect liberty 
m a. country of the size of the United States], Calhoun claims, "was solved—successfully 
solved—by the wise and sagacious men who framed our constitution."—only to add im-
mediately, "No, it was above unaided human wisdom—above the sagacity of the most en-
lightened." They needed to rely on the aid of divine Providence: "It was the result of a for-
tunate combination of circumstance, co-operating and leading the way to its formation; 
directed by that kind Providence, which has so often and so signally disposed events in our 
favor." 11 Hence, for Calhoun, in this particular case, Providence functions more like a be-
nevolent helper than unpredictable fortune, a hostile force to be mastered and subdued. 
Furthermore, its workings resulted in the birth of a system that Calhoun praises for its 
stability, a quality never associated withfortuna representing change and instability. 12 
Providence, then, also features as other than a passive and unpredictable force for 
Calhoun; it is creative, exerting a lasting impact on human affairs. Moreover, it also inter-
venes in worldly affairs when needed; it can serve as a protecting force. Calhoun, for instance, 
wrote in connection with the Nullification Controversy: "May that kind Providence, which 
has long protected our country, watch over us in this great and dangerous crisis, and so en-
lighten the people, and inspire their hearts with love of their liberty and country, that they 
may clearly see the danger, and put down effectually and forever the present and all future 
attempts on their rights." 13 
In Calhoun's use, Providence also is that force that guides the Republic in its course of 
development. This conception of Providence exhibits the attributes of Manifest Destiny i4 
assigning the course of American history: "Providence has bestowed on us a new and vast 
region," Calhoun claimed in 1841, "abounding in resources beyond any country of the same 
extent on the globe. Ours is a peaceful task—to improve this rich inheritance; to level its 
forests ... stud its wide surface with flourishing cities, towns, and villages; and spread over 
it richly cultivated fields." 15  Providence, for Calhoun, at the same time, also appears in a 
sectional context and can function to promote particular interests within the Union. This 
notion, for example, appears in a passage in which he expresses his hope that the South would 
be able to resist federal power if need be: "We have much to do, but with united councils, and 
11 	
Ib id., 12:283. 
12 	Cf. also Calhoun's speech on presidential veto power in 1842, where he refers to "that wonderful and 
sublime system of Government which our patriotic ancestors established, not so much by their wisdom, as wise and 
experienced as they were, as by the guidance of a kind Providence, who, in his divine dispensation, so disposed 
events as to lead to the establishment of a system of government wiser than those who framed it" (ibid., 16:99). 
13 	Ibid., 12:157-58; see also ibid. , 13:465. 
14 	For "Manifest Destiny" in the antebellum period, I take Frederick Merk's definition, i.e. "expansion pre- 
arranged by Heaven, over an area not clearly defined." Merk, Man Pest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Rein-
terpretation, rev. ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963; Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), 24. 
Is 	August 24, 1841, in Papers of Calhoun, 15:729. 
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firm hearts, aided by a kind Providence, we will succeed in securing our liberty, and, I trust, 
in preserving the Constitution, and the Union."' 
Thus, it seems that in Calhoun's republican vocabulary Providence can be regarded as 
more than the equivalent of fortune. Although one can detect certain instances in his political 
language in which Providence appears as an inscrutable force, there are also several instances 
when it manifests several characteristics distinguishing it from republican fortune. In the first 
place, Providence cannot be mastered by men, whereas fortune is supposed to be; 17 in the 
second place, fortune is a passive principle, while Providence, as it functions for Calhoun, is 
always active and is in complete control of the course of events; in the third place, Calhoun's 
references to "a kind Providence" indicate that, for him, it has attributes of a benevolent force, 
especially when it works in the context of American history, whereas fortuna is never "kind" 
per se—it is to be made as such; finally, Calhoun's Providence is not irrational as fortune is 
because it also involves faith, i.e. the notion of a purpose, a divine plan. His faith in a divine 
force having a purpose for man (or the American Republic) assures this. Furthermore, as will 
be seen below, "kind Providence" is also linked to the notion of exceptionalism in Calhoun's 
political rhetoric within the framework of the American jeremiad. 
THE CONCEPT OF THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD 
The concept of the American jeremiad facilitates an analysis of the interface of religion and 
politics from a rhetorical perspective. Relying on this concept, Bercovitch undertakes to ex-
plore a religious aspect of American culture, from Puritan times to the nineteenth century, 
with particular focus on its rhetorical workings. 18 Bercovitch defines the American jeremiad 
as a "ritual designed to join social criticism to spiritual renewal." It is rhetorical in nature, ful-
filling an ideological role insofar as it has been used by its practitioners to forge a consensus 
in US society. Hence, in Bercovitch's interpretation, the American jeremiad has functioned 
as the major legitimizing rhetorical ritual in American culture, even inviting the participation 
of dissent in the national middle-class consensus as long as its social criticism could be 
16 	Ibid., 12:147. In a similar vein, Calhoun also evoked Providence in his defense of slavery. In one of his 
speeches on the subject he remarks, "As to our duties, it is enough to declare, what all wise and temperate minds 
acquainted with the subject will admit, that our slaves are probably in the best hands to which a kind Providence 
could have assigned their happiness" (ibid., 12:550-51). 
17 	Pocock emphasizes the importance of manly viral in the mastering of feminine fortuna in the Renaissance 
period. See Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 37. 
18 	Other works discussing the connection between religion and American political culture include Ruth 
Bloch's Visionary Republic: Millennial Themes in American Thought, 1756-1800 (1985; Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), focusing on the interaction of religious millennialism and political discourse in the late-
eighteenth-century United States. Michael Lienesch discusses the sacred and secular readings of the past, while the 
constitutional era is covered by Paul C. Nagel. See Lienesch New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the 
Making of Modern American Political Thought (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 17-37; and Nagel, 
This Sacred Trust: American Nationality, 1798-1898 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
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integrated into the latter and made part of a continuing revolution, that urged a restoration 
of cultural ideals and values formulated during the American Revolution. i9 
What provides the American jeremiad with its nation-specific trait is the affirmation of the 
middle-class cultural ideal, based on commitment to free enterprise, with its roots extending 
back to Puritan times and unfolding in the early nineteenth century. It is part of a rhetorical 
strategy, therefore, underpinning the American middle-class "way of life." 20 The cultural 
significance of the American jeremiad is indicated by Bercovitch's statement that as a ritual 
it provided "spiritual cohesion" for a society with no tradition, by generating its identity 
through offering "the figural correlative to the theory of democratic capitalism. It gave the 
nation a past and future in sacred history, rendered its political and legal outlook a fulfillment 
of prophecy. n21 
The basis of Bercovitch's model is Perry Miller's understanding of the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Puritan jeremiad. In Miller's account, the jeremiads of the second and 
third generations of the New England Puritans were intended to express anxiety over the 
moral state of their community, and, consequently, the success of their mission. Moral de-
generation, dread of the failure to carry out their "errand into the wilderness" and to build a 
second Jerusalem in the New World as God's chosen people, as well as God's afflictions 
intended as punishment for their departure from the Founding Fathers' way were recurrent 
themes in Puritan political sermons of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 22 
Modifying Miller's model of promise and declension Bercovitch emphasizes one more 
important element of the American jeremiad: prophecy, that is, the idea that despite a 
temporary declension from the original state of perfection, God's chosen people will ulti-
mately fulfill His promise and will build His kingdom on earth. God's afflictions were inter-
preted by Puritan ministers not simply as punishment for declining but also as signs pointing 
to the ultimate success of the mission, encouraging the community to return to its original 
path of righteousness by achieving correction through castigation. As Bercovitch argues, "the 
Puritans' cries about declension and doom were part of a strategy to revitalize the errand," 
19 	Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, xi, xii, 152-60. 
20 	Ibid., xiii-xiv. Bercovitch maintains that the southern way of life was different from the American middle- 
class one. He even accepts C. Vann Woodward's daim about the South being "un-American" (ibid. xiii , note*). 
Bercovitch's contention notwithstanding, Calhoun's case shows that the American jeremiad, originally designed to 
substantiate northern middle-class ways, could be appropriated by southern planters whose culture was, to a 
considerable extent, not alien but rather akin to the Yankee free-enterprise ethos. Cf. James Oakes, The Ruling Race: 
A History of American Slaveholders (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), 69-95. 
21 	Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 140. 
22 	See Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (New York: Macmillan, 1939); Miller, The New 
England Mind: From Colony to Province (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1953); and Miller, 
Errand into the Wilderness (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1956). Bercovitch's analysis of the 
American jeremiad also stresses the notion of election, the belief that it is God's chosen people who are to carry out 
the mission of establishing His kingdom on earth as part of the covenant made with Him (Bercovitch, American Jer-
emiad, 117). On the notion of Americans as an elect nation see also Ernest Lee Tuveson's classic Redeemer Nation: 
The Idea of America's Millennial Role (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.) With the Civil 
War as a closing event, he also explores the theme of America as a chosen nation to redeem the world. Puritans 
returned to the notion of an earthly millennium instead of the notion of the City of God, the "mystical body of the 
faithful," elaborated by St. Augustine (ibid., ix-x and passim). 
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to call on the community to return to the consensual cultural model. 23 Therefore, the jer-
emiads of the American Puritans expressed "unshakable optimism" by promising the "ultimate 
success" of their enterprise in the New World. This is, in Bercovitch's eyes, what makes the 
New England jeremiad essentially different from its European counterpart, which laid stress 
on the general depravity of man and the impossibility of avoiding divine retribution for the 
waywardness of mankind. 24 Thus, the optimism of the American jeremiad ultimately lay in 
the premise of election. Nevertheless, as a rhetorical ritual, the American jeremiad also 
expressed an attitude that was future oriented, and through a sense of anxiety suggested the 
impossibility of meeting the ideal in the present. As Bercovitch contends, "The very concept 
of errand ... implied a state of unfulfillment ..., the distance between promise and fact." 25 
Another significant element of the American jeremiad is related to the figural way of 
thinking and persuasion, based on the dichotomy as well as the connection between "type" and 
"antitype." The term "antitype" comes from biblical typology, which establishes the identity 
of type orfigura as found in the Old Testament and antitype, identified as Christ, in the New 
Testament, thus establishing figural correspondences between characters in the two portions 
of Scripture. Thus Christ may appear as the antitype of Moses or John the Baptist, and so on. 
In the New World, the Puritans were the first practitioners of typology, using biblical events 
as "horological antecedents" to foreshadow their own venture, or biblical figures to refer to 
themselves. 26 
Establishing a connection between antitype and type through figural correspondence, the 
metaphorical power of the jeremiad can be employed in a process of legitimization, insofar 
as it offers a means to identify the type or figura in terms of the antitype. The New England 
Puritans' New Israel or Cotton Mather's John Winthrop as "Nehemias Americanus," for that 
matter, according to the culture of the jeremiad, could gain significance for the community 
only by means of its rhetorical identification with its antitype. 27 In the case of the jeremiad, 
the desire of legitimization, the ultimate drive of rhetorical persuasion, then, is intimately 
linked with that of familiarization, the effort to make sense to an audience, hence, as will be 
seen later, Calhoun's attempts to draw upon historical precedents to explain the significance 
of nullification as well as the details of the declension. 28 
Bercovitch's analysis increases the time span of the operation of the New England 
jeremiad, both backward and forward, making it "American." While Miller identifies the 
second generation Puritans as the first practitioners of the political sermon in New England, 
28 	The problem that Calhoun faced can be seen as similar to the one confronting the early modern thinkers 
discussed by Pocock in his Machiavellian Moment. As Pocock argues, the major dilemma for late medieval and Re-
naissance epistemology was how to render the particular meaningful given that it was regarded as "less intelligible 
and less rational" than the universal. (4) One way to solve the problem in Christian thinking was to relate particulars 
to universals, to the sacred, by way of typology, for instance (ibid., 8). 
23 Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, xiv. 
24 	Ibid., 7-8, quoted phrases on 7. 
25 	Ibid., 23; original emphasis. 
26 	On the significance of figuralism in New England Puritanism, see Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the 
American Self (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975), 35-39. 
27 	On Cotton Mather's rendering Winthrop as the American Nehemiah, see Bercovitch, Puritan Origins, passim. 
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Bercovitch argues that representatives of the first generation such as John Winthrop and John 
Cotton delivered sermons already featuring the basic elements of the American jeremiad. 
Bercovitch also demonstrates that the tripartite structure of the jeremiad (i.e. promise, 
declension and prophecy) was exploited by later generations of Americans, and spread geo-
graphically from New England to other parts of the would-be United States. In Bercovitch's 
words, "the vision survived—from colony to province, and from province to nation." 29 
The continuity in the structure of the American jeremiad throughout the centuries does 
not, at the same time, preclude changes in its characteristic features. Its major feature being 
the generation of political and social consensus, the American jeremiad as public speech 
belonged to a political community which underwent a transformation, and so did its concerns 
and objectives. Its development involved not only the widening boundaries of the community 
belonging to its domain but also the secularization of the errand and thus the appearance of 
the "Yankee Jeremiahs." The seventeenth-century New England jeremiads . sought to achieve 
the "rhetorical synthesis of man's time and God's," thus ensuring the community's parti-
cipation in the divine project by building the New Israel in America. Hence their profane 
deeds in the New World assumed sacred significance. 30 The eighteenth century brought about 
the substitution of a regional past for a biblical one and the moment of transforming "sacred 
history into a metaphor for limitless secular improvement." In the colonies of the eighteenth 
century, westward expansion was interpreted as part of the errand into the wilderness, which, 
on the other hand, was intimately linked with the American ideal of worldly progress. 31 
This secularized version of the New England Puritan jeremiad was adopted and further 
developed by the colonists during their conflict with the British Crown. For some, taxation 
by Parliament was one of the afflictions inflicted by God upon a community rambling off the 
path of righteousness. At the same time, Whig revolutionaries also used the American jer-
emiad to legitimize their defiance of foreign rule by establishing a link between the Puritan 
forefathers fleeing the corrupt Old World with the purpose of realizing God's ideal in the 
New One and their own mission to carry on the mission by controlling the decline. In this 
sense, in Bercovitch's words, "the Whig leaders ... turned the jeremiad into a lesson in na-
tional genealogy. The lesson led to the familiar figural imperative: what the fathers began, the 
sons were bound to complete." In doing so, the colonists denied the radicalism of their pursuit 
of independence: the Revolution was to be seen as one great step in the history of progress, 
an attempt to stop declension from the original ideal, to regenerate the mission. 32 
Although the republican jeremiads of the revolutionary era addressed secular problems, 
the sacred biblical past (partly by force of the genealogy of the Puritan ancestors) retained its 
importance: in the eyes of the contemporary Jeremiahs, the Revolution embodied the antitype 
of all great previous historical events, each of which had ushered in a new era in the history 
29 	Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 3-6, 8, 18, quotation on 17. 
30 	Ibid., 93, 29. 
31 	Ibid., 94, 115-17. 
32 	Ibid., 120, 123. 
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of whole mankind, in accordance with the divine plan. 33 During the time of the Revolution 
"patriot Whigs" contributed to the rhetoric of the American jeremiad by amplifying "the 
Puritan distinction between the Old World and the New" and by increasing "the Puritan 
emphasis both on process and control." Paradoxically, while radicalism became the condition 
of continuing revolution, this progress required permanent control of radical forces to save 
the infant republic from falling into the state of anarchy. 34 
In the post-revolutionary era, Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike regarded the Revolu-
tion as the ideal, the promise fulfilled, which present and future generations were obliged to 
hold on to. Any deviation from the revolutionary heritage equaled a break with the sacred past 
and the violation of the consensus. At the same time, despotism was seen as a danger of similar 
magnitude to be avoided, especially because it was associated with the Old World regime. 
Therefore the ideal for the republican Jeremiahs was embodied by the American "middle 
way," keeping the balance between liberty and order, the road between the two extremes of 
despotism and anarchy. 3s 
According to Bercovitch, by the early nineteenth century, the jeremiad had become "the 
official ritual form of continuing revolution" in America. It expressed the need for the new 
generation of Americans to renew the errand. As such it also prepared the ground for nine-
teenth-century American millennialism penetrating "the entire spectrum of social thought." 36 
Andrew Jackson and his generation, his supporters as well as his adversaries, employed the 
Revolution as an ideal by which to measure experience and if needed, to call for continuing 
the revolution in order to close the gap between ideal and experience. In contemporary 
jeremiads, therefore, the Revolution functions as an example, as "the climax of history and 
the pattern of things to come." By the beginning of the Civil War, the American jeremiad had 
become a widely accepted "ritual of socialization" exerting enormous legitimizing power. So 
much so that northerners tended to apply it in order to exclude slaveholding southerners from 
the genealogy of the fathers. They did this in the name of revitalizing the errand by restoring 
33 	Ibid., 128-29. Michael Lienesch also emphasizes that the American Revolution was regarded as heralding 
a new era "in both providential and human history" (Lienesch, New Order, 22). On the American Puritans' conception 
of exemplum as a cultural force, connecting self with community within the framework of the imitation of the life 
of Jesus see Bercovitch, Puritan Origins, 2-15. Nathan O. Hatch also emphasizes the notion of American exception-
alism in the Revolution among New England clergymen, as a sacrilegious "new seat of liberty." See Nathan O. 
Hatch, The Sacred Cause of Libeny: Republican Thought and the Millennium in Revolutionary New England (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1977), 24-25. The notion that America should serve as an example for the rest of 
the world in an effort to effect a revolution of deliverance from tyrannical power became widely accepted in the 
antebellum South, too. (See Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., "The Travail of Slavery," in The Southerner as American, ed. 
Charles Grier Sellers (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 42. 
# 	Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 134. 
35 	Ib id., 135-36,137-38. On republicanism in a jeremiadic context see also Richard J. Carwadine, Evan- 
gelicals and Politics in Antebellum America (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), 19. 
36 Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 141, 142. The linking of sacred and political discourse in the revolutionary 
era in a millennial republican rhetorical context has been explored by Nathan O. Hatch (Sacred Cause of Libeny). 
Millennial thinking also characterized proslavery argument in the antebellum South. For a discussion of the con-
nection between millennial thinking and the justification of slavery see Jack P. Maddex, Jr., "Proslavery Millen-
nialism: Social Eschatology in Antebellum Southern Calvinism," American Quarterly 31 (1979): 46-62. 
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the Republic to its original state, in order to fulfill the promise of the Revolution.' It was 
revolution in the "secular sense: overturning, undoing, doing away with" that did not fit into 
the symbol of America, since it presupposed an opposing alternative that cannot co-exist with 
what it opposes. i8 
The American jeremiad has operated as a political language fulfilling varying semantic roles 
at different historical moments and in different contexts. Its synchronically multivalent nature 
as a political language allowed for its utilization by opposing political forces: it was used 
equally by Tory vs. Whig or Federalist vs. Anti-Federalist Jeremiahs. Its multivalence was also 
exploited diachronically: it assumed different meanings for different generations of Americans. 
The Puritans applied it to revitalize an errand the nature and scope of which were different 
in the political sermons of later generations of Americans. The idea of a New Jerusalem, for 
instance, denoted several different geographical entities from Massachusetts Bay to the thir-
teen colonies of the Union. Another such change was the Puritans' turning away from Europe 
after 1660 and focusing their attention on the American wilderness. 39 
As the American jeremiad accumulated a history, it necessarily developed its own genea-
logy by extending the existing chain of types and antitypes, enriching it with further members. 
Each new stage in the development of the rhetorical ritual created new interpretations of its 
figural tradition. For the American revolutionaries and later generations of republicans, for 
instance, ancient republics served as horological antecedents, whose fate was to serve as an 
example to them. For late-eighteenth-century American Jeremiahs, they represented the 
sacred historical model, which, New England Puritans claimed to have found in the Scripture. 
At the same time, by establishing a secular link between themselves and the Puritan fathers 
by means of rhetoric, the colonists also made their enterprise, the Revolution, the antitype 
of "biblical reality."40 
In his analysis of the survival and transformation of the republican paradigm in the United 
States, Pocock suggests discontinuity between the American jeremiad and secular civic 
humanism. He contends that in the course of the eighteenth century the American Puritans' 
founding tenet of their covenant with God was replaced by the republican ethos in the North 
American colonies, and "the dread of corruption"—for him a major element of republican-
ism—became "the true heir of the jeremiad." He demonstrates how, in Anglo-American 
political thought, republicanism was merged with millennialist ideology. The community of 
citizens could be seen as the "Fifth Monarchy" and corruption as a manifestation of "the work 
of Antichrist," rooted in history. 41 
37 	Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 14-3, 172, 173-74. The language of the American jeremiad was also appro- 
priated by Abraham Lincoln, who in 1863 spoke of the American Civil War as "a punishment inflicted upon us for 
our presumptuous sins to the end that the whole people might be redeemed" (quoted in ibid., 174). 
38- Sacvan Bercovitch, The Rites of Assent (London: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1993), 184. 
39 	See Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 134-42, 68-73. 
4o 	Ibid., 124, 128. 
41 	Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 545, 512-13. 
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Nevertheless, it seems more appropriate to argue for the survival and transformation of 
the (American) jeremiad tradition, which made it possible for republican Jeremiahs to exploit 
the ritual for their own purposes. They continued to utilize the old jeremiad form, filling it 
with their own ideological content and exploiting it for its strong emphasis on exceptionalism, 
ultimately rooted in divine sanction. For instance, expansion that Pocock identifies as a com-
pensatory force for dealing with corruption in the early nineteenth-century American political 
imagination also assumed a crucial place in jeremiad discourse: it fitted with the idea of the 
mission to spread liberty on the continent—the focus of the Puritan mission transformed. 
In addition, Pocock' s understanding of the community as a subject of both republican 
theory and the jeremiad suggests their limited nature and associates them with pessimism. The 
concept of the "Fifth Monarchy," for instance, as applied to America, made its enduring glory 
dependent upon the reservoir of free land—which was ultimately conceived as anything but 
unlimited. 42 By contrast, Bercovitch's concept of the American jeremiad emphasizes the cru-
cial element of chosenness, whose affirmation and hence optimism is suggested. Thus the 
American jeremiad compensated for the republican pessimism in the New World. 
We see then, that although the American republic was simply regarded as a worldly ex-
periment, employment of the jeremiad suggested the ultimate success of the mission. This 
contrast between the two languages is expressed through Calhoun's distinction between 
"mysterious" and "kind" Providence, the former belonging to the republican idiom, the latter 
to the jeremiad. It is also indicated by Calhoun's relentless references to his optimism about 
the people of American democracy. 43 
Calhoun often drew upon the past to make predictions about the future. As he once 
declared in 1837, "From the past we learn to anticipate the future." 44 However, in his 
jeremiad rhetoric he went further than that, using epistemology for legitimizing purposes. His 
speaking of the language of the American jeremiad, as will be seen, had the potential to 
familiarize his audience with his arguments by linking them to broader ideological patterns. 
In this way, he exploited an attribute of the jeremiad that could be found in general republican 
rhetoric, toó: rendering the particular meaningful by means of its link to the universal. In this 
particular case, according to the rules of western epistemology, the profane could gain mean-
ing only through the sacred. For Calhoun, the sacred past of revolutionary times fulfilled a 
similar function, thereby becoming part of his legitimizing strategy. 
Finally, in Calhoun's rhetoric, Republican renovation, that is, return to the original 
principles, equaled the renewal of the covenant. It established the link between declension and 
prophecy. Furthermore, his American jeremiads were also secularized versions of the original 
vernacular: in them, according to the general pattern, American exceptionalism was achieved 
through the fulfillment of type in the antitype. Bercovitch's model provides a subtle way of 
making sense of this phenomenon and analyzing its ramifications with regard to the changes 
in Calhoun's application of the American jeremiad. 
42 	Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time, 99-100. 
43 	See Chapter 1, above. 
44 	Papers of Calhoun, 13:457. 
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CALHOUN'S PRE-NULLIFICATION JEREMIADS 
(1812-1828) 
In his early political career, Calhoun drew extensively upon the rhetorical ritual of the 
American jeremiad in arguing his case. For him, the ideal was embodied by the political 
system and culture created by the Constitution of 1787. In 1821, for instance, he referred to 
the United States as "this favored land, where the shackles of tyranny were first broken and 
equality first proclaimed." Moreover, he believed it America's mission to promote the cause 
of liberty in the world, in the name of "that high destiny which is ours." 45 
Calhoun's pre-Nullification jeremiads featured his recurring arguments about the 
difference between fact and ideal and were mainly aimed at promoting national defense. As 
one of the advocates of nationalist economic policies from 1812-1828, in his early jeremiads 
he employed a language in which the .republic experienced was not identical with the republic 
imagined, because, in his eyes, the former was deficient in means to protect republican 
liberty. His proposed measures for improving the state of the Republic, including national 
security, aimed at bringing experience and ideal together. 
It was at the time of the War of 1812 that Calhoun first articulated the jeremiadic para-
digm, applying it to the current situation. He put it forth in his speech delivered in the House 
of Representatives on May 6, 1812, when he took issue with those supporting the repeal of 
the embargo on British goods.' Calhoun defined the situation and the state of the nation as 
one of declension, in the form of the jeremiadic structure providing a measure to deal with 
such a case. In this regard his strategy was similar to that of Winthrop: through the ritual 
presented to the community, the aim was to remind them of the consequences of declension. 
In the speech, Calhoun argues for maintaining the embargo, but more importantly, he 
advocates war as a means to preserve independence and the republican nature of the United 
States. He queries: "... what more favorable could we desire than that the nation is, at last, 
roused from its lethargy and, that it has determined to vindicate its interest and honor [sic]." 
The alternative to the ideal state of the nation that he identifies is "a nation so sunk in avarice, 
and so corrupted by faction, as to be insensible to the greatest injuries, and lost to its in-
dependence.»47 Calhoun, then, understands moral corruption as a process of declension ulti-
mately leading to the loss of independent identity. 
He identifies the remedy for the current situation as resistance to England. As he ponders, 
"if we submit to the pretension of England, now openly avowed, the independence of this 
nation is lost—we will be, as to our commerce, re-colonized." Yet, there is hope: "this is the 
45 	Papers of Calhoun, 6:38; emphases added. On the notion that the making of the American Republic 
represented an exceptional historical moment in the eyes of the contemporaries, see John R. Howe, Jr. "Republican 
Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790s." American Quarterly 19 (1967), 163-64. Gordon S. Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969; New York 
and London: W. W. Norton, 1993), 46-48. Citations are to the Norton edition.; Wood, The American Revolution: 
A History (2002; New York: The Modern Library, 2003), 4, 57-62; and Wood, The Radicalism of the American 
Revolution (1991; New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 189-91. 
a6 	Papers of Calhoun, 1:103-7. 
47 	Ibid., 1:107. 
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second struggle for our liberty;" Calhoun continues, "and if we but do justice to ourselves, it 
will be no less glorious and successful than the first. Let us but exert ourselves, and we must 
meet with the prospering smile of heaven." At the same time, Calhoun sees war as a means 
to close the gap between ideal and experience, ensuring national security in the future: "war 
just and necessary in its origin, wisely and vigorously carried on, and honorably terminated, 
would establish the integrity and prosperity of our country for centuries." In Calhoun's 
speech, then, the second war of independence, that is, the War of 1812, thus appears not 
simply as a means of restoring the republic to its original, ideal state, but as laying the 
foundations of a "glorious" future, that of an infallible nation prophesied by young Repre-
sentative Calhoun, employing the concept of continuing revolution. 48 
The War of 1812 was a time of trial for the young Republic. Calhoun, as a Member of the 
House of Representatives who had been in support of open military confrontation with Britain 
since the beginning of the War, was working on providing for the financial means necessary 
for a successful war effort. Anxiety and decline, two crucial elements in the vocabulary of the 
American jeremiad, make a powerful appearance in one of his earliest speeches, made in 
support of the loan bill of 1814,49 in which he denounced those politicians opposing the 
motion to provide loans for the Madison administration in order to consolidate the federal 
budget. 
In the speech Calhoun lays most emphasis on the theme of corruption and the need to 
handle it. Ignoring the idea of America's mission, his main concern is to secure the financial 
basis for the survival of the country. Thus, he links the reluctance to vote for the loan bill as 
an indispensable financial means to a general tendency toward moral decay. At the same time, 
he traces the root of the problem to the United States' initially feeble handling of British 
aggression in 1812, which he interprets as the first sign of serious decline. Calhoun contends, 
"We yielded [to Britain] because we wished to enjoy the blessings of peace; its ease, its 
comforts, above all, its means of making money. The practical language of the Government 
to the people was—it is better to be rich than to be virtuous. Can we, then, wónder at the 
alarming growth of avarice? It is to be traced back, in part, to this original sin of our go-
vernment. "so 
Materialism, greed and avarice, then, have been the accompanying signs of corruption and 
declension. At the same time, in Calhoun's argumentation, punishment for the decline, that 
is, British aggression, fulfills the same role as God's afflictions did in the Puritan and revol-
utionary jeremiads. Submission to British oppression has resulted in the country's loss of 
honor and the establishment of British control over American commerce. Nonetheless, "divine 
retribution," Calhoun warns his audience, will not stop there. The process of declension will 
be catastrophic for the Republic because control over the American economy will ultimately 
48 	Ibid. War also appears as a similar force of arresting declension or the "degradation" of Americans by Britain 
in the Report of the Committee of Foreign Relations, on June 3, 1812 (Papers of Calhoun, 1:122). Furthermore, by 
alluding to the work of the Fathers achieving independence, which the present generation must preserve, Calhoun 
also appeals to continuing revolution. 
49 	"Speech on the Loan Bill," February 25, 1814, in ibid., 1:208-39. 
50 	Ibid., 1:219. 
127 
be taken over by the British Parliament: "The hopes and fears ... of the whole mercantile 
section of this country, and all connected interests," Calhoun claims, "would be turned 
towards Great Britain; for the power of legislation over our commerce would be virtually 
transferred from the American Congress to the King in Council." 51 This, in turn, would mean 
the loss of liberty. Similarly to other republican Jeremiahs, Calhoun evokes the specter of 
slavery: "It is impossible to allow any right, much less independence, to that which creeps and 
licks the dust. Such is the condition of our nature. We must have the spirit to resist wrongs 
or be slaves." The peculiar institution, then, in this case, appears, in Bercovitch's words, as 
the "disastrous alternative to the cultural ideal." 52 
How can the decline be stopped, how can virtue be restored, how can ideal and experience 
be made to correspond again? Calhoun attempts to raise anxiety in order to achieve consensus 
on the question at issue. He calls on the opposition to support the loan bill, demanding the 
elimination of dissent. He calls for "union and zeal," which, in. the current situation, are qua-
lities necessary for successful resistance to oppression. "Without these," he says, "a free people 
is degraded to the miserable rabble of a despotism; but with these, they are irresistible." 53 
In this particular speech, then, the "continuing revolution" consists of restoring the spirit 
of patriotism, halting the degeneration of the military potential of the nation, and according 
to him, making the necessary financial sacrifices for the project to succeed. With the War 
ending in victory for the young Republic, Calhoun, nonetheless, understood the importance 
of meeting the still viable military and economic rivalry of Great Britain. 
The major structural elements of jeremiadic rhetoric—promise, declension and pro-
phecy—form the major structural parts of the speech that Calhoun delivered on the repeal 
of the direct tax on January 31, 1816. 54 Although Calhoun's explicit aim in the speech is to 
argue that the extra revenue of three million dollars expected to be provided by the direct tax 
is indispensable to the development of a sufficient defense policy and, ultimately, to the pro-
sperity of the country, the way in which he argues his case, makes the speech a "state-of-the-
covenant" oration: 55 The topics that he covers, such as US foreign and defense policy or the 
problem of internal improvements and taxation, closely link up with the problem of the moral 
state of the Republic, presented within the thematic framework of preparation for a possible 
confrontation with Britain as a major foreign power. 
Calhoun opens the introductory part of his speech with an affirmation of the cultural ideal, 
the high military and moral standing of the nation, having recently emerged triumphant from 
the war with Britain. At the same time, he draws attention to the possibility and danger of 
falling out of this ideal state. He creates anxiety by evoking the specter of decline, a process 
in which the repeal of the direct tax would be a crucial step. Calhoun's binary pairs suggest 
that present greatness may become past rather easily unless those who are in the position to 
determine the future of the nation "prefer the lasting happiness of our country to its present 
51 	Ibid., 1:228. 
52 	Ibid., 1:229; Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 137. 
53 	Papers of Calhoun, 1:235 . 
54 	Ibid., 1:316-30; for details see Chapter 1, above. 
55 	See Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 4. 
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ease, its security to its pleasure, fair honor and reputation, to inglorious and inactive re-
pose. "56 
Calhoun sustains anxiety while moving from the general to the particular and names 
Britain as the foreign power posing the most serious threat to America's security because of 
the rivalry between the two countries for world leadership. He attempts to justify his fears by 
appealing to experience. He claims, "Every statesman, every one who loves his country, who 
wishes to maintain the dignity of that country, to see it attain the summit of greatness and 
prosperity, regards the progress of other nations with a jealous eye." Then he continues with 
a rhetorical question, which he answers immediately: "Will Great Britain permit us to go on 
in an uninterrupted march to the height of national greatness and prosperity? I fear not." 57 
The same tendency to voice his anxiety characterizes his line of argument about the 
necessity of lengthening the duration of military service for US male citizens as one of the 
measures to avert the threatening dangers. (The others are the development of the navy, the 
building of roads and the protection of domestic industry by means of tariffs.) In connection 
with this particular issue, jeremiadic anxiety appears in the form of the republican fear of the 
loss of liberty. 
Calhoun utilizes the republican tenet of the ideal of the citizen soldiery S8 and links his 
jeremiadic argument about declension to this problem. For him, the republican ideal is no 
longer met by experience. He claims to detect the deterioration of patriotism amongst the 
citizens of the United States, who, according to him, tend to neglect their military duties. The 
tragic consequence should be obvious to anyone well read in the history of republics: liberty 
will be lost, and a standing army will have to be established as a necessary substitute for the 
citizen soldiers. In this context, extended military service, Calhoun argues, would stop the 
decline of patriotism, and the establishment of a standing army could be avoided. The re-
storation of patriotism, conversely, would contribute to the preservation of republican liberty. 
Similarly, the repeal of the direct tax, an important source of financing the extension of 
military service, would lead to disaster. Calhoun's conclusion to this part of his speech is a re-
evocation of anxiety: "We may dispense with the taxes; we may neglect every measure of 
precaution, and feel no immediate disaster; but, in such a state of things what virtuous, what 
wise citizen, but what must look on the future with dread!" 59 
The response to such worries is provided in the conclusion of the speech, which marks the 
climax of Calhoun's argumentation. The climactic effect is derived not only from the elevated 
style but also from the fact that here all the structural elements of the American jeremiad 
appear in a systematic way. Similar to Winthrop's "A Model of Christian Charity," this jer-
emiadic passage appeals to national consciousness at the early stage of the nation's devel-
opment insofar as the passage employs a strategy which constructs an audience being at the 
onset of the mission. Calhoun magnifies the significance of the momentous decision on the 
direct tax by appealing to American millennialism, fusing secular and sacred history in a vein 
Papers of Calhoun, 1:316. 
Ibid., 1:320-21. 







similar to Winthrop's. For him, the errand is carried out on behalf of America, but it is also 
aimed at the redemption of mankind. As Calhoun says, "I know of no situation so responsible, 
if property considered, as ours. We are charged by Providence not only with the happiness 
of this great and rising people, but in a considerable degree with that of the human race." A 
few sentences later, musing on the American government's role in fulfilling this promise, 
Calhoun adds, "If it succeed, as fondly hoped by its founders, it will be the commencement of a 
new era in human affairs. All civilized governments must in the course of time conform to its 
principles."60 
According to the paradigmatic force of the jeremiad, promise, the initial structural com-
ponent, is to be followed by the idea of declension. Similarly to the Puritan Jeremiahs, Cal-
houn's words also ring with concern about the possibility of losing the exemplary status: the 
failure to make the right decision of the moment means that the American nation "will cer-
tainly sink into the list of those that have done nothing to be known or remembered." 6 ' 
Accentuating his point, drawing on a mixture of biblical and classical imagery in one of his 
rare moments of figural eloquence, Calhoun ponders, "[P]leasure is a flowery path, leading 
off among groves and meadows, but ending in a gloomy and dreary wilderness; ... it is the 
siren's voice, which he who listens to is ruined; ... it is the cup of Circe, which he who 
drinks, is converted into a swine." 62 
These images, while they are intended to warn against present gratification that will 
inevitably lead to future misery, threaten punishment for the declension, because they connect 
the fate of the classical victim with that of the modern Republic. Yet, for all the declension 
that Calhoun's images suggest, the very last part of this section of Calhoun's speech is con-
structed in a manner that, in accordance with the paradigmatic conventions to the jeremiad, 
suggests release of the tension, an attempt to deal with the anxiety that he has built up and to 
imply optimism. Although the Republic is about to choose between "present ease" and future 
happiness, the choice is not a real one since Calhoun predetermines the favorable outcome of 
the mission by the force of his rhetoric. With a sudden turn from the world of animals to that 
of demigods, he compares the.budding American Republic to the young Hercules, who, 
getting prepared for his future career in the "wilderness" was to choose between "ease and 
pleasure" and "labor and virtue." By making the correct decision in the very beginning, 
Hercules finally won fame among future generations of humans. The same fate awaits A-
merica, in Calhoun's words, "the youthful Hercules," apparently possessing the attributes of 
60 	Ibid., emphasis added. Here, arguing from the classic position of exceptionalism, Calhoun combines mil- 
lennialism with a move. to expand the scope of America's mission, in order to include the whole of mankind. The 
American republic, like Winthrop's Puritan community, is to reform the rest of the world through its example. The 
striking resonance with John Winthrop's paradigmatic Arbella sermon is obvious: "The eyes of all people are upon 
us, so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause him withdraw his pre-
sent help from us, we shall be made as story and a by-word through the world." See John Winthrop, "A Model of 
Christian Charity," in The Puritans in America: A Narrative Anthology, ed. Alan Heimert and Andrew Delbanco (Cam-
bridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1985), 91. 
61 Papers of Calhoun, 1:329. 
62 	Ibid., 1:330. This seems to be one of the few, but probably most graphic and remarkable metaphorical, 
images used by Calhoun. 
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the ancient hero. 63 This rhetorical move becomes possible since the South Carolinian con-
structs his own country, rhetorically, as the ancient hero's antitype. Through Calhoun's 
metaphor, the nation becomes identical with the demigod. 
Thus, by means of figural language, Calhoun prophesies the inevitable success of the na-
tion's mission. In doing so, he applies a rhetorical strategy similar to the one exploited by 
those practitioners of Bercovitch' s American jeremiad, who, such as John Winthrop or John 
Cotton, applied "figural correspondences" and merged sacred images taken from the Bible 
with the secular represented in their own communal enterprise, and thus "preclude[d] the 
prospect of failure" of their mission. 64 
In these early, nationalist jeremiads Calhoun regarded the American errand as taking place 
on behalf of the whole of mankind. For him, the cultural ideal to be spread all over the 
"civilized" world was represented by the American republican form of government. He saw 
declension from the ideal mainly as moral decay, the substance of which varied from declining 
patriotism to excessive materialism or indifference in public matters. At the same time, by 
calling for continuing revolution, Calhoun sustained the hope of filling the gap between fact 
and ideal, suggesting optimism about the ability of the nation to fulfill the promise. 
CALHOUN'S NULLIFICATION JEREMIADS (1828-1833) 
Beginning in the late 1820s, Calhoun's political position underwent a radical transformation. 
His abandonment of a nationalist platform, which involved the broad constructionist view of 
the Constitution as well as interventionalist economic policy meant, at the same time, the 
adoption of the states' rights position with a program of minimal government, low tariffs and 
strict constructionism. 6S During the Nullification Controversy, Calhoun exploited the Amer-
ican jeremiad in defense of states' rights. In his interpretation, the crisis, as it becomes 
manifest in his speeches and writings of the period, resulted essentially from the decline of the 
Republic during which federal power had become overly dominant. 
With its basic structural components remaining constant, certain details of Calhoun's 
jeremiadic rhetoric nevertheless underwent modifications depending on the actual state of the 
crisis and went beyond the principles that he originally formulated. These differences include 
his perception of the nature of the crisis, its predictable outcome, the means of restoration and 
his use of figural correspondences. 
In contrast to his early period, Calhoun's application of the jeremiadic model during the 
Nullification Controversy primarily consisted in portraying political decline as the current 
63 	Ibid. 
64 	See Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 8. 
65 	Broad constructionism allows the interpretation of the Constitution by implication, whereas strict con- 
structionism follows a literal approach to it and deems federal or state legislation unconstitutional if it relies on 
powers that are not stated explicitly by the document. Calhoun himself admitted that there was a shift in his attitude 
toward nationalism. In the Senate in 1837, he claimed that he had been closer to consolidation than states' rights. 
See Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy (Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 169. 
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state of the Republic, accompanied by argumentation about moral corruption. On the whole, 
compared to the topics of his nationalist period, the theme of America's world mission oc-
cupies a secondary place in Calhoun's Nullification jeremiads. Instead, he places emphasis on 
national problems, perceiving the nullifiers' mission as one being performed for the Republic, 
and, simultaneously, carried out in the interest of South Carolina and the South. It is aimed 
at preserving both "Liberty" and the "Ünion." 66 
Calhoun's use of the past can be detected in his justification of state veto, his definition of 
the ideal from which the republic had degenerated, as well as the state of affairs that would 
inevitably result should his jeremiadic threats did not meet favorable response. A further 
significant difference with the previous period is that the mythic past is strongly featured in 
these texts and appears, in the first place, as that of the Founders and, in the second place, as 
that of the ancient Roman republic. At the same time, for Calhoun, the Virginia Resolutions 
of 1798 and the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 assume perhaps even greater sig-
nificance: they function as horological antecedents of Nullification in his rhetoric. In his ar-
gumentation, the Antifederalist legislation and Nullification figure as attempts to stop political 
and moral decline, to prevent the establishment of tyranny and to restore the Republic to its 
original state of perfection. In this sense, Calhoun constructs state interposition as a remedy 
functioning to close the gap between ideal and experience, within the rhetorical framework 
of his republican jeremiad. 
Due to the similarity of the purposes that Calhoun intended to serve with his Nullification 
jeremiads, despite their individual differences, he applies the same model with shifting 
emphases and details. In my analysis below, I will start with Calhoun's first relevant writing, 
his South Carolina "Exposition,"67 and since it contains most of the elements characteristic of 
later documents of the same type, I will confine my further investigations to those that show 
important variations of its original jeremiadic pattern. In Calhoun's understanding, the crisis 
caused by the tariff has economic, moral, political and constitutional aspects, which are, at the 
same time, intimately linked. 
In the "Exposition," Calhoun accompanies his argument about the harmful impact of the 
tariff on South Carolina's economy with his attack on the tariff on economic, moral, political 
and constitutional grounds, largely drawing upon elements of jeremiadic rhetoric. In the 
speech, like in his previous jeremiads, he regards the making of the American Republican form 
of government as a unique event, occurring at an exceptional, divine moment. It was created 
for an exceptional nation by the Founders who were "no ordinary men.» 68 However, he says, 
the protective tariff will have negative moral and political consequences, as it is "calculated to 
corrupt the publick virtue and destroy the liberty of the Country." In arguing his prediction 
of moral decay, he thus builds on the republican fear of losing liberty. 69 
66 	He seems to have claimed to be conforming to the cultural ideal of the American jeremiad, following the 
"'middle way,' the happy union of liberty and order" (Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 137). 
67 	Papers of Calhoun, 10.444-534. 
68 	Ibid., 10:526. 
69 	Ibid., 10:444. For a similar argument in Calhoun's other nullification jeremiads, see his "Address to the 
People of the United States," in ibid., 11:675; and his "Remarks on the President's Message on South Carolina," in 
ibid., 12:14. 
132 
Furthermore, since the tariff tends to develop "the industry of one section of the country, 
on the ruins of another," it will result in a "great inequality of property" characteristic of the 
countries of the Old World. 70 It is bound to enrich the North and impoverish the South, 
resulting in the same economic and social cleavage plaguing contemporary Europe. Here 
Calhoun evokes the traditional dichotomy between the corrupt Old World of great social 
differences and the virtuous Republic of relatively homogeneous population, the latter 
nonetheless also exposed to the danger of corruption. The movement toward social instability, 
however, will not stop on the level of state relations. By the European analogy, the North will 
have to face the consequences of growing social inequalities and poverty in its own industrial 
cities: "Heretofore in our country this tendency has displayed itself principally in its effects as 
regards the different sections, but the time will come, when it will produce the same result 
between classes in the manufacturing states." 7' Calhoun's diagnosis and the conclusions he 
draws are based on the assumption that corruption, if unstopped, tends to destroy even those 
who initiated it, resulting finally in the overthrow of the republican order. 
Moral corruption, however, will be merely a long-term effect of the tariff. The consti-
tutional aspect of the declension lies in Calhoun's argument that the tariffs are unconstitutional 
since, as nullifiers claimed, they have been levied for the protection of Northern manufac-
turing interests, a power not granted to the Federal government by the Constitution. Thus 
they represent a decline from its spirit,'Z that is, from strict constructionism. Calhoun points 
out that its passage in Congress despite being unconstitutional is also a sign of the deterioration 
of the republican political system. Levying duties for the protection of the economy of one 
section is against his strict constructionist interpretation of the Constitution, which sanctions 
such a measure only for the regulation of commerce. Therefore the tariff of 1828, Calhoun 
argues, is the result of the federal government wielding powers not granted by the sacred 
document. Furthermore, powers are divided between the federal government and the states; 
those not enumerated specifically in the Constitution belong to the states. Calhoun explains 
such a division of powers by means of the traditional republican argument that "irresponsible 
power is inconsistent with liberty and must corrupt those who exercise it.» 73 In other words, 
the unconstitutional tariff law, an outcome of "irresponsible power," will also destroy those 
who concocted it. 
Calhoun also links the problem of unchecked power with the issue of majority rule. The 
tariff embodies the will of the majority as represented in the federal government and fails to 
respect the interest of the minority, that is, southern states, which cannot benefit from the 
protection of home industry. Calhoun claims that building government exclusively on majority 
rule includes the danger of self-destruction through the abuse of majority power. "No go-
vernment, based on the naked principle, that the majority ought to govern ... ever preserved 
its liberty even for a single generation," Calhoun asserts. "Those governments only which 
70 	Ibid., 10:446, 480. 
71 Ibid., 10:480. 
72 	Ibid., 10.444-46. 
73 Ibid., 10:496 486. Cf. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, enlarged ed. (1967; 
Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), 60. 
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provide checks, which limit, and restrain within proper bounds the power of the majority have 
alone had a prolonged existence, and been distinguished for virtue, patriotism, power and 
happiness."i4 What is at stake at the moment, according to Calhoun, is, then, whether ma-
jority rule can be kept under control, whether the tyranny of the majority can be avoided. 75 
Throughout the crisis, part of Calhoun's nullification rhetorical strategy, derived from the 
logic of the American jeremiad, consisted in his effort to justify state interposition and related 
assumptions by means of historical references and allusions that can be regarded as figural 
correspondences. In arguing for state veto as a means to prevent the tyranny of the majority, 
Calhoun turns to the example of the ancient Roman republic, the "great commonwealth," as 
he refers to it, whose decline, after the kings had been expelled, continued until the tribunate 
was introduced as an effective means of checking the power of the Patricians. 76 He calls for 
a similar measure to stop the decline of the American Republic: "May we profit by the ex-
ample, and restore the almost lost virtue and patriotism of our Republick, by giving due 
efficiency in practice to the check which our Constitution has provided against a danger so 
threatening.' As part of the mythic past, Calhoun also evokes the Constitutional period as 
the age of perfection, to be realized in the present.'$ 
Another segment of the mythic past for Calhoun concerns the origins of nullification. State 
veto, which stems from the sovereign nature of the states, as Calhoun argues, is not re-
volutionary, it is not his own invention; it is rooted in the Constitution "to prevent the 
encroachment of the General Government on the reserved rights of the States." 79 Further-
more, sovereignty also empowers the states to judge for themselves whether the "consti-
tutional compact" they made is violated, that is, whether a federal law is constitutional or not. 
Calhoun refers to the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 
1799 to justify his claim, to deny the revolutionary character of nullification, to argue that 
state veto had been legitimatély applied before in US history. 80 By alluding to these historical 
events, Calhoun's major aim was to familiarize his audience with nullification, to deny its 
74 	Papers of Calhoun, 10:492. 
75 	On the dangers of constructing the government on mere majority rule, see also his "Rough Draft of an 
Address to the People of South Carolina," in ibid., 11:275. 
76 	Ibid., 11:494.; see also his "Speech on the Force Bill," in ibid., 12:90-91. 
7' 	Ibid. For such a function of the state veto, see also the documents "Rough Draft of an Address to the People 
of South Carolina," in Papers of Calhoun, 11:270; "Address to the People of the United States," in ibid., 11:673, 676; 
"Draft Report on Federal Relations," in ibid., 11:489; his letter to James Hamilton, Jr. of South Carolina, in ibid., 
11:630; as well as "The Fort Hill Address," in ibid., 11:425-26. 
78 	Ibid., 10:496. 
79 Ibid., 10:506. 
80 	Ibid., 10:506-8. The argument that the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 are to be seen as 
antecedents of nullification legislation appears in several other texts by Calhoun in the Nullification period. "I am 
no more of a nullifier, than Tho[ma]s Jefferson, Judge [Thomas] McKean, John Taylor of Caroline, Spencer Roane 
and the whole body of the Republican party of `98," Calhoun wrote Virgil Maxcy on September 1, 1831, and added, 
"The bolder the better. Timidity would be fatal. No man can distinguish my views from that of the party in `98" 
(ibid., 11:464). He wrote Bolling Hall on September 8, 1831: If my experience has taught me thoroughly any one 
truth, it is, the extreme danger of departing from those principles [i. e. those of 1798]. A rigid adherence to them, 
I believe to be the rock of our political salvation" (ibid., 11:465). See also his letters to Samuel D. Ingham, in ibid, 
11:404; ibid.; 12:8; ibid, 11:566; ibid., 11:464; and ibid., 11:414, 415-16; see also ibid., 12:105. 
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novelty as well as its revolutionary character. South Carolina's defiance of the Federal go-
vernment as understood through the prism of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, then, 
appears in Calhoun's rhetoric as an act of participating in a continuing revolution. 
The tariff, then, in Calhoun's analysis, becomes a symptom of declension from the ideal 
Republican form of government, in which the balance of power between the federal and state 
governments can be restored only by means of nullification. If the tariff were applied in the 
current situation, it would arrest declension and corruption and help restore the original state 
of perfection, that is, the pre-tariff state of affairs. State interposition is a duty South Carolina 
must perform to save the Republic. He concludes his draft with the conventional jeremiadic 
turn arguing the greater significance of the cause of South Carolina: state interposition is "a 
duty to herself [i.e. South Carolina], to the Union, to the present, and to future generations, 
and to the cause of liberty over the world, to arrest the progress of a usurpation which, if not 
arrested, must in its consequences, corrupt the public morals and destroy the liberty of the 
country."81  Through Calhoun's jeremiadic rhetoric, then, the cause of South Carolina assumes 
larger dimensions: it becomes part of the national mission, also performed on behalf of the 
world. 
Calhoun repeated these principles in more detail in his "Fort Hill Address" of July 26, 
1831. 82 In the text he reaffirms his emphasis on the necessity of restoring the distribution of 
powers between the federal government and the states because, to him, it makes the A-
merican system of government exceptional. As he claims, the special "distribution of power, 
settled solemnly by a constitutional compact, to which all the states are parties, constitutes 
the peculiar character and excellence of our political system. It is truly and emphatically A-
merican, without example, or parallel.» 83 At the same time, his jeremiad contains a new element, 
namely the stress that he lays on the troubles caused by the increase of sectionalism in the 
Union, which he criticizes in a moralistic tone. As he argues, the tariff controversy has 
resultéd in the weakening of patriotism and the strengthening of sectionalism. It is part of a 
struggle between North and South, "in which all the noble and generous feelings of patriotism 
are gradually subsiding into sectional and selfish attachments." Calhoun asserts that the tariff 
of 1828, affecting geographical interests in different ways, "has divided the country into two 
great geographical divisions, and arrayed them against each other.n 84 Thus, the crisis is also a 
political one: it has destroyed the harmony that he believes has characterized pre-tariff-law-
America. In the language of republicanism, if the pursuit of particular goods is raised above 
the common good, the consequent result must_be corruption. 85 
Calhoun's later speeches and addresses concerning nullification follow the pattern of 
republican jeremiads. In them, anxiety over the concentration of power becomes more ex-
plicit than in the earlier ones, and he puts more emphasis on the nature of the declension as 
having resulted in the concentration of power within the national government and the 
Ibid., 10:530-32. 
Ibid., 11:413-39. 
Ibid., 11:418-19; original emphasis. 
Ibid., 11:427. 







Executive. This is evident in his "Address to the People of the United States," 86  commissioned 
by the Convention, aimed at justifying nullification for the American citizenry. In the doc-
ument Calhoun claims that the crisis has shown that the process of the concentration of power 
has already begun, and it is bound to lead to despotism. This, at the same time, will become 
hereditary "as the virtue and patriotism of the people decay." 87 Calhoun's main objective in 
the address is to argue that state interposition is a legitimate means of defending southern 
interests and even of saving the Union from this extreme concentration of federal power. 
"[S]uch a power ... ," he claims, "must, ultimately, concentrate the whole power of the 
community in the General Government, and abolish the sovereignty of the States; and .. . 
discord, corruption, and, eventually despotism must follow, if the system be not resisted. "88 
At the same time, - he points out, the concentration of power will not stop at the federal level; 
sooner or later the 'Executive will seize all the power and establish despotic rule. 89 When 
emphasizing the danger of "consolidation," i.e. the uncontrolled growth of federal power, 
Calhoun was, in fact, echoing Anti-Federalist fears. The Antifederalists, on the grounds of di-
vided sovereignty, criticized Federalists for creating a more centralized, nationalist govern-
ment in place of a federal one. 90 
Calhoun makes his predictions based on the paradigmatic force of the republican jeremiad 
for an audience well-versed in the language of conspiracy rhetoric. 91 By proposing the use of 
state veto, therefore, he calls for a return to the ideal, by driving federal power back to its 
proper domain to prevent the "loss of liberty of all." For him, then, nullification equals a 
return to the original principles. South Carolina, as he explains, is without "the remotest view 
to revolution, or wish to terminate her connection with the Union—to which she is now, as 
86 	Papers of Calhoun, 11: 669-81. 
87 	Ibid., 11:674-75. 
88 	Ibid., 11:673. The danger of consolidation, culminating in military despotism, appears in almost all of 
Calhoun's nullification jeremiads. See his "Rough Draft of an Address to the People of South Carolina," in ibid., 
12:267, 277, or his letter to James Hamilton, Jr., in ibid., 11:628,642,645; see also ibid., 12:45-46; ibid., 12:15; 
ibid., 12:24-26; and ibid., 12:132-33. 
89 	Ibid., 11: 674-75. 
90 	Lienesch, New Order, 153; and Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Ant federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in 
America, 1788-1828 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early 
American History and Culture, 1999.) 
91 	Gordon S. Wood demonstrates how, rooted in eighteenth-century epistemology, gy,  conspiratorial argument 
was common in the Atlantic political discourse. By emphasizing the intimate, "mechanistic" link between cause and 
effect, it aimed at inferring real intentions of politicians by scrutinizing their deeds. In spite of changes in social 
epistemology, the conspiratorial mindset survived into the early nineteenth century. See Wood, "Conspiracy and 
the Paranoid Style: Causality and deceit in the Eighteenth Century," in The William and Mary Quarterly, 3`d ser., 39 
(1982), esp. 410-11,423,438,440. For conspiratorial rhetoric in the Jacksonian era, see Marc W. Kruman, "The 
Second American Party System and the Transformation of Revolutionary Republicanism ,"Journal of the Early Republic 
12 (1992), 532. Calhoun's rhetoric based on the American jeremiad, similarly to others, dearly showed traces of 
conspiratorial idioms. As Richard B. Latner points out, the major motivating force behind Calhoun's turning to 
historical antecedents of the Nullification Crisis was the attack of the anti-nullifier side, which took great pains to 
discredit nullification by identifying it with "civil war," "disunion," "secession," "treason," "conspiracy" and "re-
publican subversion." See Richard B. Latner, "The Nullification Crisis and Republican Subversion," The Journal of 
Southern History 43 (1977): 19-38. The anti-nullifiers often claimed nullification to be only the beginning of a series 
of disasters. For instance, once Jackson warned, "The loss of liberty, of all good government, of peace, plenty and 
happiness, must inevitably follow a dissolution of the Union" (quoted in ibid., 21). 
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she ever has been, devotedly attached. Her object is, not to destroy, but to restore and 
preserve."9z 
In this text Calhoun also goes beyond the established paradigm by proposing a convention 
of the states. Parallel to justifying the nullification of the tariffs by the South Carolina 
convention in November 1832, Calhoun calls upon the states for continuing revolution: 
according to him, the state veto is not a sufficient device to complete regeneration, the states 
should gather in a convention for the purpose of "restoring harmony and confidence to the 
country."93 His aim was, in jeremiadic terms, to expand the errand to involve other states as 
well. 
Andrew Jackson's response to South Carolina's nullification legislation made Calhoun 
repeat his jeremiadic tirades against the Executive and the tendency to "consolidation." Of 
these, the most powerful application of the republican jeremiad can be found in his speech on 
the Force Bill of February 15-16, 1833. 94 What makes this speech different from the others 
of the period in terms of jeremiadic strategies are the following: presenting the role played 
by Andrew Jackson in the impending crisis; introducing the War of Independence asfigura of 
the Nullification Crisis, thus creating an explicit analogy between the nullifiers and the 
revolutionaries of 1776 taking arms against Britain in defense of their liberties; depiction of 
the concentration of executive power as a moment of declension from the ideal European-
American form of government, and finally, a detailed treatment of the process of decline. 
In this speech on the "Force Bill," by means of the figural correspondence between 
Nullification and the events leading up to the War of Independence, Calhoun raises the specter 
of military confrontation and uses the language of the jeremiad to demand southern unity in 
order to resist federal power representing majority will. He also applies analogy to denounce 
consolidation as declension from tradition, the origins of which he, by force of reference to 
Asian despotism and European, including Teutonic "federalism," places in the mythic past. 
Arguing in retrospect, Calhoun claims that, before his election in 1832, Jackson, a poli-
tician with strong pro-southern and states' rights sentiments, had appeared as a prospective 
savior expected to stop the decline of the Republic. However, he failed to fulfill those ex-
pectations by refusing to destroy the protective tariff system. To make matters worse, Cal-
houn claims, he continued to concentrate power in the Executive, thereby accelerating the 
process leading to military despotism. South Carolinians had become disappointed with Jack-
son: "[T]he very individual to whom they looked as a deliverer, and whom, under that 
impression, they strove for so many years to elevate to power," claims Calhoun, "is now the 
most powerful instrument in the hands of his and their bitterest opponents to put down them 
and their cause!i9S Jackson, then, proved to be an inappropriate solution in order to stop de-
cline. 
92 	Papers of Calhoun, 11:675 , 677. 
93 	Ibid., 11:679. Calhoun's purpose in a convention of all the states is not clear. One explanation could be 
that he sought to forge a nationwide consensus on the way of handling a crisis, and the convention would have served 
such a purpose. 
94 	Papers of Calhoun, 12:4-5-93; for details see Chapter 1, above. 
95 	Ibid., 12:59. 
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Calhoun constructs the American Revolution rhetorically as the horological antecedent of 
the nullifiers' struggle against the Federal Government. In his vocabulary, the "Force Bill" 
becomes the symbol of tyrannical power, similar to the one employed by Britain during the 
controversy with its colonies, and the tariff laws become identified, even fused with the British 
measures working revolution in 1776. "The law must be enforced," says Calhoun in a mocking 
tone. "Yes, the act imposing the `tea-tax' must be executed. This was the very argument 
which impelled Lord North and his administration to that mad career which for ever separated 
us from the British Crown." Jackson's "tea-tax" bill is aimed "to enforce robbery by murder .» 96 
Similarly to the War of Independence, in the Nullification Crisis "the controversy is one 
between power and liberty," Calhoun's argument leaves no doubt as to the place of the South 
in that struggle associated with the latter. 97 Calhoun claims that one of the several similarities 
between the crisis leading up to the revolutionary war and the Nullification Debate is related 
to the problem of subjugation, the North assuming the role of tyrannical Britain overwhelming 
the Southern minority. To assure his audience of the soundness of the analogy, Calhoun 
concludes, "The very arguments resorted to at the commencement of the American 
Revolution, and the measures adopted, and the motives assigned to bring on that contest (to 
enforce the law), are almost identically the same."98 
Calhoun also introduces a new analogy to legitimize the struggle for nullification: a dif-
ferentiation that he makes between the European "federal" and the Asian "consolidated" forms 
of government, between the ancient Greek republic and the despotic Persian empire. The 
former, he asserts, was based on the distribution of political power, while the latter was based 
on the concentration of political power. The "Teutonic race," to which Americans belong, 
adopted the federal form. 99 
The implication of Calhoun's argument is clear: the American Republic must not abandon 
the system of the government developed by the ancestors and adopt the alien Asian 
alternative, which the "Force Bill" is aimed at establishing. Adopting the bill would fit in with 
the process of decline from the ideal, the result of which would be "the near approach" of 
(Asian) "despotism.» 10° Here, then, Calhoun moves beyond the jeremiadic strategy of revol-
utionary Americans: for him it is not the "Old World" that embodies a despotic form of 
government but Asia. 101 According to him, the South can keep standing in the republican 
struggle between power and liberty only as long as it is capable of maintaining its "reserved 
rights," with state interposition among them. The alternative, expressed in the language of the 
jeremiad, would be catastrophe: "[Ijf we yield," warns Calhoun, "and permit the stronger 
interest to concentrate within itself all the powers of the government, then will our fate be 
96 	Ibid., 12:72. 
97 	Ibid., 12:73. By 1833, the identification of the South with liberty and the North with power had become 
an explicit claim m Calhoun's rhetoric. See also his "Speech in Reply to Daniel Webster on the Force Bill:" "It is a 
great struggle between power and liberty—power on the side of the North, and liberty on the side of the South" 
(ibid., 12:135). 
98 	Ibid., 12:74. 
99 Ibid., 12:75-76. 
100 
 Ibid., 12:86. 
101 	Cf. Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 137 
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more wretched than that of the aborigines whom we have expelled.'toz  Therefore, the duty 
of the South is to resist the encroachment of the federal government upon states' rights. 
In Calhoun's reasoning, it is for the South to carry out the task of restoration, to preserve 
liberty. Calling for Southern unity, in the jeremiadic fashion, he concludes his speech with 
anxiety, offering two alternatives: 
"To discharge successfully this high duty [i.e. the defense of states' rights] re-
quires the highest qualities, moral and intellectual, and should we perform it 
with a zeal and ability proportioned to its magnitude, instead of being mere 
planters, our section will become distinguished for its patriots and statesmen. 
But, on the other hand, if we prove unworthy of this high destiny—if we yield to 
the steady encroachment of power, the severest calamity and most debasing 
corruption will overspread the land." Those Southerners who join the federal 
government to receive its "honours and emoluments," at the same time, 
Calhoun rages, "have qualified themselves, by political prostitution, for ad-
mission into the Magdalen Asylum." 103 
Calhoun, then, in his construction of the end of declension, employs images of historical and 
more recent "Others" of white Americans, including the earlier mentioned slaves and lunatics, 
to make clear to his audience what choices they have if they do not consent to regeneration. 
As has been seen, Calhoun's Nullification jeremiads compared to those before the crisis 
concentrate less on America's mission in the world than on the necessity of restoring the 
original ideal state of the American government. It is state veto that serves for him as a means 
of stopping decline, to bridging the gap between ideal and experience, halting degeneration 
and preserving liberty. In a vein similar to other republican Jeremiahs, he positions ancient 
republics such as Greece or Rome asfigura of which the American federal republic appears as 
an antitype. At the same time, he also draws upon US history for historical precedent in these 
speeches. The constitution-making period appears to Calhoun as the age when the perfect US 
system of government was born. However, declension soon set in, and it was left for Jefferson 
to restore the Republic to its original state on the basis of the "principles of 1798" by de-
manding and securing for the states their reserved powers. Hence Calhoun, historically 
speaking, claims to intend to drive the Republic back to the ideal age of Jefferson and the 
Founding Fathers by means of his state veto. Yet, adopting the concept of continuing re-
volution, he evokes the War of Independence as a means of establishing a parallel between the 
colonists and the nullifiers as well as between British rule and the majority's abuse of power 
against the South in 1832-33. 104 
102 	Papers of Calhoun, 12:92-93. 
103 	Ibid., 12:93; original emphases. 
too 	That Calhoun's evocation of struggles from the nation's past was no exception is clearly suggested by 
Andrew W. Robertson's study The Language of Democracy: Political Rhetoric in the United States and Britain, 1790-1900 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). According to Robertson, as part of a shift to a more familiar political style, 
to narrow the gap between the discourse of political elite and that of the popular voters, electioneering rhetoric in 
the Jacksonian era extensively drew upon "historical folklore," with more and more emphasis on national rather than 
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When using historical examples to familiarize his audience with nullification, establishing 
parallels between the nullifiers' cause and past events, Calhoun achieved ambiguous effects. 
During the crisis, however painstakingly he strove to deny the links that anti-nullifiers es-
tablished between the application of state veto and secession, the idioms he employed had 
implications that he was unable to control: Roman plebeians, his archetypes of the nullifiers, 
seceded from the ancient republic before establishing their tribunate, and the North American 
colonies did break their ties with Britain. 
As we have seen, due to its basically jeremiadic structure, Calhoun's nullification rhetoric 
was governed by metaphors, most prominently by the metaphor of two worlds, which took 
several shapes in his writing and oratory: corrupt, poverty stricken, industrialized Europe 
versus virtuous, socially homogeneous America, or "despotic" Asian versus "federal" European 
government. Even more importantly, another set of "two worlds" in Calhoun's rhetoric was 
North versus South, through which he implied the possibility of moving away from the 
mainstream American jeremiad. This metaphor was also reinforced and complicated by the 
connotations of disunion through references to the American Revolution. The course of events 
having made Calhoun disappointed with "the people of the United States" as the major 
addressees of his jeremiads, by the time of the Force Bill he turned to Southerners as the 
minor remnant to carry on the national mission by regenerating the Republic through defying 
Federal government. In doing so, however, he also raised the possibility of the South initiating 
its own sectional version of the national errand. Calhoun, thus, formulated a Southern version 
of the American jeremiad, in which US exceptionalism merged with the uncorrupt Southern 
exceptionalism, creating a sectionalist idiom for the national ritual. Thus Calhoun had a 
significant role in developing a regional variation of the hegemonic national mission through 
rhetoric, the idea of starting a new revolution instead of continuing the old one. Throughout 
the crisis, as has been seen, Calhoun did not give up the mission of continuing revolution: he 
hoped to close the gap between the ideal of the Founders, 1798 and 1799, and the experience 
of declension. However, he introduced the element of the South as the protagonist of the 
errand and this feature gained increasing emphasis in his later jeremiads. 
CALHOUN'S POST-NULLIFICATION JEREMIADS 
(1833-1850) 
In the post-Nullification period, Calhoun applied the American jeremiad to a wide range of 
topics. Some of his speeches and writings merely reflect upon the Nullification Controversy, 
while others focus on economic and/or political declension and the need for restoration. Still 
classical elements (73-74). Calhoun, at the same time, seemed to find the classical age still appealing, especially 
when his performances were located in Congress, in front of elite audiences. Understandably, anti-nullifiers also 
resorted to the device of horological antecedents in the rhetorical struggle of the Crisis. As Richard B. Latner claims, 
"Editorials . . . drew parallels between ancient republican subversives described in Plutarch, such American 
counterparts as Aaron Burr and the Blue Light Federalists of the Hartford Convention, and the nullifiers" (Latner, 
"Nullification Crisis," 22). 
140 
others—and they represent a new type of argumentation—apply the language of the jeremiad 
to the territorial question. 
Regarding these issues, in the post-nullification period Calhoun also testified to the ex-
ceptional nature of the American Republic, an ideal, from which, however, he often perceived 
declension. In August 1841, for instance, he, in the manner of the American jeremiad, talked 
about "the high destiny which certainly awaits our country if we should be but true to 
ourselves." i05 Moreover, as he explained later, in urging the use of presidential veto in 184-2, 
the US political system was perfect, being the result of divine intervention, a "wonderful and 
sublime system of Government which our patriotic ancestors established, not so much by their 
wisdom, as wise and experienced as they were, as by the guidance of a kind Providence, who, 
in his divine dispensation, so disposed events as to lead to the establishment of a system of 
government wiser than those who framed it.» 106 Its perfection notwithstanding, he saw it liable 
to degeneration but available for restoration, too. 
Those texts in which he concentrates on the course and history of the decline in this period 
and refrains from addressing a particular current political issue follow the logic of his 
Nullification jeremiads: the concentration of power in the federal government and the Ex-
ecutive, the threat of despotic rule, the consequent loss of liberty and the need to return to 
the principles of 1798 and 1801 as a remedy constitute the general pattern of these speech-
es. 107  Calhoun addressed the problem of declension in his proposal to repeal the Force Act in 
his speech in the Senate on April 9, 1834. 108 The American system of government based on 
the principle of the division of power is far from its original, enviable state, he claims. Power 
has become concentrated in the federal government. "If we now raise our eyes and direct 
them towards that once beautiful system, with all its various, separate, and independent parts, 
blended into one harmonious whole, we must be struck with the mighty change!" Calhoun 
explains. "All have disappeared, gone; absorbed; concentrated and consolidated in this Go-
vernment; which is left alone in the midst of the desolation of the system, the sole and 
unrestricted representative of an absolute and despotic majority.» 109 
The Force Act created a situation which, unless reversed, Calhoun argues, will culminate 
in a complete loss of liberty and the establishment of "military despotism.' 10 Using the 
characteristic idiom of declension, he depicts the current state of the Republic as a far cry 
from the once ideal one. The centralization of power has serious consequences for the polity, 
too: "To this fruitful source of woes may be traced," Calhoun claims, "that remarkable decay 
of public virtue; that rapid growth of corruption and subserviency; that decline of patriotism; 
105 Papers of Calhoun, 15:730. 
106 Ibid., 16:154; see also ibid. , 15:281; and ibid., 16:409. 
107 	See; for instance, his speeches "To a Committee at Farmville, Virginia,"June 23, 1834, in ibid. , 12:344-47 
or "To George N. Sanders and Others," June 19, 1840 in ibid., 15:281-282; "To a Committee at Charlotte, N. C.," 
June 30, 1844, in ibid., 19:227-28. 
108 	Ibid., 12:277-98. 
tog 	Ibid., 12:283. 
110 	Ibid., 12:284-85. 
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that increase of faction; that tendency to anarchy; and, finally, that visible approach of the 
absolute power of one man, which so lamentably characterizes [these] times." 1" 
State interposition applied by South Carolina was beneficial, Calhoun argues, in that it 
prevented the establishment of despotic government. However, it was only a temporary block 
to the process of consolidation. The existence of the Force Act still poses a threat to repub-
lican order. As Calhoun maintains, "The seed still remains in the system." Therefore con-
solidation may start all over again and, Calhoun repeats his point made at the beginning of the 
speech, "pass through all those stages which we have witnessed, and in all human probability, 
consummate itself and terminate our hopes in a military despotism."' iz 
Repealing the Force Act, then, would equal killing the principle and halting the tendency 
toward consolidation and the restoration and preservation of the exceptional system of A-
merican government, "that admirable and beautiful federative system," as Calhoun says, 
closing his discourse with the standard jeremiadic prophecy: "and our country may yet realize 
that permanent state of liberty, prosperity, and greatness, which we all once so fondly hoped 
was our allotted destiny." 13 Repealing the Act, then, in Calhoun's rhetoric, becomes a key 
to fulfilling the prophecy of the American jeremiad. 
A similar pattern is exhibited in a speech that Calhoun delivered to an audience in 
Covington, Georgia in August 1833. i4 What makes his argument peculiar here, though, is the 
contradiction it contains. On the one hand, Calhoun claims that with Jackson's Nullification 
Proclamation and the passing of the Force Bill, consolidation culminated in the establishment 
of despotism, the loss of liberty for the entire American people: "[W]e are no longer a free 
people," he claims, "but under the absolute will of an unchecked majority, which has usurped 
the power according to my conception, constituting the very essence of despotism.» 15 In other 
words, Calhoun interprets the current situation as a complete breakdown of the ideal: the 
Republic is beyond the ultimate point of declension. At the same time, later in the speech, he 
evokes the danger of future despotism which he claims will result unless the current process 
of decline is stopped. He contends, "The pressure of despotic power will first fall on us [i.e. 
southerners]; and if we do not meet it, with the lofty and determined spirit of freemen, ready 
to sacrifice all rather than surrender our liberty, our doom, and that of our institutions, will 
be fixed forever.» 16 The obvious tension between his two propositions can be attributed to 
the force of the jeremiad: Calhoun, even if he is unaware of it, modifies his statement about 
the complete loss of liberty, the end of the decline in order to sustain hope about the pos-
sibility of the mission calling for continuing revolution. "7 
"' 	Ibid., 12:285. 
12 	Ibid., 12:297. 
113 	Ibid., 12:298; see also ibid., 12:334-37, 344-46. 
14 	"To Charles Kennon and Others," August 10, 1833, in ibid., 12:166-68. 
115 Ibid., 12:167. 
16 
 Ibid., 12:168. 
117 
	Once doom sets in for once and all, the American Jeremiah can no longer call on his audience to continue 
the mission, to bridge the gap between ideal and experience because at that hypothetical moment the concept of 
chosenness would be questioned and the errand would lose its meaning. The continuous "state of unfulfillment" that 
characterizes the American jeremiad, according to Bercovitch, implies not only the constant "distance between 
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The bulk of Calhoun's post-Nullification jeremiadic rhetoric deals with the theme of 
decline from an economic-moral point of view and addresses issues related to the President's 
financial policy, the Second Bank of the United States, the spoils system as well as patronage, 
which gained special importance during the presidency of Andrew Jackson. Another form of 
declension from the republican ideal that concerned Calhoun was related to a particular aspect 
of corruption and dependence. One of the targets of eighteenth-century country republican 
jeremiads was favoritism, patronage, or the Crown's practice of granting offices to its sup-
porters in the executive and legislative branches. 118 A group of Calhoun's texts of the 1830s 
and early 1840s were intended to address this problem. In them, he appealed to the republican 
fear that the Executive granting offices to his party members aggravates political and moral 
corruption. In doing so, he made extensive use of the framework of the American jeremiad. 
For Calhoun, patronage is also associated with the dangerous increase of the executive 
power. In the first place, as he points out, the President of the United States is not granted 
unlimited power by the Constitution to appoint and remove officers: "To give him the power 
to dismiss, at his will and pleasure, without limitation or control, is to give him an absolute 
and unlimited control over the subsistence of almost all who hold office under Govern-
ment." 119  They would be totally dependent upon the Executive for their existence. Depen-
dence, according to republican logic, leads to corruption: "Who does not see that a power so 
unlimited and despotic over this great and powerful corps must tend to corrupt and debase 
those who compose it, and to convert them into the supple and willing instruments of him 
who wields it?"' 
Should this power of the Executive remain unlimited, Calhoun argues, "the result must 
be the complete corruption and debasement of those in public employ." The corruption due 
to patronage, in turn, he warns, will not remain confined within the federal government: it 
will contaminate the entire society, because its tendency is to destroy the spirit of the people, 
thus subverting the Republic. Patronage caused the decline of the Roman republic by de-
stroying the independent spirit of the people. Growing dependence on another man tends to 
lead to the loss of republican liberty. As Calhoun contends, "With the growth of executive 
patronage, and the control which the Executive has established over those in office by the 
exercise of this tremendous power, we witness among ourselves the progress of this base and 
servile spirit, which already presents so striking a contrast between the former and present 
character of our people." 121  The ultimate result of the tendency will be that "in a few ge-
nerations the American character will become utterly corrupt and debased." The process of 
decline can be stopped only by limiting the power of the Executive to appoint and remove 
promise and fact," (Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 23) but also the preclusion of failure and thus the affirmation of 
hope, which is also at work in this speech of Calhoun. 
118 	See Chapter 1, above. 
119 	Speech on the President's Power of Removal," February 25, 1835, in Papers of Calhoun, 12:489. On 
patronage see also ibid., 23:107-10. 
120 	Ibid., 12:489. 
121 	Ib id., 12:490. 
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government officers, by reducing patronage. In Calhoun's words, "the danger which now 
menaces the destruction of our system may yet be arrested." 122 
In most of his writings on the topic Calhoun links the increase of patronage with the 
financial affairs of the Republic. Jackson's decision to remove federal deposits from the Bank 
of the United States in 1833 and to distribute them among certain state banks provided 
Calhoun with the opportunity to raise anxiety over the connection between the federal go-
vernment and the pet banks. 123 For him, the removal of the federal deposits is, in reality, a 
struggle between the Executive and Congress to gain control over the national currency. In 
his eyes, the pet bank system is designed merely to extend the power of the federal govern-
ment, providing the president with overwhelming power. In addition, he warns his audience, 
as a result of such a policy "[n]ot only the selected banks, but the whole banking institutions 
of the country, and with them the entire money power, for the purpose of speculation, 
peculation, and corruption, would be placed under the control of the Executive. 7/124 
Calhoun accentuates the gravity of the danger by drawing a parallel between Jackson and 
his partisans and Julius Caesar's breaking into the treasury of the Roman republic. At the same 
time, he denounces the American counterparts, who are of a different character: They are 
"artful, cunning, and corrupt politicians and not fearless warriors. They have entered the 
treasury, not sword in hand, as public plunderers, but with the false keys of sophistry, as 
pilferers, under the silence of midnight." All they want is to acquire the financial means 
necessary to develop patronage and win the elections. The removal of the deposits is, there-
fore, one step down the road to the destruction of republican liberty. 125 Calhoun's conclusion 
is a conventional evocation of jeremiadic doom: "Confidence is daily withdrawing from the 
General Government. Alienation is hourly going on. These will necessarily create a state of 
things inimical to the existence of our institutions, and, if not arrested, convulsions must fol-
low, and then comes dissolution or despotism, when a thick cloud will be thrown over the 
cause of liberty and the future prospects of our country." 126  Returning public deposits to the 
Treasury is the way to deal with the crisis. 
In Calhoun's rhetoric, the attempts to establish links between the federal government and 
the banks as well as the increase of patronage appear as part of the intention to revive old 
Federalist policies. For him, Alexander Hamilton was the first US politician to show a positive 
attitude toward patronage, which he considered "not as bone but an essential ingredient, 
without which the Government would be impracticable.» i27 Other "measures" originated by 
the Federalist school, such as the "funded debt," "a National Bank," high tariffs, a strong con-
nection between the federal government and the banks promote the decline of the Republic, 
because they are aimed at enriching "the mercenary corps ... the dependent corps, who live, 
124 	Ibid., 12:218. 
125 	Ibid., 12:221,222. 
126 	Ibid., 12:225. 
127 	Speech on the Bill to Prevent the Interference of Certain Federal Officers in Elections," February 22, 1839, 
in ibid., :566. 
122 	Ibid., 12:491. 
123 	"Speech on the Removal of the Deposits," in Papers 12:200-25. 
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or expect to live, on the Government—the office holders and expectants." 128  The Democratic 
party in power aims to revive these policies. Were it to succeed, catastrophe would take 
place, warns Calhoun. "Adopt these measures," he prophesies, "and ... the power would 
depart from the people ... and would pass into the hands of the master spirits, who would, 
for the time, control the Government by their herds of dependants and partisans.n 129 Calhoun 
also denounces the protective tariff of 184-2 on account of its tendency to corrupt "politics and 
morals." Only the adoption of free trade principles can save the Union from the loss of 
liberty. 130 
Calhoun also resorted to the rhetoric of the American jeremiad in political debates over 
territorial expansion that emerged in the mid-1800s. For instance, conventional jeremiadic 
strategy appealing to the republican fear of the loss of liberty characterizes his rhetoric 
regarding the Mexican War, started by the Polk administration in 184-6. By February 184-7, 
Calhoun argued that despite the series of military successes, the United States should refrain 
from conquering the whole of Mexico, subduing and incorporating it into the union. Instead, 
he advocated the establishment of a border separating the already occupied territory of the 
country from the unoccupied rest of it. 131 
One of his major arguments against the conquest of Mexico and its incorporation into the 
Union is that these would result in disastrous consequences for the Republic. In his words, 
"Mexico is to us the forbidden fruit, the penalty of eating it would be to subject our instit-
utions to political death.» 132 To integrate the people of Mexico into the American Republic 
would be an impossible task, suggests Calhoun, due to the difference between them and the 
citizens of America, who had been practitioners of self-government: "Can we incorporate a 
people so dissimilar from us in every respect—so little qualified for free and popular go-
vernment-without certain destruction to our political institutions?" he asks. His answer is 
"No." 133 
A republican form of government, he argues, cannot be imposed on a conquered people 
against its will; only a government of the aristocratic or despotic kind could survive in a 
Mexico conquered by the United States. "I must say," Calhoun declares, "I am at a loss to see 
how a free and independent Republic can be established in Mexico under the protection and 
authority of its conquerors. I can readily understand how an aristocracy or a despotic Go-
vernment might be, but how a free republican Government can be so established, under such 
circumstances, is to me incomprehensible.' Also, given the racial composition of the Mex-
icans—"Indians" and "mixed blood"—Calhoun maintains that once incorporated into the 
128 	"Speech on the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury," June 21, 1841, in ibid., 15:580, 583. 
129 	Ibid., 12:584. 
130 	Ibid., 16:372, 375. 
131 	"Speech on the War with Mexico," in ibid., 24:115-33. 
132 	Ibid., 24:118. He also opposed the war due to the financial consequences, believing that military expenses 
would increase both tariffs and the national debt. See Ernest McPherson Lander, Jr. Reluctant Imperialists: Calhoun, 
the South Carolinians, and the Mexican War (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 32. 
133 Papers of Calhoun, 24:131. 
134 	"Speech on the War with Mexico" (Revised Report) January 4, 1848, in ibid., 25:81. 
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Union they cannot be granted a position equal to white Americans. "Ours is the Government 
of a white man. The great misfortune of what was formerly Spanish America, is to be traced 
to the fatal error of placing the colored race on an equality with the white. That error 
destroyed the social arrangement which formed the basis of their society. »135 
The conquest of Mexico would lead to the destruction of the Republic, according to 
Calhoun, primarily because such a conquest would be bound to increase the power of the 
Executive. Calhoun draws on historical experience to justify his claim: "The nations con-
quered and held as a province have, in time, retaliated by destroying the liberty of their 
conquerors, through the corrupting effect of extended patronage and irresponsible power. 
Such, certainly, would be our case." And the outcome is predictable: "the Union would be-
come an imperial power," and the "end would be anarchy or despotism." 136 Conquest proved 
fatal to the ancient Roman republic, the model for the Union. Calhoun warns against the 
conquest so that the American Republic can avoid the fate of the ancient one: "[W]hen the 
Roman power passed beyond the limits of Italy, crossed the Adriatic, the Mediterranean, and 
the Alps, liberty fell prostrate; the Roman people became a rabble; corruption penetrated 
every department of the Government; violence and anarchy ruled the day, and military des-
potism closed the scene." 13' 
Making use of the jeremiadic model, Calhoun also highlights another aspect of the war: he 
charges the citizens of the Republic with a decline in their vigilance for liberty as their top 
priority. In "the early days of the republic [liberty] was the first object of our solicitude," says 
Calhoun. Today, however, he adds, "other topics occupy the attention of Congress and of the 
country—military glory, extension of the empire, and the aggrandizement of the country.» 138 
The long time of peace and prosperity has made the people of the American Republic believe 
that liberty is their God-given lot, lasting forever, unconditionally. This mistaken belief is the 
reason, maintains Calhoun, why "we plunge into war, contract heavy debts, increase vastly 
the patronage of the Executive, and indulge in every species of extravagance, without thinking 
that we expose our liberty to hazard. It is a great and fatal mistake. The day of retribution will 
come. »139 
135 	Ibid., 25:85. As seen above in Chapter 1, Calhoun made the degree of liberty that a people could live with 
proportionate to the actual level of intelligence and moral development. Obviously, for him, the people of Mexico 
had a level incompatible with Republican government allowing the utmost level of liberty. 
136 	Ibid., 25:86; see also ibid., 24:431. 
137 Ibid., 25:87. Manisha Sinha claims that Calhoun's opposition to the annexation of Mexico was induced by 
his fear of the end of slavery if Mexicans, an allegedly inferior race, became full-fledged U.S. citizens. Sinha, The 
Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South Carolina (Chapel Hill and London: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 2000), 67. However, it seems more plausible to argue that what Calhoun was, in fact, 
concerned about was the corruption of government in order to accommodate to a presumably degraded people: 
steeped in despotism, Mexicans would be unable to exist under self-government and whites would have to suffer 
their government turning despotic in order to be able to control the degraded others. 
138 Papers of Calhoun, 25:90. 
139 	Ibid. Calhoun also opposed the annexation of all Mexico due to his belief in the Mexicans' adverse attitude 
to slavery, which most probably would result in the exdusion of the peculiar institution from the occupied ter-
ritories (ibid., 25:19). 
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To ease anxiety and offer an optimistic alternative to doom, Calhoun advocates peace 
instead of war as a means of increasing the prestige of the Republic, in order to make A-
merica's mission more effective. "By pursuing such a course," he argues, "we may succeed in 
combining greatness and liberty ... and do more to extend liberty by our example over this 
continent and the world generally, than would be done by a thousand victories.n 140 In other 
words, here Calhoun evokes the Winthropean conception of the errand: converting the rest 
of the world through example; the American Republic, instead of continuing the war, is to 
rely on the power of its free institutions, as an example for Mexico to follow. For him, 
choosing war would entail fiasco in two senses: as far as domestic republican order is con-
cerned, whose breakdown he so eloquently envisions, and also concerning the errand, the 
failure of which would also be jeopardized. 141 
For Calhoun, then, the conquest of Mexico would prove disastrous for the Republic 
because its incorporation into the Union would promote the process of corruption, leading 
to the destruction of republican institutions. At the same time, even the thought of conquest 
on the part of the citizens of the Republic, in his interpretation, is to be taken as a sign of 
decline. 142  By arguing that the love for liberty is fading among Americans, Calhoun, in terms 
of the jeremiad, also argues that the mission, the ideal, is losing its appeal for them. 143 
The territorial question brought to surface the tensions over slavery between the two 
sections. The Wilmot Proviso of 1846, proposing the banning of slavery in territories to be 
acquired as well as intensifying abolitionism in the North, made southern slaveholders 
increasingly sensitive to the changing balance of power within the federal system, when, as a 
result of expansion, new states were to be admitted to the Union. 
Toward the end of Calhoun's political career, a new argument gained more and more 
emphasis in his jeremiadic rhetoric, namely the possibility that the South might be compelled 
to renew the mission by starting its own and trying to restore the ideal outside the Union. By 
the late 1840s he regarded the abolitionist threat to the South as the main danger subverting 
the foundations of the Republic. The concentration of power within the federal government, 
according to Calhoun, poses a threat to slavery in the South because of the importance of the 
140 	Ibid., 25:92. 
141 	See also ibid., 25:235-45. On Calhoun's understanding expansion as part of America's mission, see also 
his eloquent argument on the occupation of Oregon, March 16, 1846 (ibid., 22:701-2). 
142 	Calhoun's jeremiadic denunciation of the war as leading to the corruption of republican virtue and the fall 
of the American republic was also a response to pro-war rhetoric, which, in sharp contrast to his attitude, hailed the 
military confrontation as a means to renew virtue and to halt the process of corruption. On pro-war republican 
rhetoric, see Johannsen 1985, chapter 10. Calhoun's reluctance to conquer all Mexico was also related to the 
North's attempt to restrict the expansion of slavery in Mexican territory as manifest in the Wilmot Proviso (Lander, 
Reluctant Imperialists, 63). In connection with Calhoun's attitude to the War of Mexico in a broader South Carolinian 
context, Lander also points out that the speech received massive reaction nationwide regardless of sectional 
affiliation (ibid., 161-63). 
143 	When lamenting the loss of the love of liberty in the American people, Calhoun uses republican language: 
liberty was always conceived of as the distinctive trait or virtue of the many and had thus become second nature of 
the American people (cf. Chapter 1). The loss of liberty would necessarily implicate a change in government, which 
would turn despotic, appropriate for a people without liberty. 
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balance between the two sections. The day it is gone, he argues, "is a day that will not be for 
removed from political revolution, anarchy, civil war, and wide-spread disaster."' 44 
These notions are articulated in an accentuated manner in Calhoun's last speech on the 
slavery question which he made in connection with the admission of California into the Union 
as a free state, and which was read out for him in the Senate on March 4-, 1850. It is, in part, 
a jeremiadic call for attention to the declension threatening with disunion. 145 In his view, the 
abolitionist movement has developed to such an extent that it endangers the Union. As he 
contends, "[T]he agitation has been permitted to proceed, with almost no attempt to resist it, 
until it has reached a period when it can no longer be disguised or denied that the Union is in 
danger."146  The "almost universal discontent" of the southern states with the Union may lead 
to their secession. 147 
The major reason that Calhoun gives for the alienation of the South from the North is the 
loss of the balance of power between the two sections within the federal government. The 
once "perfect equilibrium" has deteriorated to such an extent that the South can place no 
control over northern power. In Calhoun's words: "[O]ne section has the exclusive power of 
controlling the Government, which leaves the other without any adequate means of protecting 
itself against its encroachment and oppression.n 148 Due to the dramatic population increase in 
the North, the South has lost a considerable number of seats in both chambers of the federal 
legislature as well as its influence over the Executive. Another aspect of the decline is the 
concentration of power in the federal government. As Calhoun points out, "What was once 
a constitutional federal Republic, is now converted, in reality, into one as absolute as that of 
the Autocrat of Russia, and as despotic in its tendency, as any absolute government that ever 
existed.n 149 In other words, republican order based on the principle of self-government has 
broken down. 
The admission of California into the Union as a state based on the popular sovereignty 
formula, which would put the decision in the hands of the inhabitants over the status of their 
state concerning slavery, signifies a further degree of the loss of balance between North and 
South, presuming that the principle would tend to favor the North. Hence the hope of 
restoring the balance is totally destroyed, Calhoun implies. He addresses his fellow senators 
indicating the erroneous nature of the anticipated decision: "If you admit [California], you 
endorse and give your sanction to all that has been done. Are you prepared to do so? ... Are 
you prepared to surrender virtually to the Executive Department, all the powers which you 
144 	Papers of Calhoun, 24:172; see also ibid., 25:658-59 on the significance of consolidation and the sectional issue. 
145 	Ibid., 27:187-211. 
146 	Ibid. 27:128. See also his "Speech on the organization of government in Oregon Territory," August 12, 
1849, in Works of Calhoun, 4:513-35. Calhoun suggests that although small in number, abolitionists are capable of 
exerting political influence through parties and elections (Papers of Calhoun, 24:252-57). Fitting for the rhetoric of 
declension, Calhoun defines abolitionism as a disease: "There are diseases of the body politick, as well as our natural 
bodies, that never will stop of themselves. Abolition is one of them" (ibid., 25:657 see also ibid., 25:661, 665). 
147 	Ibid., 25:188-89. 
148 	Ibid., 25:189. 
149 	Ibid., 25:195. On the South having lost power in the federal government, see also ibid., 24:169-71; and 
ibid., 24:249. 
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have heretofore exercised over the territories? If not, how can you ... give your assent to the 
admission of California as a State, under a pretended constitution and government?"' 
Calhoun identifies decline with the South gradually losing power within the Union. The 
decline could be stopped and the Union saved only by adopting several measures, including 
permitting slavery in California Territory, banning abolitionism, as well as an amendment that 
would "restore to the South in substance the power she possessed of protecting herself, before 
the equilibrium between the sections was destroyed by the action of this Government." He 
demands justice for the South so that "she could remain honorably and safely in the Union," 
a settlement that would "restore the harmony and fraternal feelings between the sections, 
which existed anterior to the Missouri agitation." Then, he concludes, "Nothing else can, with 
any certainty, finally and forever settle the questions at issue, terminate agitation, and save the 
Union.» 151 Calhoun regards the admission of California as the test case: if slavery were 
excluded from the new state, the South would not hesitate to leave the Union. "We [i.e. 
southern politicians]," he says, "would be blind not to perceive in that case, that your real 
objects are power and aggrandizement, and infatuated not to act accordingly. "152 
In conclusion, most of Calhoun's post-Nullification jeremiads manifest the pattern established 
during the Nullification Controversy: his main target remains consolidation, the concentration 
of power in the Executive, the tendency to establish tyranny in place of the republican form 
of government. Patronage, the spoils system, or the surplus revenue of the federal treasury, 
in his application of the jeremiadic paradigm, become signs of decline, of majority power 
getting out of control. 
This argument, accompanied by his warning against the dangers of territorial expansion 
contributing to the increase of majority power, developed into a new version of the jeremiad 
by the late 1840s. As his last major speech shows, at the end of his political career, with the 
compromise of 1850 in the making, Calhoun laid more emphasis on the possibility of the 
South continuing the errand on its own. The anxiety that he aroused had no longer to do with 
the loss of republican liberty for the whole of the Republic but, instead, the loss of liberty for 
the South. With the broken balance of power between the two sections and the growing 
antislavery sentiment in the North, he pleaded for protective guarantees for the South by 
raising the specter of secession as an alternative. 
John Ashworth argues that from the 1830s through the 1840s, Calhoun employed different 
strategies to defend Southern interests. While in the 1830s he tried to create a United 
Southern front, cutting across party lines, in the late 1830s and early 1840s, back in the De-
mocratic party, he looked for Northern support. In the mid-1840s, in turn, he courted 
Western interests through his advocacy of internal improvements, whereas in the late 1840s, 
15o 	Ibid., 25:207-8. 
15t 	Ibid., 25:210. 
152 	Ibid., 25:211; see also ibid., 25:670-71. On Calhoun's argument for the necessity of northern guarantees 
for the protection of slavery in the South as a condition to preserve the Union, see also his "Speech on the Oregon 
Bill," in Works of Calhoun, 4:534. 
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he, again, turned to his strategy of creating a unified South. 153 Whichever period we take, 
however, through the rhetorical ritual of the American jeremiad, Calhoun spoke to the whole 
nation as his audience. Even when voicing the possibility of the South being the "stewards of 
the trust," t54 he did so with an eye on the trust with a meaning independent of sectional in-
terpretations: he emphasized the same continuing revolution for the same purpose that his 
sectional adversaries also adopted. 
As has been seen, Bercovitch claims that the South and southern public figures fell outside 
the domain of the American jeremiad. My arguments above, however, suggest that Calhoun's 
case does not seem to bear that out. His own version of the American jeremiad assumed fea-
tures generally characteristic of mainstream republican jeremiads. He persisted in arguing on 
the ground of the national republican consensus, which, at the same time, he interpreted in 
a way fitting for his sectional cause. Similar to other dissenters applying the American jer-
emiad, he adopted the "logic of continuing revolution" and remained, also in a rhetorical 
sense, within the framework of the national consensus. The alternative of secession was still 
about carrying on the original errand but outside the Union. 
Calhoun's concern with abolitionism was intimately intertwined with the pattern of 
declension as represented by consolidation from his earlier jeremiads. For him, the northern 
denunciation of slavery and attempt to bar its expansion into new territories gained real 
significance with the presumed concentration of power in the federal government and the 
North's control of it. Hence, he managed to transpose the conventional jeremiadic structure 
invented for the nation to the cause of the slave South, at the same time, retaining its core 
elements. 
153 	John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic, vol. 1, Commerce and Compromise, 
1820-1850 (Cambridge, New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 136,202,451-54. In fact, Calhoun 
started talking about the necessity for the South to act on a common platform instead of relying on national parties 
as early as 1844. See Papers of Calhoun, 19:525, 613. 
154 	The term belongs to Paul C. Nagel. See his This Sacred Trust, xii. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing chapters I have attempted to show how Calhoun drew upon a pool of diverse 
political languages consisting of various vocabularies, idioms and structural frameworks, 
tending to utilize them in order to amplify the impact of his political rhetoric, for largely 
similar purposes, centering around the themes of protection and preservation. Whether vir-
tue, Lockean liberalism or the balance of power, the speeches and writings of Calhoun ana-
lyzed above expressed either concern about their loss or ways to restore them. The traditions 
that he drew upon fitted his critical purposes of fighting the process of losing power gradually, 
stopping tendencies he deemed harmful to his state and his section. 
Calhoun's major target of criticism usually being the federal government, he could use 
republican vocabulary structured by the dichotomy of virtue and corruption providing him 
with a tool by means of which to accentuate his apprehensions about deteriorating republican 
order, tendencies of the central power to jeopardize individual and southern rights. Such was 
the case with Lockean liberalism; with its emphasis on the protection of property, self-
preservation or the right of revolution. 
With shifting focus, his jeremiads functioned to create anxiety in his audience as well as 
to urge them to act in a way that would facilitate bringing together the present with the 
promised but deteriorating ideal. Furthermore, the typological structure of the .jeremiad pro-
vided Calhoun with another tool, by which he could establish a figurative, metaphorical re-
lationship between past, present and future. 
Calhoun's peculiarity lay in the fact that he spoke the languages of the Union to a national 
political community. Yet he did so for sectional purposes, in an attempt to defend Southern 
slaveholding interest—he hoped to gain empowerment through the persuasive power of those 
languages. ts5  As we have seen, Calhoun's political languages ran throughout his career, cutting 
across national and sectional concerns: their idioms, with varying degrees of intensity, in-
formed his political rhetoric, mostly independently from the nationalist/sectionalist divide. 
Different idioms of the languages gained emphasis in different periods in accordance with the 
political issues that Calhoun addressed. Nevertheless, it was the Nullification Crisis, the most 
turbulent period of his life, that brought about an important change: this was the time when 
the consolidation idiom developed in Calhoun's jeremiads with the momentary appearance 
of the Lockean right of revolution. Still, it was the emergence of the slavery issue in the 
155 	In a recent study, Lacy K. Ford, Jr. has argued that the various political strategies that Calhoun employed 
during his political career with the purpose of defending Southern minority interests met unfavorable reception, 
resulting in his ultimate failure to create a politically unified South. Ford maintains that this fiasco was due mainly 
to his unremitting effort to implement "consensus-building" politics in the age of conflicting party and other interests 
dominated by governments of the numerical majority. Ford, "Prophet with Posthumous Honor: John C. Calhoun 
and the Southern Political Tradition," in Is There a Southern Political Tradition? ed. Charles W. Eagles (Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 1996), 21. Yet, as we have seen, Calhoun was very much into a politics that also 
acknowledged the significance of party politics and the legitimacy of majority power. 
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mid-1830s that, combined with fear of the abuse of central power, gained increasing 
significance. (This was in obvious contrast to the Missouri Crisis, during which Calhoun saw 
no danger of consolidation, or a real threat to the peculiar institution.) 
By relying on Pocock's theory of political languages one can understand how, in his 
republicanism, for instance, Calhoun was capable of drawing upon such diametrically opposed 
approaches to securing virtue in the republic as the Federalist and Antifederalist ways. My 
Pocockean reading of Calhoun's republicanism or his American jeremiad has also shown how 
multivalent meanings structure a given thinker's discourse. For example, virtue or causes of 
declension took on several forms and meanings in the South Carolinian's rhetoric. Fur-
thermore, through the perspective of political languages we have also been able to see how 
Calhoun, in part, still spoke the language of Lockean liberalism or at least utilized its idioms 
in several cases despite his own intentions as expressed through his denial of the Lockean state 
of nature and natural right. Needless to say, Calhoun's own reading of Locke, as I tried to 
show above, was not exempt from instances of misreading. Yet, by applying the Pocockean 
paradigm I am able to show that these instances are better seen as modifications of the original 
meaning. Further, my analysis reveals that various, often contradictory idioms of political lan-
guages informed Calhoun's way of argumentation in accordance with Pocock's theory. Finally, 
the Pocockean reading of Calhoun's political thought has allowed a better understanding of 
how this thought interacted with its political contexts, constantly responding to them, as, for 
instance, the transformation of his jeremiadic rhetoric indicates. 
As Pocock argues, the individual user of a given political language may modify it in order 
to exploit it for his or her own purposes, effecting a conceptual change in it, which may a-
mount to a "conceptual revolution," the birth of a new paradigm. 156  Did Calhoun, then, in any 
way participate in transforming the languages that he appropriated? Can he be considered to 
have implemented a revolution as described by Pocock? 
In the light of my analysis, it can be concluded that Calhoun did tend to modify the 
political languages that he employed to achieve a persuasive effect, based on idioms and beliefs 
already known to his audience, and whenever he acted as an innovator, the South or the states 
as corporate entities were involved. This is most obvious in the case of his version of re-
publicanism in which the South appears as a quasi-social estate of classical republicanism, with 
its own virtue, maintaining balance and order in the Union as social estates function in the 
mixed government type. Through this vision of the South, Calhoun returned from the main-
stream Federalist to a pre-Federalist conception of the mixed government based on the 
balance of social orders, uniting individuals along common interests. In addition, in making 
Rome the exemplar of the successful mechanization of virtue, he performed a significant 
modification of earlier republican visions having the Venetian Republic as their ideal. Calhoun 
also performed innovation on the original republican idiom of the connection between virtue 
and the citizen soldier by claiming virtue for a standing army in peacetime, an army consisting 
of citizen soldiers—an important step on the road to a modern professional army of the 
Republic. He did so by making the Southern plantation system appear a peculiar one, capable 
156 	Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (New York: Atheneum, 1971; 
repr. with new preface, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 277. 
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of shifting from modernity to pre-modern self-sufficiency, thereby regaining republican 
independence when need be. 
His corporate perspective also lends novelty to his appropriation of the elements of 
Lockean liberalism, his basic innovation being the extension of Locke's argument about the 
link between rationality and liberty to the adult individual as well as, in the Jeffersonian 
fashion, making individual states the equivalents of Locke's independent individuals. By the 
end of his career, Calhoun's contributions to the tradition of the American jeremiad consisted 
in proposing the South as a saving remnant to continue the revolution. Yet, his most 
influential innovation is related to the nullification movement in South Carolina, when he 
worked out his theory of state interposition developed on the basis of certain antecedents and 
putting it into practice. In fact, he did not prove successful in employing the power of 
tradition in order to make his innovative additions to the original languages acceptable to an 
increasingly sectional audience. He had partial successes only, when his efforts were unrelated 
to sectional issues, such as his strategic move to republicanize the concept of the regular army. 
The latter ultimately proved essential in the reform movement of American defense. His 
effort built on the concept of military virtue as a significant trait of the citizens' army, 
defending the liberty of the republic. However, Calhoun's innovative doctrine of nullification 
by one state as presented in the antagonizing context of the Nullification Crisis was ineffective 
in winning enough support even though it appealed to tradition. Using the language of 
Lockean liberalism, with particular allusions to the idiom of the American Revolution could 
not sell state veto as a non-revolutionary measure even though the heritage of the 
revolutionary fathers was evoked: after all, the tradition was born out of revolution. 
Calhoun's participation in effecting conceptual changes in the original languages did indeed 
amount to a revolution. His efforts to make sense of his innovations, however, found no 
favorable response outside his own section. This failure contributed to the slave South's 
alienation from the Union and its compensating for being rejected through the formation of 
an independent nation state. Growing increasingly aware of their minority position within the 
Union, southern slaveholders were ready to embrace the sectionalized versions of traditional 
political languages offered by Calhoun. In doing so, however, they also alienated themselves 
from the political majority within the Union, drawing sectional boundaries that became 
irredeemably divisive, in that way planting the seeds of political distrust and paranoia. 
Calhoun's quarrel with growing antislavery sentiments in the North, as well as his sense 
of the South losing power within the Union, may shed light on a fatal dilemma that he and his 
section had to face: fighting a multi-front battle along class, racial and sectional lines. Blurring 
the class line inside the South proved successful on the rhetorical level, with the help of re-
publican ideology: Southern yeomen were ready to follow their social betters (that is, slave-
holding planters) in defending republican values in the face of attack by a Northern majority 
that they increasingly associated with corrupting power. However, sectional divisions could 
not be tackled due to the coupling of the race and territorial issues. The 184-0s and 1850s 
showed the fatality of this mixture. When the admission of new states into the Union provo-
ked debate over the westward expansion of slavery, the national party structure was under-
going a sectional transformation that amplified cultural divisions. Southerners, who believed 
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slavery to be an integral part of their republican and liberal world showed no willingness to 
renounce their intention to spread it in new territories—let alone their right to slave pro-
perty. They accepted racial division within their region between whites and blacks, because 
it reinforced white solidarity overarching class divisions. Yet, they did that at a price of 
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